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I 
Introduction 
General Theme of Research 
"Bulek aie dek pambulueh - bulek kato dek mupakat 
Aie batitisan batuang - bana batatasan urang" 
water is shaped in the bamboo pipe -
decisions are shaped through consensus 
water flows through bamboo. 
Truth flows through man.1 
(Nasroen 1957: 52) 
"Kamanakan barajo ka mamak 
mamak barajo ka panghulu 
panghulu barajo ka mupakat 
mupakat barajo kapado alua 
alúa barajo kapado mungkinddan patuik 
patuik dan mungkin barajo kapado bana 
bana ltulah nan manjadi rajo." 
the kemanakan are subject to the mamak 
the mamak is subject to the panghulu 
the panghulu is subject to mupakat 
mupakat is subject to the power of reasoning 
the power of reasoning is subject to what is 
appropriate and possible 
what is appropriate and possible is subject to truth 
it is truth which becomes king. 
(R.M. Datuk Rajo Panghulu 1971: 80) 
"Bajanjang naiek - batanggo turun" 
one has to go up the stairs - one has to go 
down the ladder. 
The main principles of Minangkabau decision-making, in West Sumatra, 
Indonesia both in disputes and in trouble free situations, are contained 
in these three proverbs. The first one refers to the requirement that de-
cisions should be made in a process of deliberations leading to consen-
sus. Oily when 'one word', sakato, or consensus, mupakat is reached by 
all those involved in the problems to be solved, is there a true deci-
sion. The Indonesian equivalent for this expression, 'musyawarah untuk 
mufakat' is considered to be the basis for Indonesia's particular form 
of democracy (see Koesnoe 1969; Steenhoven 1973, 1974; Slaats and Portier 
1981). 
Minangkabau society is relatively egalitarian, but that does not imply 
that there are no persons with authority, or that there are no great dif-
ferences in power. The structure of authority is expressed in the second 
proverb cited above. The society is primarily structured on the basis of 
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matrilineal descent. The members of a matrilineal descent group are sub-
ject to the authority of the eldest man, mamak (mother's brother), who, 
in turn, is subject to the lineage head, panghulu. But the panghulu can-
not do as he wishes, because he himself is subject to consensus within 
his lineage or among the members of the Adat Council. Consensus can only 
be obtained when people conform to certain abstract values, such as rea-
sonableness, appropriateness, to what is possible, and ultimately to 
truth. Thus the authority of the mamak and panghulu is not at all abso-
lute, but confined to the exercise of leadership under specific condi-
tions. Persons of authority are, more than anything else, representatives 
of the group towards the outer world, and organizers of the deliberations 
which should lead to consensus. 
The third proverb provides the principles which determine the level at 
which a decision has to be made. It states that one should try to make a 
decision at the lowest possible level. The process should start at the 
bottom of the stairway. Only if the attempt to reach an agreement has 
failed, may the problem be taken up a step to the next level, where a new 
attempt is made. Higher levels of decision-making always mean that a more 
inclusive group of persons becomes involved. Therefore no step may be 
skipped, lest the problem reaches too quickly a level at which the whole 
community must take part in the deliberations. Once a decision has been 
reached a certain level, it has to be passed 'down the ladder' to the 
original parties concerned, who must finally agree with the solution of-
fered. Otherwise there is no valid decision. The Minangkabau value these 
principles highly, and consider them as the expression of a democracy far 
superior to our western majority democracy (cf. Nasroen 1957). They are 
extremely sensitive to decisions imposed upon them and consider such de-
cisions an affront to their person, as well as to adat, i.e. Minangkabau 
culture, customs and laws (cf. Koesnoe 1971: 3; Van Dijk 1971: 5 f; Van 
Vollenhoven 1918: 7; R.M. Datuk Rajo Panghulu 1971: 86 f). Yet this does 
not mean that they exhibit an outspoken individualism. On the contrary, 
the Minangkabau are very much aware that they are part of a social net-
work in which they have responsibilities as well as rights. Being part of 
a qroup, however, does not mean that others can make decisions for them. 
Everyone must have a say and everyone must ultimately concur. 
The adat sayings mentioned above reflect a delicate system of checks 
and balances in this rather egalitarian society. They form the core of an 
ideal system of decision-making, but whether it is an adequate descrip-
tion of actual decision-making processes in the past when adat was the 
only normative system in Minangkabau is very doubtful, since ideals rare-
ly coincide with actual behaviour. It is even less probable for the per-
iod during which Minangkabau villages lived under a pluralistic normative 
order, first with the Islamization which started in the 16th century (cf. 
Dobbin 1975) and then through their incorporation into the colonial state 
of the Dutch East Indies in the early 19th century. The Minangkabau were 
among the earliest Islamized ethnic groups of Indonesia (cf. Taufik 
Abdullah 1966: 11 f; Dobbin 1975: 5, 1977; Kato 1982: 33, 68) and Islamic 
law has had its impact on adat. In part this happened through the incor-
poration of Islamic legal concepts, such as hibah, donations, wasiyya, 
wasiyat, testament, wakf or wakaf, pious endowments, often assuming a 
new meaning adjusted to adat (cf. Juynboll 1903; F. von Benda-Beckmann 
1979: 197 ff). Adat has been further influenced by Islam in that Islamic 
offices have been incorporated into the adat socio-political system.2 
Finally parts of Islamic law have replaced or have been added to 
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adat, such as the marriage and divorce law, until this was in turn re-
placed by the Marriage Law of 1974, introduced after I had left the field 
(cf. Prins 1977). Since 1957 every district has a religious court which 
may decide in cases of inheritance, divorce and marriage (cf. Damián and 
Hornick 1972: 517, Tanner 1971: 162 ff; F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 
128). 
The pluralistic constellation became even more complex when the Dutch 
returned to the West Coast of Sumatra in 1819 and established a colonial 
administration and introduced colonial law. Numerous laws and administra-
tive regulations have set parts of adat law aside or have been introduced 
in addition to adat law (cf. Gautama and Hornick 1972: 75 ff, 83). The 
colonial administration, over time, introduced a judicial organization 
modelled on the Dutch system. Officially it served as an alternative to 
village justice until 1874 and after 1935 and as a replacement for it be-
tween 1874 and 1935. The pluralistic situation seems to be characterized 
by several contradictory principles: Islamic law with its strong emphasis 
on individual rights and the privileged position of men over women seems 
to stand in contradiction to adat, which is characterized by the prin-
ciple of matrilineal descent, the strong economic position of women and 
group ties. Also, the law of the state with its strong emphasis on indi-
vidual rights and hierarchical and authoritarian processes of decision 
making seems opposed to the emphasis on group ties and the egalitarian 
social organization embodied in adat. 
The research, of which this collection of papers is only one result, was 
conducted by my husband Franz von Benda-Beckmann and myself. Our aim was 
to find out how people cope in daily life with a constellation of law 
which seems to contain so many contradictions. We did not wish to follow 
the then current method in legal anthropology of concentrating entirely 
on disputes. We did not share the underlying assumption that law can be 
known only from decisions in disputes, based on the idea that only rules 
which are sanctioned can be properly labelled as legal rules (cf. Hoebel 
1954? Chapter 5, p. 103 ff). Our reading of the literature on Indonesian 
folk law had convinced us that law is not only effective in disputes but 
also in trouble free social life. Dispute management is an important part 
of legal life, but not fundamentally more important than, for example, 
the law pertaining to property or labour relations, or decision-making 
processes in trouble free situations (cf. F. and К. von Benda-Beckmann, 
1975). It was altogether impossible to cover the whole spectrum of law 
and therefore a few themes were selected which in our opinion are of fun­
damental importance in any society: property relations and inheritance, 
which became the main topic of research of my husband; dispute management 
on which I concentrated; and finally the socio-political aspects of vil­
lage (nagari) organization and processes of decision-making, for it was 
clear that the first two themes could not be studied without a thourough 
knowledge of the latter. Before outlining the questions with which I went 
to the field, a brief sketch of the historical development of the dispute 
managing institutions will first be given. 
The History of the State Courts and of Village Justice 
When the Dutch entered the highlands of West Sumatra in 1819 to stop the 
Padri's from taking over Minangkabau, they gradually set up a colonial 
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administration, long before the Padri War had come to an end in 1Θ37. By 
1Θ25 they had established the first court in Fort van der Capellen, now 
Batusangkar, the main stronghold at that time (cf. Westenenk 1913b: 680 
ff). By Missieve (official letter) of 9-1-1833 the colonial administra­
tion decreed that each of the major centres of Minangkabau was to have a 
Landraad (local court), which should apply the 'law in accordance with 
the existing customs of each district'. Disputes between 'natives' had to 
be decided by the nagari-government first. For these disputes the land­
raad was to act as a court of appeal. The principles of colonial admini­
stration in Minangkabau were laid down in the so-called 'Plakaat Pan-
jang', the long declaration, decreed by the governor of the West Coast on 
25-10-1833. It stated that: 
"The Government shall refrain from all interference with the domes­
tic affairs of the natives, and all problems concerning debts, 
torts, marriage, divorce and inheritance must be decided by the 
adat functionaries according to adat" (cf. Kroesen 187 3: 95 ff, 
Kielstra 1889: 332; Westenenk 1918b: 688). 
Throughout the years, 1837 to 187 5, there was a considerable amount of 
disagreement within the administration as to how much or how little it 
should interfere (cf. Kielstra 1887a, 1888, 1889, 1892; Westenenk 1918b). 
In fact it did, from the beginning, interfere extensively in domestic 
affairs by levying market taxes (cf. Kielstra 1887b: 125), but even more 
so by introducing, in 1847, a system of forced cultivation of cash crops 
known as 'Cultuur-stelsel' (see Kahn 1976: 81). The implementation and 
enforcement of this system was the responsibility of the Tuangku Laras, 
the newly installed Minangkabau village federation heads and the panghulu 
rodi, the officially recognized lineage heads. 
As a consequence of their intention to interfere as little as possible in 
the domestic affairs of the Indonesian population, the colonial adminis­
tration introduced in 1847, with the enactment of the Act on the Algemene 
Bepalingen van Wetgeving (general principles of legislation), Staatsblad 
1847-23 (governmental gazette of the Netherlands Indies, shortened S.) 
two categories of citizens, natives and Europeans. In 1854, with the en­
actment of the Regeeringsreglement, S. 1855-2 (regulations of the colo­
nial administration, shortened RR) a third category, foreign Asians, was 
introduced. The 'natives' were according to par. 75 RR and from 1925 on, 
according to par. 131 (6) of the Indische Staatsregeling, S. 1925-447 
(constitution of the Netherlands Indies), subject to their unwritten adat 
substantive law. Only when adat law was offensive to western - Dutch -
principles of equity and justice, or when statutes explicity set aside 
adat law, was adat law not applicable. This principle is still in force 
(cf. Gautama and Hornick 197 2: 10; Hooker 197 5: 278). 
The separation between the different categories of citizens was also 
reflected in the dual court system, one for the natives and one for the 
others, set up throughout Indonesia at different times. In West Sumatra 
this started in 1837, the year in which the Padri War came to an end, and 
was fully developed with the introduction of the Reglement op het Rechts­
wezen van Sumatra's Westkust of 1874, S. 1874-94b (regulation concerning 
the judicial organization on Sumatra's Westcoast, shortened RSW, cf. 
Kielstra 1887b; Couperus 1882).2 The lowest colonial court for the Minang­
kabau became the Districtsgerecht or Rapat Tuangku Laras, staffed with a 
Tuangku Laras as a president, and several panghulu as assessors. Appeal 
was open to the Inlandse Rechtbank, with a Dutch civil servant as presi-
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dent and two or more Tuangku Laras as assessors. 
Until 1874 the courts, established by the colonial administration for 
the native population, were allowed to work according to adat procedures. 
This changed radically with the introduction of the RSW, written by Der 
Kinderen, a fervent advocate of western law (cf. Der Kinderen 1875). From 
then on all colonial courts had to work according to statutory proce-
dures, based on Dutch law. Furthermore, village justice was officially 
abandoned. Moreover, all citizens of Minangkabau had become subject to 
the Penal Code of the Netherlands Indies, S. 1871-85. 
From 1874 onwards state courts were only permitted to apply adat sub-
stantive law in civil disputes. This did not change with the introduction 
of the Rechtsreglement voor de Buitengewesten, S. 1927-227 (regulation 
concerning the judicial organization in the Outer Territories, shortened 
Rbg). The Districtgerechten were substituted by The Districtsraden with 
the district head as president, and at least two assessors in the smaller 
towns, and the Landraden with a professional judge as president in the 
major towns.3 
Although village justice was formally abolished in 1874, Guyt (1934: 
133 f) reported that the judges of the courts always asked what the pang-
hulu had decided, and never decided intra-lineage disputes unless there 
had been a decision of the Kerapatan Adat Nagari, the Adat Council (cf. 
Indisch Tijdschrift voor het Recht 133: 264; 135: 299; 138: 471). In 1935 
village justice was rehabilitated. By the Inlandse Gemeenteordonnantie 
Buitengewesten (ordinance on the native village organization in the Outer 
Territories) of 9-3-1935, S. 1935-102, the Rbg. was amended with several 
paragraphs, and the Reglement op de Rechterlijke Organisatie en het Be-
leid der Justitie of 1847, S. 1847-23 and 1848-57 (regulation concerning 
the judicial organization and administration of justice) with par. 3a. 
Both declared that: 
"For legal actions in which the village judges have passed a deci-
sion the Landraad has to take cognizance of that decision and, in 
so far as possible, of the grounds on which the decision was based" 
(cf. Indisch Tijdschrift voor het Recht 142: 109 ff). 
The institutions of village justice could make village regulations and 
impose a maximum of three days detention or fines up to ten guilders. If 
there was an adat court this was allowed to punish according to adat (see 
Sihombing and Sjamsulbahri 1975; Kemal 1964). At present, village insti-
tutions have no official sanctioning competence. They have the status of 
mediating body (hakim perdamaian), a status , however, which does not 
conform with their status according to adat. 
The Japanese abolished the distinction between Europeans and Indone-
sians in West Sumatra in 1944 and established the Koto Hoin as the first 
instance court, staffed with Indonesian judges, and the Tino Hoin as the 
court of appeal with a Japanese judge (cf. De Weerd 1946). As far as I am 
aware, procedural law remained the same as under the Dutch. 
After Independence the status of the various Laws, Acts and Regula-
tions was quite confusing (cf. Damián and Hornick 1972: 510 ff). The ju-
dicial organization developed as follows. The Constitution of 1945 pro-
vided for a Supreme Court and other courts to be installed by law. An 
emergency law was enacted in 1951, Law No. 1, Lembaga Negara (government 
gazette, shortened LN) 1951-9, replaced by Law No. 13 of 1965, LN 1965-70 
and changed again by Law No. 14 of 1970, LN 1970-74. According to these 
laws the ordinary judicial organization consists of a district court 
(pengadilan negen), a high court (pengadilan tinggi) and the Supreme 
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Court (Mahkaraah Agung). There has been some confusion about the appli-
caDle procedures. The emergency law of 1951 declared the Herzien In-
landsch Reglement of 1941, S.1941-44 (revised law concerning court pro­
cedures) and the Ebg. of 1927, to apply in civil cases and to be 'guide­
lines' (pedoman) for criminal cases. The religious courts (pengadilan 
agama), introduced by Government Regulation No. 45 of 1957, LN 1957-99 
work according to their own procedures. 
Research questions 
These documents, collected from libraries and archieves in the Nether­
lands, provided a background knowledge of the formal legal skeleton of 
state courts and village justice, but there was hardly any information 
about the way it worked in practice. World War II and the period of tran­
sition to Independence had virtually put a stop to all research in Mi-
nangkabau. Nancy Tanner's research in 1963-1966 was the first field work 
since the 1940's. She had published two lengthy articles on disputing in 
Minangkabau (1969, 1970), but her dissertation, submitted in 1971, only 
became available to us in early 1974, shortly before we left Switzerland, 
where we lived at that time, for the Netherlands. 
During our preparatory visit to Minangkabau in September 1973 we had 
been told that village justice did exist, but we were not able to obtain 
an impression of how it worked. The first aim to be undertaken by me, 
therefore, was to find out which institutions made up village justice, 
and to describe its institutional organization and the way it operated. I 
was also interested in finding out whether procedures of decision-making 
by administrative agencies, and more generally whether the social and po­
litical changes which had taken place before and after Independence, had 
had any impact on village justice. On the other hand I wanted to know how 
state courts operated in practice. They were organized after the Dutch 
model and their procedures were basically Dutch procedural law. What kind 
of substantive law they applied, and to what kind of disputes, I did not 
know. I knew that in principle statutory law, adat law and Islamic law 
were applicable, but how this was implemented was not known. I wanted to 
find out what the issues were, and the type of disputes dealt with by the 
state courts, and see whether these had changed since Tanners work in the 
mid sixties (cf. Tanner 1971). Furthermore I wanted to know what happened 
to those decisions made by both state courts and village institutions, a 
neglected part of the process of dispute management (cf. J.F. Holleman, 
1973). I was further interested in the question as to whether, in prac­
tice, any influence of adat procedures could be discovered in the way 
state courts operated. Moreover I wanted to know what the relationship 
between village justice and state courts was; whether these institutions 
were used as alternatives by disputants, and how the members of those in­
stitutions saw their mutual relationship. I was also intrigued by the 
question as to whether adat law, applied in different procedures, would 
lead to different decisions. I hoped to be able to make a comparison be­
tween state courts and village justice in disputes which had been treated 
under adat law, which would provide me with some insight into the rela­
tionship between procedural and substantive law. This was the main reason 
why I concentrated my research on civil disputes as defined by the state 
courts. I realized that 'civil' was not an adat category, and that I 
would not be able to distinguish such disputes sharply from 'criminal' 
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cases. In practice I studied only the disputes dealt with by the civil 
chamber of the state courts. In the village I concentrated on disputes 
dealt with by village institutions. Since the police were always involved 
in the more serious crimes and took the initiative to bring these crimes 
to the attention of the prosecutor, this proved to be a workable formula. 
As is clear from the case material presented in the following chapters, 
the police were occasionally involved in the disputes I studied, but 
never took over the initiative. 
With these questions I started my field work. Through a study of the 
literature in the Netherlands I was able to advance the study to some ex­
tent. However, it was only in the field that I could substantially refine 
and develop the questions, and of course some of the problems addressed 
in my publications only occurred to me after I had returned from Minang-
kabau. 
Fteldwork 
When I started my field research I knew little more than what I have sum­
marized above. I knew that the state courts had to apply statutory proce­
dural law, but were permitted to apply adat substantive law in civil dis­
putes. My first task was to find out in what circumstances they actually 
did apply adat law. The overview of the issues, given by Tanner (1969, 
1970, 1971), of both criminal and civil disputes dealt with by the state 
courts did not systematically indicate which type of law was applied. 
Based on the available literature (cf. Nairn 1968 (e.d.). Prins 1953; 
Tanner 1971) we expected there to be a great number of disputes about the 
inheritance of a man's personally acquired property, pancaharian, between 
his children and kamanakan, matrilineal relatives. This had been a great 
political issue in the 1960's (cf. К. von Benda-Beckmann 1975? F. von 
Benda-Beckmann 1979: 355 ff). In the first interviews with judges and 
adat experts we were always assured that adat law applied to the inherit­
ance of lineage property, pusako, whereas Islamic law was applicable for 
pancaharian. As it turned out there were hardly any disputes around the 
applicable norms at all. Moreover, in later discussions the same persons 
readily admitted that the rule that children inherit pancaharian from 
their father was now part of adat law and as such generally accepted, lb 
be sure, there were many disputes between the children and the kemanakan 
of a deceased man. However, these always concerned a disagreement about 
the status of the property, not about the norms. Islamic law, we dis­
covered, was not applied in one single case by the state court, nor were 
inheritance disputes dealt with in religious courts. The first informa­
tion they gave therefore was merely a statement referring to the politi­
cal issues of the 1960's, but not a description of what happened in the 
state courts. 
I had also speculated on the possibility of the state courts having 
adopted adat ways of decision-making. I had expected that the courts 
would make extensive use of the possibility of bringing the parties to 
settlements, as provided for in par. 154 Rbg. However, it appeared that 
settlements are not often reached, and if they are, this mostly happens 
in disputes in which banks want to recover outstanding debts. The bank 
disputes belong to the 14% of civil disputes in which state law and not 
adat law is applied (cf. К. von Benda-Beckmann 1980). In the 86% of civil 
disputes in which adat law is applied settlements are only rarely reach-
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ed, least of all in land disputes (cf. table on p. 43). Moreover, the ap­
peal rate of more than 50% is very high in Minangkabau, but the litiga­
tion rate is relatively low (cf. F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 308; 1981). 
Thus the Minangkabau do not readily go to the state courts, but if they 
do, they want to elicit a decision and are prepared to go all the way to 
the Supreme Court. As I shall demonstrate in Chapter 5, this does not 
mean that the decisions are simply executed, on the contrary. Once made 
they are taken up in adat procedures in the village from which they ori­
ginated. 
During the initial period of my fieldwork I learned that village jus­
tice was regulated by a number of provincial regulations. Since Indepen­
dence both the village administration and the village mediating body had 
undergone several changes (cf. Sihombmg and Sjamsulbahri 1975; Kemal 
1964; Sjofjan Thalib 1974). The provincial regulations in force during 
our fieldwork were a provincial regulation (surat keputusan) of the gov­
ernor of West Sumatra SK 015/GSB/1968, stating that each village was to 
have a mayor. Wall Nagari, a legislative body, Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat 
Nagari, and a village council, Kerapatan Nagari. The last one was insti­
tuted in 1970, by provincial regulation 149/GSB/1970, stating that the 
Village Council was to consist of three sections, an adat section, a re­
ligious section and a general section. The members of the adat section 
had to be members of the traditional adat council, Kerapatan Adat Nagari. 
Thus, although there was no direct recognition of the Adat Council as a 
mediating body, its existence was indirectly recognized by this regula­
tion. The members of the religious section had to be either recognized 
experts, alim ulama, or members of the council of religious experts, 
Majelis Ulama Nagari. 
Little had been published on the actual practice of village justice. 
The work of Amilijoes Sa'adanoer (1973) and Sjofjan Thalib (1974) only 
described in very general terms the conflicts and competition between the 
adat and administrative type of village justice, but they indicated that 
both kinds of institutions dealt with disputes. Much of our time was de­
voted to a study of the ways in which both recognized and unrecognized 
institutions of village justice operated in practice, and of how they had 
changed under the influence of social and political changes and whether 
they had developed different procedures. Our research reveals that the 
term adat judge, as introduced by the Law of 1935, S. 1935-102, suggest­
ing a simple institutional organization of village justice, does not cor­
respond at all with the very complex structure of decision-making insti­
tutions that exist in Minangkabau. Chapter 3 gives an account of the 
various institutions dealing with disputes in one Minangkabau village. 
Although the social organization of the village in which we conducted our 
research is particularly complex, nowhere in Minangkabau is village jus­
tice as simple as the Law of 193 5 suggests. 
Our review of the court registers confirmed that Minangkabau would pro­
vide the possibility of studying the relationship between procedures and 
substantive law, for it appeared that the state courts applied adat law 
in the majority of civil disputes and that village justice still played 
an active role in dispute management. In order to be able to make a com­
parison of the procedures I needed to study disputes which had gone 
through institutions of village justice as well as through state courts. 
The selection of a village, then, depended in the first place on whether 
a sufficient number of disputes were brought to the state court. Further-
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more the village had to be close enough to one of the state courts to pay 
it frequent visits, whilst living in a village. We started our field re-
search in Bu4ittmggi, the largest town in central Minangkabau. We used 
this period to improve our knowledge of the Indonesian language and to 
start learning the Mmangkabau language. We also started work in the 
state courts of Bukittinggi, Batusangkar and Payakumbuh, going through 
the registers which covered the years 1968-1974. These registers con-
tained information about the disputants, about the issues under dispute, 
about representation in court, about seizure of goods by the court, about 
settlements, withdrawals and final decisions, dates of the sessions and -
where available - information about appeal and revision (cf. p. 31). We 
read about one quarter of the nearly 500 decisions and studied as many 
files as possible. Since our relationship with the court in Bukittinggi 
was very good and the files were most accurate and easily accessible we 
chose a village in the district of Agam for which that court had juris-
diction. We visited a number of subdistrict heads in order to get some 
notion of their role in dispute management and to obtain support for se-
lecting a village. 
Vie chose a village, which I shall call Bukit Hijau, because from there 
particularly many disputes came to the state court: thirteen between 1968 
and 1974. Fortunately the subdistrict head was very co-operative and had 
an open mind concerning our research. Through his energetic mediation we 
found a house to live in. It had been built for the youngest sister of 
the wife of the subdistrict information officer, who was also head of the 
Adat Council in Bukit Hijau and who became a good friend and neighbour in 
the course of our research. During the last ten months of our research we 
lived in Bukit Hijau. From there I visited the state court in Bukittinggi 
two or three times a week over a period of 6 months and followed several 
disputes, attending all sessions held in that period. I checked the min-
utes of the sessions made by the scribes and found that they were in gen-
eral very accurate. This made me more confident in also using the minutes 
of sessions not attended by me. I used these for information about testi-
monies of witnesses and about the kinds of questions judges asked parties 
and witnesses. I also continued to study files and had many conversations 
and more formal interviews with judges, clerks and scribes. Because of 
the greater distance to Payakumbuh and Batusangkar I did not attend court 
sessions there, but confined my research to the study of registers, deci-
sions, files and discussions with the staff. My main research was done in 
Bukittinggi and Bukit Hijau. 
One omission should be mentioned here. I paid far too little attention 
to court representatives. Although there is no requirement that parties 
be represented in court (par. 147 Hbg.), about 10% do consult a profes-
sional representative. There are only a few official advocates, but there 
are a great number of professional representatives, prokrol or prokrol 
bambù, some with a law degree and others with a training on the job. Most 
of the staff members of the law faculty of Ándalas University and of the 
Islamic lav faculties are part-time representatives. Also many villagers 
ask a co-villager with some formal education or with experience of admin-
istrative institutions to represent them. I regret now that I did not 
interview them systematically, since they seem to be important dispute 
brokers. 
In our discussions with members of the law faculty of Ándalas Univer-
sity in Padang it was suggested that we should study three different vil-
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lages. Our counterpart from the law faculty, Mr. Narullah S.H. would do 
one village study and we would do the other two. One of our studies would 
be conducted in the district of Agam, identified with the mythological 
founder of Minangkabau, Datuk Perpatiah Nan Sabatang, who was said to 
have developed a rather egalitarian form of village government. The other 
would be carried out in the district of Tanah Datar with a more hier­
archical traditional village government, associated with the other mytho­
logical founder, Datuk Katumanggungan (cf. Kroeskamp 1931: 46; De 
Josselin de Jong 1951; De Rooi] 1890; Leyds 1920). We expected that the 
difference in political organization of these two adat types would have 
important implications for village justice. However, after a few weeks in 
Bukit Hijau we dropped the idea, realizing that we would need all our 
time to do a proper study of Bukit Hijau. The socio-political structure 
was far more complex than we had expected. In fact, a similar village 
structure - and this one must have existed for at least a century - had 
not been described for Minangkabau. And although Bukit Hi]au had a 
special organization, it was by no means the only village with such a 
sociopolitical organization (cf. F. and К. von Benda-Beckmann 1978; Г. 
von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 57 ff). This meant that a study of village jus­
tice was more complex than we had foreseen. We also discovered that there 
were not many villages which had a pure organization of one of the two 
adat types. Mast villages had features of both kinds of organization and 
Bukit Hijau was one of these mixed types. Mr. Narullah also did field 
work in a village in the district of Agam, but so far his research find­
ings have not been published. 
Our move into the village was delayed by several weeks, as a result of a 
dispute which concerned the house we had rented. I recount the dispute 
here, because it shows many of the problems with which village justice is 
confronted. We had planned to move to Bukit Hijau directly after the 
fasting month had ended, which in 1974 was in early October. The house we 
wanted to rent was built on a former rice field and had no direct connec­
tion with the main village road. The house was situated in the valley, an 
area which must have been brought into cultivation at the beginning of 
this century, for old people still remembered it as bush. Because water 
was scarce so low down in the valley the land had been divided into long 
strips the width of one or two rice fields, running downhill. Each strip, 
tunan, had been allotted to a different lineage or sublineage. They ran 
parallel to the village road, and between the road and the tunan on 
which our house was built, were two other tunan. Ever since the rice 
field had been converted into a house site there had existed a dispute 
between our landlady, the wife of the intelligence officer and head of 
the Adat Council, and almost all of the rest of her lineage, as well as 
the lineages of the tunan between the house and the road. Our landlady 
had requested that a footpath be made directly to the road. She had de­
manded it from the women of the other turian-owning lineages, but the 
latter had refused to grant a footpath. They had said that it could only 
be considered if her mamak, in casu her own brother, who happened to be 
the eldest man in the lineage-segment, approached their mamak and submit­
ted a formal request. Such a request would certainly not have been refus­
ed, because the right to have a footpath to the main road existed. How­
ever, our landlady was stubborn and refused to follow the formal proce­
dure. As a result she did not get her footpath and neither did we. 
Through the mediation of the subdistrict officer we were allowed to use 
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the footpath of our nextdoor neighbour Itam, a younger cousin of our 
landlady's mother. Itam repeated several times that she only allowed us 
to use her path because the subdistrict officer had asked her to help us 
and not because her niece had asked her to do so, for with her she lived 
in permanent conflict. 
This conflict was of course a nuisance, for it delayed our move into 
the village for several weeks. However, I do not ]ust recount it here as 
a nice anecdote of the difficulties anthropologists have to go through in 
the field. The dispute was in many ways an eye-opener for us. For the 
first time we were directly confronted with a feature so characteristic 
of Minangkabau adat, which makes no distinction between substantive rules 
and procedures. We knew this, but had not quite realized what it meant. 
If one does not go through the proper procedures a right does not exist. 
So, even though the owners of the tunan between our house and the road 
said they felt very much ashamed that we had no path, we did not get it. 
That was the way adat was: no proper procedure, no right. Through this, 
we began to understand what is meant that adat does not distinguish 
sharply between substantive rules and procedures. Every substantive rule 
has its procedural aspects. This procedural aspect is not something which 
is only needed to enforce one's right in case of dispute. It is an essen-
tial element of the right itself. During our fieldwork we came across nu-
merous examples of this feature and came to understand that much of pre-
ventive law care6, of dispute prevention, can only be understood if one 
realizes that rights and obligations do not exist independently of the 
processual element. Furthermore, it made us aware that, because of this, 
adat law as it was applied in the state courts could not be the same as 
adat law applied in the village context. State courts tend to distinguish 
sharply between substantive rules and procedures and tend to disregard 
the procedural aspects of adat rules. Korn (1941) already commented 
briefly upon this difference, but its significance had not until this 
time become clear to us. The insight that customary law as applied by the 
state courts is not the same as folk law applied in villages is not new 
(cf. Woodman 1984 with references), but as far as I am aware, there has 
been nothing published on the procedural aspects of this discrepancy. 
This meant, however, that a comparison between state courts and village 
justice not only involved a comparison between two kinds of procedures, 
but also between two sets of substantive law, which are sometimes decep-
tively similar. 
In Bukit Hijau I attended all sessions of the Mat Council held in 
that period and most of the sessions of the Village Council, as well as 
various occasions at which lower institutions attempted to settle a dis-
pute. The greatest difficulty was not that I was not always warned when a 
session was to be held. Far more problematic was the fact that only a re-
latively small part of the deliberations took place in formal sessions. 
Dispute management is a highly political activity in Minangkabau villages 
and the game is played as a political one, as will be clear from the 
cases presented in the next chapters. 
The dispute with which we entered Bukit Hijau had already made us 
aware of how difficult it is to follow the ideal procedure of decision-
making. It was the first of a long list of examples in which the dispu-
tants did not go up the stairway step by step and in which no consensus 
was reached. The case described in Chapter 3 is another example, but we 
have come across many more. The stairways which should lead to consensus 
are very shaky indeed. The lowest steps are perhaps the most stable, for 
12 Vxltaqe Juetbce and State Courts 
consensus is reached more often within the sublineage than in a dispute 
which has climbed up to the higher echelons of village justice, especial-
ly when steps have been skipped. 
I have come to realize that the term musyawarah means much more than 
the formal deliberations during official sessions (cf. Kòesnoe 1969). The 
numerous discussions in small groups of a few persons which take place 
outside the formal sessions are an integral part of the process which 
must ultimately lead to sakato, to consensus. Such private discussions in 
which loyalties are probed and standpoints tested are surrounded by quite 
a lot of secrecy. They are often held during the evening when one can 
slip to the house of someone else without being noticed. "The black cock 
flies at night", "ayam hitam terbang malam", the Minangkabau say. The 
black cock is the lineage head, who is expected to talk about adat during 
the night only. Quite often people came to our house to have a quiet 
talk, not so much because they wanted us to be present, although they did 
not seem to mind that, but because they felt they would not be spied upon 
so easily. And spies are actually sent out to eavesdrop, as we found out 
when we visited a lineage head one evening. During our vjsit a young man 
came back from a mission and was rather brusquely reprimanded because he 
had not been able to hear what had been discussed by the enemies of this 
lineage head. All such discussions serve to prepare for the normal ses-
sions, which usually only take place when there is a reasonable chance 
that consensus will be reached. Formal sessions are also held, however, 
when a majority wants to demonstrate that it can enforce a decision on 
recalcitrant persons who refuse to accept its proposals. 
It may have become clear that the researcher has to develop detective 
talents to acquire as much information as possible, without hoping to be 
able to hear all (cf. F. and К. von Benda-Beckmann 1981b) . Fortunately, 
Minangkabau are usually quite willing to talk about such discussions af­
terwards and by checking the information against other sources it is 
usually possible to form a reasonably accurate picture of what has hap­
pened. Moreover, the alliances and standpoints usually become quite clear 
during the formal sessions. 
The decision to choose a village from which a relatively high number of 
disputes were brought to the state court proved to be valuable. It al­
lowed me to get a detailed knowledge of the setting of the disputes, 
their history and their continuation after the state court had made its 
decision. The files also provided me with much information which served 
as a basis for discussions with villagers. It happened a number of tunes 
that people who had been involved in a state court procedure, as party or 
as witness or expert, only started to give us their true version once 
they realized that we already knew quite a bit about the dispute. By true 
version I do not mean the objective truth, but their subjective views on 
the dispute, whereas before they had tried to sell us a made up story. 
One great advantage of these discussions was that I learned to understand 
the problems from the perspective of the disputants and not only from the 
viewpoint of judges and other court personnel. This proved also to be 
fruitful because it made me alert to some of the difficulties which al­
ways recurred in the state courts. These difficulties resulted from mis­
understandings as well as from differences in the interpretation of adat 
law. Chapters 4 and 5 deal with some of these difficulties. 
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Presentation 
Most of the research in court and a great part of the data collected on 
village justice was undertaken by myself. However, I have also made use 
of data collected by my husband, as he has done with mine. Someone who 
studies inheritance and property relations has to pay attention to both 
trouble cases and troubleless cases (cf. J.F. Holleman 1973). On the 
other hand dispute management in an agrarian economy with a matrilineal 
social organization necessarily involves disputes about land and inherit-
ance. Moreover, as will become clear from Chapters 3, 4 and 5 a study of 
dispute management cannot be made without a clear understanding of deci-
sion-making processes in troubleless cases. Had we been free to choose 
our own form of publication we would have written a book together which 
would have included the three themes of our research. However, formal 
requirements of Swiss and Dutch universities for acquiring academic de-
grees did not allow for such a publication. We wrote several publications 
together (1977, 1978, 1980, 1981a, 1981b, Chapter 6), but for the rest we 
published separately on our respective themes. In the process of publica-
tion we have followed the westeuropean tradition according to which the 
husband finishes his degree first. This has had certain consequences for 
my own publication. A monograph set up in the customary way with an ex-
tensive ethnographic account of the area of research did not seem to be 
the proper format for my dissertation. Quite a number of general ethno-
graphic accounts have been published recently (cf. Nairn 1974; Tanner 
1969, 1970, 1971; Scholz 1977; Kahn 197 5, 1976, 1980b; Kato 1981; Thomas 
1977; Cordonnier 1974; Evers 1975; Harsja Bachtiar 1967). I decided to 
write a series of papers, each provided with a minimum of ethnography and 
a short description of some aspects of the socio-political organization 
of Bukit Hi]au. The papers are built up around extensive case histories 
and the ethnography serves primarily as a background, necessary to under-
stand the cases and arguments discussed in the papers. As a consequence 
there is a certain amount of overlap between the chapters of the thesis. 
The reader will discover, however, that the ethnographic parts are never 
completely identical and always contain some information particularly 
relevant for the issues discussed in the chapter. The most detailed 
ethnography of adat concepts can be found in Chapter 6. For more exten-
sive descriptions I have always referred to our other publications and to 
the writings of other authors who have done recent field research in 
Minangkabau. 
A presentation of my material in the form of independent papers meant 
that I had to make a choice between discussing a great number of disputes 
briefly or a small number extensively. I decided that the latter was more 
fruitful. Only so could I fully describe and analyse the complexity of 
disputes, especially of land disputes between two or more kin groups, 
which are the typical disputes reaching the state court. Although I have 
followed many disputes in court which originated from villages other than 
Bukit Hijau, the most complete information regarding social setting, his-
tory and aftermath was gathered in Bukit Hijau. Therefore the disputes I 
have selected for publication all stem from Bukit Hi]au, but the reader 
should bear in mind that some of the analyses given are also based on 
other disputes. Some of the disputes described by me have also been de-
scribed by my husband. A comparison will reveal that they differ on some 
points, as a result of the different emphases put upon them. Though a 
certain selection of information is always necessary I took great care 
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not to leave out information which could undermine my arguments. 
One final remark should be made about the ethnographic material pre­
sented in my papers. There is a striking absence of women. I only grad­
ually became aware of this and was surprised and slightly worried at 
first. Women have a very strong economic position because they control to 
a large extent the exploitation rights to lineage land. Also, I had come 
to appreciate their managing capacities, their outspoken views and the 
energetic way in which they defended their position within the household 
and sublineage. How could it be that they played hardly any role in the 
institutions which I had studied, which devoted so much of its time to 
land disputes? I checked my material, but had to conclude that they were 
indeed absent. Two possible explanations can be given. The first is that 
I had overlooked them and had fallen victim to the common male oriented 
anthropological research against which women have recently, and rightly, 
taken action. Although I cannot deny that I may have slightly overempha­
sized the role of men, there is no doubt that in the institutions of dis­
pute management which I have studied women do not play a significant 
role. One of the most important reason for this is discussed in Chaper 3. 
Had I concentrated on the lowest levels of dispute management, the house­
hold and sublineage, women would have played a prominent role and would 
have appeared in my materials (cf. Tanner 1971). However, the choice I 
made before coming to the field, to study the institutionalized treatment 
of disputes in the village and in state courts had men, as a consequence, 
playing a major role in this book, because this is considered to be work 
for men, not for women. The reason for the absence of women is therefore 
more a result of the subject I chose to study than of a blindness to 
their importance. I realize that the picture I present here is only the 
tip of the iceberg of disputes. Some of the other levels of dispute man­
agement have already been covered by the work of Nancy Tanner (1969, 
1970, 1971) and others will probably be discussed in the publications of 
Joanne Prindiville based on her fieldwork undertaken between 1975 and 
1977. Later research must fill in the remaining gaps to provide a more 
complete understanding of the role of women in dispute management. How­
ever, in the limited time and with the limited resources available to me 
it was not possible to extend my analysis further. I feel confident that 
within the limitations set out here, the insights provided concerning the 
relationship between adat procedures and state court procedures are valid 
and have not been provided previously. 
The papers which represent the chapters of this book together provide a 
descriptive analysis of the relationships between procedures and substan­
tive rules in various Minangkabau institutions of dispute management in 
West Sumatra. The first paper. The Use of Polk Law in Minanakahau State 
Courts, attempts to develop a model with which it becomes possibleto 
give a differentiated description of the various ways law, i.e. legal 
concepts, rules, principles, are used throughout a process of dispute 
management within an institution, and during the 'execution' of the in­
stitution's decision. I have argued that many legal anthropologists call­
ed attention to particular kinds of law-use without fully taking into 
account that the way in which law is used varies throughout the process. 
The stage model I have developed here serves to make clear that norms may 
be used in a different manner at each stage. Authors who discuss various 
kinds of norm-use generally emphasize one stage or another of the process 
and tend to treat that stage in isolation or as representative of the 
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whole process. In my opinion a fruitful intra- and cross cultural com­
parison can only be made if each of the stages receives equal attention. 
Although the model does not include the whole history of the dispute be­
fore it enters the institution under study, it could easily be accommo­
dated to do so, and could include all other stages of the dispute as 
well. My focus of attention, however, is directed to the treatment within 
an institution, and to the post-trial stage. In the first paper. The Use 
of Folk Law in МгпапдкаЪаи State Courte, an attempt is made to demon­
strate the usefulness of the model using the example of state court pro­
cedures in West Sumatra. The general ideas outlined there provide a 
framework for the following three papers, which in a way are an elabor­
ation of these stages and a more detailed analysis of the way in which 
norms are used in them. 
The second paper. Forum Shopping and Shoppinq Forums, deals mainly 
with the first stage and with the definition of issues in relation to the 
search for an institution and its willingness to accept the dispute. The 
paper describes how parties in a dispute shop among the various institu­
tions of dispute management available to Minangkabau villagers. It also 
describes how these institutions themselves shop for disputes. This shop­
ping proceeds in the first place in terms of arguments over jurisdiction. 
Depending on which aspect of the dispute is emphasized, different insti­
tutions can assume jurisdiction. Once jurisdiction is established, much 
of what happens and has happened in the dispute is evaluated in terms of 
procedural arguments in the public sessions. I argue that this is a con­
sequence of the socio-political structure of the village and its reflec­
tion in adat norms and principles of decision-making, with a strong em­
phasis on proper procedures and consensus. As long as a consensus does 
not yet seem within reach both adat and administrative functionaries ar­
gue mainly in terms of procedural law. Parties are forced to do the same, 
especially those with an ambiguous role of being both party and institu­
tion of dispute management. Substantive arguments are carefully and often 
obliquely probed in more secluded, private sessions. Only when there is a 
good chance that consensus is within reach are these arguments expressed 
in the formal institutional sessions. However, many disputes remain un­
solved and the dispute described in this paper is a case in point. This 
is mainly a result of the manipulations of the various village function­
aries. There are limits to such manipulations, imposed by the Adat Coun­
cil on the one hand, and the state courts on the other. But in other res­
pects, the state courts reinforce shopping activities and the manipula­
tion with disputes at village level. 
The third paper, Fvidence and Leqal Reasoning in minangkabau, deals 
with the second stage: the construction and evaluation of evidence. It is 
an analysis of the differences in procedure between state courts and vil­
lage justice which account for a difference in evaluating the relevance 
and reliability of evidence. Although one could easily assume - as I did 
in the beginning - that the major differences in treating evidence would 
result from differences in the prescriptive procedural norms (in the Rbg. 
and adat), in practice the important differences lie in the realm in 
which judges have discretion: in the treatment of witnesses, in the 
evaluation of testimonies, and in the evaluation of the relevance of evi­
dence. Since disputes are at least in part defined in terms of legal con­
cepts and norms, the relevance of evidence depends to a certain extent on 
the court's interpretation of these norms. I have mentioned the sharp 
distinction courts make between procedures and substantive norms, as op-
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posed to the adat ideas, which accounts for a discrepancy in the evalu­
ation of evidence. Judges tend to overlook the procedural aspects, to 
which village decision-makers attach much value. Furthermore, the courts' 
approach to adat norms could be characterized as analytic and the use of 
norms as centrifugal, because courts seem to be interested mainly in the 
outer boundaries of the field of social phenomena covered by a norm or 
concept. The villagers' approach is more integrative and could be charac­
terized as centripetal, because villagers constantly refer to the core 
meaning of concepts and norms as laid down in adat sayings and proverbs. 
The courts' evaluation of the reliability of evidence is also quite dif­
ferent from village justice. These differences are not primarily a result 
of prescriptions in the law of civil procedure, but rather of the judges' 
approach in a realm in which they have a relatively high degree of dis­
cretion. Judges have a low opinion of adat functionaries and tend to 
exaggerate the decline in their role in preventive law care. They do not 
therefore value the testimonies of such functionaries much higher than 
that of ordinary witnesses. Moreover, although judges do question adat 
functionaries as experts on local adat, they avariciously guard their 
rights to interpret adat norms and to decide whether to follow the local 
or the general variant of a norm. 
The fourth paper The ЪосіаЛ Svqmfbcance of ЧьпапаМаЬаи 4tabe Court 
Decisione is an analysis of the social significance of state court deci­
sions and deals to some extent with the third but especially with the 
fourth stage. Whereas most anthropologists refer to the final decision as 
the outcome of a dispute, in this paper I try to demonstrate that the ac­
tual outcome can be quite different. Λ decision usually contains a state­
ment of rights, obligations and social relationships, as well as certain 
consequences attached to the first statement. These elements tend to as­
sume an existence largely independent of the courts' influence, once the 
decision has been made. I demonstrate that decisions can have quite a 
different impact than was foreseen by the court and that the court deci­
sions are taken up in the 'semi-autonomous social field' (Moore 197Q) 
from where the dispute originated. A proper analysis of the post-trial 
stage should focus on the social processes in such a social field. In 
Minangkabau, court decisions play a role in the ongoing negotiations of 
kin relations. Their significance depends, to a large extent, on the 
changing political constellations within the village and the lineage, 
which varies through time. As a result, the significance of court deci­
sions also varies over time. For a fruitful analysis of the social sig­
nificance of decisions it is therefore essential to follow dispjtes over 
time, not only in the pre-trial and trial stage, but also in the post-
trial stage. 
The model developed in these papers has certain theoretical conse­
quences, some of which I have elaborated in the third paper and others 
more extensively in the fourth. In this paper I elaborate my contention 
that the case as the proper unit of analysis should not end with the fi­
nal decision, as usually happens, but should include the period after the 
decision is made. The focus of attention is then shifted fron a one-sided 
concern with what the courts do to a concern with what people do with the 
courts. Even though I myself have devoted much time to the courts I have 
constantly kept in mind and asked what this means for the people who use 
the court. Of course, much has been written about the various reasons why 
people utilize courts, but this has hardly led, surprisingly enough, to 
any systematic research on what the effects of the courts' decisions is, 
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after the courts have ceased to be involved. 
The model and the analysis of the Minangkabau material also raises the 
question of whether it is useful to look only at disputes and the deci­
sions of institutions if one wants to learn about the law of a society. 
As I mentioned before, my interest in dispute management does not result 
from the idea that one can only know law from decisions in disputes. My 
fieldwork strengthened for me the validity of the proposition that a 
great deal about law can be learned from trouble free cases. The inter­
dependence of dispute management and preventive law care was the most 
striking argument in support of our approach. However, the fact that de­
cisions are very often not implemented also raised the more fundamental 
question of whether under such circumstances it is fruitful to take sanc­
tions as the discriminating feature which makes a rule legal. The empha­
sis on sanctions obscures the fact that most legal rules are far more 
often followed than not, especially in a society with a developed system 
of preventive law care, but probably everywhere else also. It seems to me 
that the preoccupation with deviating behaviour and sanction mechanisms 
is another example of centrifugal thinking. Western legal scholars as 
well as anthropologists are so much concerned with the demarcation pro­
blems, e.g. between legal rules and moral norms, that they tend to over­
look the rest of the field of social phenomena to which rules pertain but 
which cannot be observed if one concentrates on disputes. 
The last implication of my approach forms one part of the last paper. 
Transformation and 'Ъапде in Minangkabau Adat, written jointly by my 
husband and myself. 7 If it is true that, as a result of the different 
procedures and different ways of reasoning between village justice and 
state courts, different sets of law have developed, which are both called 
adat law, these two sets must be kept apart if one wants to study legal 
change over the period of 150 years during which Minangkabau came under 
effective colonial control. And if economic and social change is reflect­
ed at least in part in changes in the law, a study of such economic and 
social change must also pay attention to these differences. In our opin­
ion, the studies of for example Schrieke (1929), Maretin (1960) and re­
cently Kahn (1976, 1980b) have not taken into account this discrepancy. 
When we came to realize that there is indeed a discrepancy between the 
two kinds of adat law, we critically re-examined the literature of 19th 
century Minangkabau. We came to the conclusion that the descriptions of 
change given by Schrieke, Maretin and Kahn had another flaw. They did not 
appear to fully realize that in many descriptions, Dutch legal terms had 
been used which neither expressed nor adequately fitted the Minangkabau 
adat conceptions and institutions, nor allowed easy inferences of actual 
social and economic conditions, although careful reading of the explana­
tions and ethnographic examples often did reveal that the concepts were 
given a specific Minangkabau meaning. As a result of these two distor­
tions the authors have inferred a far stronger lineage homogeneity in the 
19th century than actually existed, at least according to the available 
sources. Oi the other hand they inferred from the Dutch adat law litera­
ture and state court adat law a greater degree of individualism in the 
20th century than exists in Minangkabau villages. Thus, although the 
scope of this last article exceeds the problems dealt with in the previ­
ous papers, I included it in order to show how important a careful com­
parison between state court and village justice is. 
18 Villaqe Justice and State rourts 
Notes 
1. Geertz (1983: 213) translates the first two lines with 'water circulates in 
bamboo pipes; consensus circulates in accordant discussions'. The term circu-
late does not pay justice to the causal connotation of the word dek, meaning 
with, by means of. Bulek, Ind. bulat, means ball or round. The translation of 
the third and fourth line are his. 
2. David (1978: 445), quoting Milliot, suggests that there is a tendency towards 
1Islamization' of western institutions, but he does not mention the 
possibility of 'customarization' or 'adatization' of Islamic institutions. In 
the case of Minangkabau, we find both, see F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1978; 
Graves 1981: 62; F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 80, 125 ff; see also p. 154 ff. 
It is a general weakness in David's discussion of Asian countries that so 
little is said about the existence of customary law and the role it plays m 
the various legal systems. He briefly mentions that in Indonesia "Romano-
Germanic concepts combine with Muslim law and customary law (adat law) in 
such a way that it is possible to consider the system as mixed" (1979: 73). 
And occasionally customary law is mentioned in other places, but it does not 
nearly receive the attention he gives it when writing about Africa. Other 
writers on comparative law are even less aware of the importance, or even 
existence, of customary law in countries with a predominantly Islamic popu-
lation, with the exception perhaps of Sauveplanne 1975. See K. von Benda-
Beckmann 1979 for a critique on German comparative law. The lack of attention 
to customary law is all the more regrettable, since some of the most import-
ant characteristics of mixed legal systems remain undiscussed as a result. 
3. The Districtsraden were more or less the same as the Districtsgerechten. Only 
in 1914, the Tuangku Laras were replaced by district heads (cf. R.M. Dt. Ra]o 
Panghulu 1971: 39). The Magistraatsgerechten with an assistent controller or 
a Minangkabau civil servant appointed by the resident had jurisdiction over 
small crimes and misdemeanors. For Europeans there were the Residentiege-
rechten and Raden van Justítie. For an overview of the dual court system see 
Couperus 1882; Mieremet 1919; Carpentier Alting 1926; Kleintjes Vol. 2 1929; 
De la Porte 1933; Ter Haar 1948: 1 ff. 
4. It was mainly on Van Vollenhoven's pleading that village justice was reha-
bilitated. Cf. Memorie van Toelichting, published m Indisch Tijdschrift van 
het Recht 1935: 115. 
5. We also looked through the questionnaires of the German West Sumatra Develop-
ment Planning project, which included some questions about disputes. One 
question was "who deals with disputes: the mayor, the secretary, the lineage 
elders, the subdistrict head or the court?". The answers proved to be com-
pletely worthless, because whether the mayor, the secretary or the subdis-
trict head included in the answer, depended on who were present when the 
question was asked. Moreover, in a number of villages the court alledgedly 
was never used, although we knew from the court registers that at the time 
these answers were given a number of disputes from those villages were pend-
ing in court. What the questionnaires indicated was no more than what the 
people who happened to be asked considered a proper answer, for the project 
and for the persons present. 
6. Based on observations of F.D. Holleman concerning the function of the village 
head as a witness in land transactions in Toeloengagoeng (1920: 393 ff). 
Logemann (1924: 114 ff) developed a more general theory about the role of 
witnesses at transactions throughout Indonesia. The primary role of such 
witnesses, he suggested, was to prevent later disputes from arising, hence 
the term 'preventive law care' (preventieve rechtszorg). 
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7. The paper was written together in such a way that it is impossible to deter-
mine which parts were written primarily by myself and which primarily by F. 
von Benda-Beckmann. 
Women harvesting rice next to our house. 
Women planting rice-seedlings 
II 
The Use of Folk Law in Minangkabau State Courts 
State courts in Indonesia work according to procedures based on Dutch 
procedural law.1 Substantive law is in criminal cases also statutory, 
based on French and Dutch law. Civil disputes may also be determined ac­
cording to statutory law, in part closely similar to Dutch civil law, in 
part derived from Anglo-American law, and in part newly created Indone­
sian law without a clear basis in any particular foreign legal system. 
Such law is mainly used in urban and semi-urban centres, especially where 
international trade is involved. However, in civil disputes state courts 
also apply folk law, adat law2, which varies throughout Indonesia. This 
is generally the case in rural areas, one of which is West Sumatra, the 
region to be discussed in this paper. West Sumatra is inhabited by the 
piously Muslim Minangkabau, a matrilineal ethnic group of approximately 
six million people, half of whom live within the province of West Suma­
tra, while the remainder live scattered throughout the archipelago (cf. 
Kato 1982; Nairn 1973). Statistics of court registers show that state 
courts in the central, rural part of West Sumatra apply adat or adat law 
in 86% of all civil disputes (see K. von Benda-Beckmann 1982: 39). 
In this paper I shall attempt to clarify what it means to 'apply adat 
law'. Generally speaking this term refers to one particular use of rules, 
namely that of attaching certain consequences to a given set of facts. If 
A has happened then norm В determines that С shall be the consequence. 
The term law-application is thus closely related to the concept of sanc­
tioning and it refers to the final decision in a dispute. However, during 
a process of dispute management disputants and judges make frequent use 
of norms in a sense quite different from the one mentioned here. Recent 
publications on the application of folk law show a growing uneasiness 
with the conventional way in which the term has been used. Perhaps the 
shift away from the study of rules and decisions towards an orientation 
to processes and procedures has brought the shortcomings of the conven­
tional model to the surface. As a result, many authors have called atten­
tion to various other ways in which substantive rules are used in proces­
ses of dispute management. Comaroff and Roberts (1977: 85) have argued 
that parties in a dispute present a "paradigm of argument" by which an 
attempt is made "to convey a coherent picture of relevant events and ac­
tions in terme of one or more (implicit or explicit) normative referente" 
(original italics) . Iforms are thus used not only as a programme for the 
attachment of consequences to a set of events, but also to set the para­
meters of the dispute. Depending on whether the paradigm presented by a 
party is accepted by the opponent, the ensuing argumentation tends to be 
put either more in terms of facts or more in terms of norms.3 Earlier, 
Abel (1970: 62) had questioned the validity of "the central assumption of 
conventional legal scholarship - concern with the analysis of legal 
rules" and commented that, if it was true that most disputes concerned 
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disagreement about facts, then evidence was a central part of a dispute 
which deserved our full attention. In that case "surely legal scholarship 
should be concerned primarily to discover the critical rules governing 
the determination of facts and not allow itself to be limited by conven­
tional preoccupations with the study of substantive principles...". How­
ever , Abel does not seem to move far from the conventional model. He 
merely uses it for the determination of facts rather than for the attach­
ment of consequences. Moore (197Θ: 209) criticized the model from yet 
another perspective. She suggested in her work on the Chagga that judg­
ments only to a certain extent contained the true reasons for the deci­
sions and should be regarded also as a justification of the consequences 
attached to the proven events or as a demonstration that the court was a 
guardian of law and order. She called for a critical examination of the 
other uses of norms and warned against rash inferences from decisions. 
In each of these approaches the need is expressed to do more than sim­
ply look at substantive legal rules and their precise content. Each 
author pays attention to one particular way in which rules and principles 
are used. In fact, each one looks at a different part of the dispute. 
Comaroff and Roberts concentrate on the beginning of the dispute at which 
the parameters are set by a presentation and acceptance or rejection of 
the paradigm. Abel emphasizes the establishment of facts, which usually 
occurs at a later stage. Moore writes about the next stage, the decision. 
It seems to me that it would be more fruitful to look at the various ways 
in which rules and principles are used throughout the process than to 
pick out one particular aspect only. This may not be so obvious for pro­
cesses lasting no longer than a few hours. In such cases it is tempting 
to select one salient aspect, as Comaroff and Roberts did. However, if 
one studies processes which last several months or even years, it becomes 
obvious that each passes through a number of stages which can be distin­
guished analytically. 
It seemed fruitful to me to distinguish four different stages, in each of 
which substantive and procedural norms are used in different ways.1· 
1. Presentation of the claim, definition and specification of the issues 
In this stage the parties explain, modify and specify their version <·* 
the events about which they have a conflict. They also give their inter­
pretation of the events and may propose what the judge should do about 
the dispute. This stage ends with a preliminary decision determining what 
are the issues, which events and interpretations are disputed, and on 
what matters evidence is needed. 
2. Provision and evaluation of evidence 
At this stage each of the parties provides as much support for his asser­
tions as he can. This includes evidence of facts as well as interpreta­
tions of facts and rules. Further specification of disputed issues takes 
place here. The stage ends with a decision that all evidence required and 
available has been obtained and - more importantly - with an evaluation 
of this evidence. Two questions must be answered at this stage: Is the 
evidence reliable? Is it relevant to the issue in dispute? 
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3. Final decision 
This consists of two parts, one being the court's own version of what 
happened, its identification of the issues and its evaluation of the evi-
dence. To a large extent these decisions have been made at earlier stages 
and only take their definite form here. As Gulliver noted: "Decision 
making is not limited only to the final outcome of a dispute. Throughout 
both kinds of process [i.e., arbitration and adjudication] there is a 
necessity for decisions in both procedural and substantive matters" 
(1978: 37). I would add that most of these can be reversed until the fi-
nal decision has been made. Tne other part of the final decision is form-
ed by the consequences to be attached to the events (cf. van Velsen 1969: 
144). 
4. Realization of the decision 
If we talk about application of norms, we are interested not so much in 
the final decision as such, but in the final result of the decision-
making process. That is to say, we should include in our analysis ques-
tions such as to what extent, when and how the consequences pronounced in 
the decision are carried out. This stage, however, not only concerns the 
effectiveness of decisions in the narrow sense in which the term is 
usually employed. At the same time we need to see how the first part of 
the decision is treated. Do parties attach the same meaning to the 
court's version of events, to its evaluation of evidence and to the 
ascription of rights and duties to the parties as the court does? 
Shifting our attention from the final decision to all stages of a process 
has another advantage. It forces us to realize that in West Sumatra not 
only adat substantive norms are used, but at the same time non-adat pro-
cedural norms. This brings me to the second purpose of my paper. In which 
ways does the Dutch type of state court procedure affect the outcome of 
disputes? I use the term procedure here in a very broad sense, including 
the actual course of a dispute as well as the state court organization, 
recruitment and education of judges, and their notions of proper proce-
dure. Both questions will be elaborated by a comparison with village in-
stitutions of dispute management, which by and large work according to 
adat procedures. In West Sumatra thus there are two kinds of institutions 
using adat substantive law, one according to the Indonesian law of pro-
cedure, the other according to Minangkabau adat procedural law (cf. 
Koesnoe, 1984). 
Since the relative influence of procedure and adat substantive law is 
different in each stage, I shall make my comparisons stage by stage. The 
stages cannot always be neatly separated. At any one time different is-
sues may be in different stages and an issue may go back and forth sever-
al times between them. I do think, however, that for analytical purposes 
the division into stages is useful and allows us to obtain a clearer un-
derstanding of what 'rule application' means than if we concentrate on 
decisions only. More particularly it makes it possible to discern the im-
portant reasons for the differences in outcome between state courts and 
village institutions. One such reason is the difference in procedures. 
The other is that procedural aspects, or action aspects, considered es-
sential elements of adat norms in the villages, are disregarded or even 
willingly cut off from the adat norms in state courts. 
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Village institutions dealing with conflicts in West Sumatra are de­
signed to solve conflicts, whatever the issue at stake. They do so by 
means of deliberations and negotiations among all people concerned until, 
ideally, a unanimous decision (Min. sakato, Ind. mupakat)5 is reached. 
Consensus is the main guarentee for a just and correct decision, because 
the Minangkabau consider it hardly thinkable that all persons involved 
would agree with something unjust or incorrect. This system can only work 
when parties and decision-makers know each other well, when the social 
setting of disputes is familiar to all, when access to information is 
easy, and when the power of every person involved is properly held in 
balance by the power of others. Some villages in West Sumatra are still 
small and coherent enough to make this kind of dispute management pos­
sible. In Bukit Hijau6, from which I derived most of the information used 
in this study, it does not work well and many conflicts remain unsolved 
or come to the state court. 
State court procedures are based on very different presumptions. They 
are meant to guarantee a neutral, impartial, distanced treatment of a 
dispute, in which legal questions should be addressed by full time, sal­
aried officials with a law training. Neutrality and impartiality of 
judges is guaranteed by restrictions on admissibility of information. 
Only information presented during formal sessions may be accepted and 
parties should have equal access to such information. Judges may have no 
prior knowledge of either the conflict or the parties. In fact, they of­
ten have no more than a vague notion of village life. They live in towns, 
are personally oriented towards semi-urban or urban social life, and many 
of them greatly dislike the narrow-mindedness of village life. They not 
only lack the background information which village functionaries have, 
but they are also restricted in their search for information and evalu­
ation of information. 
The rules of evidence used in state courts are designed for a society 
in which literacy is widespread and where documents are commonly used in 
transactions. Both admissibility and evaluation of evidence are more re­
stricted than in village institutions. Furthermore, courts are designed 
to pass a decision, rather than bring parties to an agreement. And the 
idea is that with the decision a solution is reached for the conflict, 
which can be simply carried out, if necessary with police support. Even 
though the Indonesian judges are required to try to bring parties to an 
agreement at every session, the procedure is not designed for negoti­
ations, nor are judges trained for such activities. They have learned to 
interpret rules and analyse legal questions, not to negotiate with 
people. They are trained more to say what the law is than to bring people 
to a settlement of their problem. This does not mean that judges are 
never interested in the real conflict, nor that they do not try to pro­
mote settlements, but neither their training, nor their ideas of their 
task as judges, nor the court organization and procedures promote this 
kind of activity. Judges are in general oriented towards a Dutch type of 
dispute management, in which legal questions are to be answered and norms 
should be applied in a clearcut way (cf. К. von Benda-Beckmann 1984a). 
Definition and Specification of the Issues 
Most conflicts already have a long history of unsuccessful settlement at­
tempts by various village institutions such as the lineage head, the 
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clan-segment council, the adat council, the mayor, the village council or 
subdistrict and district institutions, (police, military officer, dis­
trict officer)7 , before they are submitted to the state court. In a way 
state courts are used as a kinH of appellate institution. People consider 
that conflicts should be handled first by village institutions - espec­
ially the village council - which may only act as mediators and formally 
are not allowed to pass judgments.8 However, m practice the court dis­
pute tends to take on a rather different character from that which the 
conflict had before it reached the state court (cf. Moore 1977: 182 ff). 
State courts do not accept all kinds of conflicts; they deal with 'civil 
disputes' only and a conflict must be formulated to fit this requirement. 
In general one could say that disputes about village politics and about 
proper behaviour are never the central issue and are avoided as far as 
possible. A conflict about the right to be a lineage head, for example, 
is not considered to be a civil dispute, whereas a conflict about lineage 
land is. Likewise, a conflict about an omission to pay due respect will 
not be accepted as a civil dispute, whereas one about land titles will 
be. If both issues are involved, the latter must be the basis for a claim 
and the first can at best play a role in the evidence submitted in sup­
port of the latter issue. On the other hand, in village institutions dis­
putes tend to be formulated in terms of proper behaviour and procedures 
(cf. К. von Benda-Beckmann 1981). 
A suit usually contains only a factual account of the main events on 
which the claim is based and a request to the courts to take certain ac­
tion. It rarely makes explicit reference to any norms. However, implicit­
ly norms always structure the formulation of a dispute, especially when a 
plaintiff takes an opportunity of asking a court clerk or a judge to help 
him formulate the suit. Judges and clerks have very definite opinions on 
what kind of issues may be treated. They advise a plaintiff either to 
withdraw the claim or to define it in such a way that it fits their re­
quirements (cf. Tanner 1971: 189 ff). 
Usually the first four sessions are spent reading claims and counter­
claims. Thus, this initial exchange of claims and counterclaims is used 
to specify, modify and adjust each party's claim. Judges usually ask 
short questions about the meaning of passages and make some suggestions 
for a better formulation. Too bold claims may be withdrawn and extra ar­
guments added. More importantly, however, in this stage the first selec­
tion of relevant facts and issues takes place. Since judges concentrate 
on legal issues and neglect other complaints, a dispute is moulded ac­
cording to the judges' ideas of relevance, which may differ markedly from 
the plaintiff's original ideas. Parties must follow the judges' kind of 
reasoning and provide them with arguments plausible to them in order to 
be successful. For many disputants this is a very difficult and frustrat­
ing activity, because they have the feeling that judges treat not their 
conflict but something else. 
With the formulation or definition of the dispute thus a first global 
selection of relevant norms, issues and events is made. This forms the 
basic structure for the rest of the dispute. In the course of the dispute 
this is further narrowed down, but the parameters are set at this early 
stage.9 When the court gives a summary of the events and issues on which 
the claim is based and decides what is undisputed and what needs further 
evidence, this is structured by the normative framework set out in this 
stage, even though there is still no explicit reference to the norms. 
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Provision and Evaluation of Evidence 
Once the main issues are defined and it has become clear What are the 
disputed and undisputed events, the court invites parties to provide 
evidence in support of their respective standpoints}° 
There is a strong preference on the part of judges for written evi-
dence, especially contracts and notary deeds. However, sufficient evi-
dence of this type is rarely available. Other kinds of written evidence, 
such as genealogies, decisions by various village institutions of dispute 
management, and letters from village functionaries, explaining the situa-
tion, are frequently presented, but treated with great distrust by the 
court. As long as papers do not fulfill the statutory requirements of 
proper signatures by both parties, they are worth very little. 
Most disputes hinge on witnesses' testimonies. The problem with wit-
nesses, however, is that they are usually related in one way or another 
to at least one of the parties. Whereas in village procedures this is 
considered normal and even desirable, judges in state courts tend to be 
suspicious and sometimes reject such witnesses' evidence on the ground 
that it is against the law of civil procedure to allow close relatives of 
a party to testify. An important category of witnesses are the adat func-
tionaries and other village functionaries, such as the mayor and the vil-
lage secretary. They are heard not only as regular witnesses, but also as 
expert witnesses on village life and on the village variant of Minangka-
bau adat. It is especially this role which causes great misunderstanding 
between judges and adat experts. Both consider themselves the only true 
experts, but they tend to interpret both rules and events rather differ-
ently. Moreover, information formally received by an adat functionary 
from his predecessor, and therefore according to adat particularly trust-
worthy and an important basis for their expertise, is often treated as 
ordinary evidence. Judges in general have a low opinion of adat function-
aries and tend to over-emphasize the decline during the last 100 years of 
their prestige and knowledge of local affairs. 
It is not always possible to present enough direct evidence to con-
vince the court of one's claim. Hardly any dispute in which the history 
of a lineage and kin relations are disputed can be decided on direct evi-
dence. Inheritance is the main issue in 29% of all cases according to the 
court registers, and lineage history and kin relationships are an import-
ant element in far more disputes. They can only directly be proven by 
means of a genealogy recognized by both parties. But these are usually 
contested, frequently on good grounds. Many genealogies I have seen had 
been tampered with, often in the crudest way. What remains then is cir-
cumstantial evidence, because blood relationships are unobservable, and 
according to state courts therefore cannot be proven by witnesses. A 
statement by a lineage head to the effect that both parties belong - or 
do not belong - to the same lineage within his clan-segment is often re-
garded as unacceptable evidence in state courts. In village procedures 
such a statement would be an acceptable basis for a decision. 
During the initial stage each party usually has given several reasons 
to make its standpoint plausible. At this stage the arguments are refined 
and put more precisely. Usually they run along the same lines of thought, 
namely that social relationships always have a number of other social and 
legal implications. However, parties may disagree about the specific im-
plications of a certain relationship, the relevance of certain events for 
the relationship, or the occurrence of the events. The first two involve 
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an interpretation of norms, whereas the latter is 'merely' a question of 
fact. 
In a case described at length elsewhere the dispute evolved around the 
lineage membership of the two parties (cf. К. von Benda-Beckmann 1984b). 
Each provided a genealogy which differed from the other on the crucial 
point. The issue of lineage membership was then dissected into several 
issues from which lineage membership could be deduced or not. Both par­
ties and the court agreed that it implied having common lineage property 
(harato pusako), a common graveyard, a lineage house, etc. The disagree­
ment concerned smaller details. For example, the plaintiff had sent a 
mattress to the house where the head of the lineage, of which he claimed 
to be a member, had died. He had intended to fetch the body of the de­
ceased, bring it to his house, and have a ceremony performed appointing 
him as the new lineage head, after which he would bring the deceased to 
the graveyard and bury him. However, the mattress was refused and one 
point of disagreement was about the interpretation of the refusal. Could 
the mattress be refused on religious grounds only, in which case the re­
fusal would not necessarily amount to a denial that the sender was a 
lineage member? Or did refusal always mean a denial of lineage member­
ship? The court chose the latter possibility. 
Less macabre indications of lineage membership may be provided by the 
answers to questions such as whether female relatives live closely to­
gether; who cared for a deceased during his or her illness or old age; 
who paid doctor's bills; and questions such as who took part in what 
function during ceremonies like lineage head installations, weddings and 
burials. Much of this is common knowledge in village institutions. Par­
ties may even agree about the interpretations in a village setting. But 
it is not uncommon for them to take standpoints in state court processes 
which they could not and would not take in village processes. Many of the 
elements of circumstantial evidence are regarded in village procedure as 
tando, visible signs of something invisible and so as compelling evi­
dence, to be valued more highly than most other evidence, and rebuttable 
only by the knowledge of an adat functionary. 
But judges have insufficient access to background information, even 
though some go into great detail, and clever disputants gamble on a dis­
missal of evidence. Although some judges pursue the history of the issues 
under dispute far back and build a whole pyramid of questions, leading to 
the central issue to be proven, they do not go down to the basic issues, 
especially when village and lineage politics are involved. Going all the 
way down could mean that the very points which should prove the issue 
could only be proven by means of that issue. Thus in the case mentioned 
above the court did not go as far as to ask whether the plaintiff had le­
gitimately sent over the mattress. The answer to that question would have 
depended on whether he belonged to the same lineage as the deceased and 
that was precisely the question under disputel Judges simply stop short 
of getting involved in such a vicious circle. 
Judges often need an expert on village customs to interpret the events 
and norms, because norms, generally valid throughout Minangkabau, may 
vary in their more specific forms from village to village. Sometimes 
judges follow the interpretation of adat experts, but sometimes they pre­
fer to use a more generally accepted interpretation, much to the chagrin 
of those experts. In general, they tend to treat every issue separately. 
If, for example, a series of events is put to them as evidence of lineage 
membership, they ask as to every event whether it by itself necessarily 
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indicates common lineage membership. If it is an indication for clan-seg­
ment membership but not necessarily for lineage membership, it is con­
sidered irrelevant to the latter issue. x l Village functionaries on the 
other hand have a more integrative approach. They do not look at the 
various aspects as if they were independent issues to each of which a 
norm could be applied. Even though an event by itself is only one pos­
sible indication, the more of such events there are, the more likely 
there is to be a common lineage membership. The result is that events are 
considered irrelevant by state courts which are highly relevant in vil­
lage procedures. 
Final аеагеьоп 
The final decision can take either of two forms. Oie is a settlement be­
tween the parties, in which case the parties make the decision and the 
court only acts as a mediator with more or less influence. However, only 
15% of all civil disputes end thus. By far the greater proportion end 
with an authoritative decision.12 For a complete description it would be 
necessary to include settlements in the analysis. In this paper I shall 
confine myself to formal judgments of the court. 
Indonesian judgments have a similar form to Dutch judgments. They 
start with the list of parties, the claims, defences and counterclaims as 
they were formulated in the written statements, exchanged at the initial 
sessions. In contrast to Dutch judgments, they contain a full list of the 
means of evidence provided by the parties.13 Then comes the first main 
part of the judgment, in which the court gives its own version of the 
disputed and undisputed facts and issues and sums up the disputed facts 
for which it required evidence. It then gives a summary of each piece of 
evidence and a discussion of its reliability and relevance. After that 
comes a final reconstruction of the events, according to the view of the 
court, followed by decisions on the issues considered to constitute the 
dispute, in which the rights and obligations of the parties, the validity 
of transactions, legal positions etc. are decided. The final part is a 
short list stating the consequences of these decisions. It is thus the 
direct answer to the original request by the plaintiff to the court to 
take particular action, and what precedes it is the justification - imag­
inary or real - for that decision. 
The judgment is authoritative in the sense that the court decides in­
dependently of whether parties agree to the decision. Generally, at least 
one party does not agree and often both are dissatisfied. In the section 
about realization of decisions I shall examine the further consequences 
of parties' disagreement. 
Village functionaries cannot make authoritative judgments. A decision 
is only valid, or 'round', as it is called, when the disputants have 
agreed to it. If one of the parties is not satisfied with a proposed so­
lution, he refrains from consenting and waits for the other to take fur­
ther steps or goes to another institution himself. If no other institu­
tion is available, the dispute either remains unsolved or is raised above 
the village level and presented to a state institution. 
Most decisions by village institutions remain unwritten. They should 
by custom be affirmed with a ceremonial meal, but often such a meal does 
not take place and the only way to know whether consensus has been 
reached is by looking at what the disputants do. However, the village 
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council, installed by the state administration, usually writes a decision 
in much the same form as state court judgments, the only difference being 
that the disputants have to sign it, because formally it is a settlement, 
not a judgment. About half of the decisions drawn up by the village coun-
cil lack the signature of at least one of the parties. The adat council, 
the highest traditional institution of dispute settlement, and some of 
the lower councils as well, sometimes write decisions, the form of which 
varies greatly. Some are very similar to state court judgments and 
village council decisions. Others contain a very short statement of what 
the parties promised to do or refrain from doing. 
As I have demonstrated in the preceding sections adat norms play various 
roles in the final decision. Tentative decisions made in the preceding 
stages take on their final form here. The final judgment thus contains 
the last and most definite of a long series of decisions. In the next 
section I shall discuss the question of how conclusive the decision is. 
We have also seen that procedural rules of non-adat character play an 
important role during the process, in particular at the stage where evi-
dence is evaluated, resulting in a different picture of the disputed 
events and a different meaning from those they would have in village pro-
cesses. Since the overwhelming majority of disputes decided by state 
courts hinge upon the legal relevance and credibility of events and so-
cial relationships, the differences between Dutch procedural law and vil-
lage procedures often result in a different outcome to a dispute. 
However, the differences in outcome are also caused by differences in the 
ways in which judges and village functionaries conceive of rules. Al-
though they agree about most rule-statements, they interpret them differ-
ently when relating them to concrete events and claims during the pro-
cess. I discuss this difference at this place, although it has an impact 
on the two preceding stages as well. Basically the difference lies in two 
closely related characteristics attributed to rules in adat: (I) Adat 
rules have a high degree of flexibility in that they are treated as 
guidelines for decisions rather than as clear prescriptions as in western 
legal theory. (II) Adat theory demands the consideration of all concrete 
circumstances of the situation to which the rule must be applied. This 
holds true for all kinds of decisions and not only for decisions in dis-
putes. In village processes of decision-making the substantive content of 
a norm therefore is not sharply distinguished from the decision making 
process in which the norm is used, even though this 'procedural' aspect 
is not explicit in the norm statement. Under these circumstances proper 
procedure - and especially the requirement of unanimity - is the main 
guarantee for a good solution. Functionaries have a rather large discre-
tion in how they use adat norms.1u 
With the introduction of the Dutch court system and doctrine of deci-
sion-making, flexible adat rules have been transformed into rather 
strict, inflexible rules, fitting into the rule model of western-contin-
ental law. The guarantee for a good decision lies now in the substantive 
content of the rule and not so much in procedural requirements. Rules of 
procedures in western legal systems are rules for trouble cases, not for 
trouble-free decision-making processes. However, since the rules of pro-
cedure are statutory, judges feel free to neglect or even cut off the 
procedural elements of adat law, considered essential in that law, from 
the adat substantive rules. 15 
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I have described elsewhere this fixation, or transformation of adat norms 
with respect to the division of estates, land titles, the social meaning 
of the 'knowledge' of adat functionaries, and the construction of con­
tracts.16 In a much more general way the differences between adat and 
state interpretations of norms are reflected in the way compensation is 
awarded. The state courts have laid down the rule that the risk of infla­
tion should be equally divided between plaintiff and defendant, indepen­
dently of their individual circumstances such as fault or relative econ­
omic prosperity. In order to assess the value of the damage ensuing from 
inflation, a simple comparison between prices in terms of the rupiah is 
considered enough. But it may be necessary to compare gold prices, since 
the value of land and pawning prices are often expressed in gold rupiah. 
The most common claim for compensation is the loss of harvests from 
the moment of illegal occupation until the final decision. Generally 
speaking one half of the value of harvests over that period is allowed, 
with a tendency to fix a maximum limit of five years. 1 7 In this respect 
the amount of the compensation is fixed in a way similar to the division 
of an inheritance, i.e. in equal parts. For a consideration of particular 
circumstances there is substituted the fiction that both parties are 
equally at fault (or in the case of inheritance have equal needs) and 
therefore should share the damage. 
Of course, village institutions also allow damages to be recovered. 
But they do not calculate in such a clear-cut way as the courts. They do 
not simply count the years of illegal occupation and have the harvests 
paid back. This could perhaps happen if the period of illegal occupation 
had lasted only a very short time. Otherwise it will depend on the econo­
mic situation of both parties and, more specifically, on whether the per­
son entitled to the land has really suffered from the lack of harvest; on 
how much the illegal occupier can pay; on the personal and social rela­
tionships between the parties and their lineages; on an evaluation of how 
much each party is to be blamed for the existence and continuation of the 
illegal situation; and of course on the relative negotiating strengths. 
The total amount of the compensation never becomes as high as in the 
longer court disputes, not because villagers are particularly nice to 
each other, but because they are realistic. Too high a debt cannot and 
will not be paid anyway and vrould only enhance rancour instead of making 
an end to the conflict. A very realistic calculation and evaluation of 
what is feasible, and what the consequences will be, is the basis for 
such decisions. 
These considerations hardly play a role in court disputes. Parties 
usually have gone through considerable frustration because no solution on 
the village level could be reached. Once they have made the step to go to 
the court, they fight bitterly to get as much out of it as they can. They 
do not even expect judges to be considerate. It is not by sheer chance 
that only a very low percentage of court disputes end with a settlement, 
especially in land and inheritance cases. 
State courts thus often use fictions where village institutions look 
at the real situations. And since state courts cannot and may not follow 
the same procedures as village institutions, they do not consider them to 
be essential elements of adat rules. State court adat rules, in short, 
are different from adat rules used in village decision-making processes. 
This is one reason why villagers do not recognize state court law as 
their own law. However, many disputants appreciate the advantages of 
state court law and make clever use of its possibilities. They know that 
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judges, even if they tried, could not possibly take all circumstances in-
to consideration, and they take great care to ensure that some circum-
stances never come to the judges' attention. Furthermore they recognize 
the value of manipulating witnesses, and know that by simply denying 
facts, even though these are well known, they can turn a decision in 
their favour. Not all disputants are will-less victims of ill-meaning 
judges. And some are victims of the manipulations of their opponents 
rather than of judges. 
Realization of the Decision 
State court doctrine makes a sharp distinction between a court procedure 
resulting in a judgment and the execution of the decision. The first is 
in the hands of judges, whereas the latter is in principle a matter for 
the parties themselves. Only when necessary can the 'strong arm' of the 
law, the bailiff (jurusita), or the police, be called for assistance. For 
the court a dispute ends with the judgment, but not for the disputants. 
They have several options in deciding how to proceed from there. A much 
used possibility is to appeal to the court of appeal in the capital of 
West Sumatra. Minangkabau disputants are very tenacious once they have 
made the step to go to the state court. 54% of civil disputes are ap-
pealed and as many as 18% of the decisons by the court of appeal are 
taken to the Supreme Court of Indonesia in Jakarta for review (kasasi) . 
It seems to be worth the trouble: Over 40% of the appealed decisions are 
reversed (cf. F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 308). 
Of the 46% contained at the state court level, the judges claim that 
almost all decisions are adhered to or executed. Unfortunately I have no 
systematic data on the actual rate of execution. In Bukit Hijau from 
where I have information about several disputes from the period after 
court decisions, there were several ways in Which these were 'executed' 
and all decisions had at least some effect. If the court ordered the 
transfer of a piece of land, the demolition of a lineage house, or any-
thing other than the payment of money, it was usually done. But there 
were other ways to 'execute' the decision. In one case the defendant, who 
had been ordered to give a plot of rice land back to the plaintiff, con-
tinued to work on it, with the implicit understanding that from now on-
wards she held it on loan and not as her property or in pawn, as she had 
claimed in court (cf. p. 131 ff) 
I expect that similar kinds of arrangements are quite commonly made, 
especially in cases in which the court awards compensation for unlawful 
possession and use of agricultural land. As compensation may be awarded 
for periods of thirty years or more, sums may reach staggering heights. 
It seems completely impossible that sums equivalent to US $1,000 or more 
are ever fully recovered. I assume that disputants usually come to some 
arrangement and that only a small part of the compensation is actually 
paid. For the rest the outstanding debt can be conveniently used as a 
threat in case the main claim is not fulfilled. 
Another possibility is that for the time being nothing happens at all. 
If, for example, the disputed land was pawned or taken in share-cropping 
by a third person, no immediate action is necessary to execute a decision 
requiring the land to be transferred to the plaintiff. Its effect is sim-
ply that another person is entitled to redemption. The same holds true 
for all kinds of validation, nullification or determination of the legal 
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status of land or other property, unless the court itself attaches fur-
ther consequences to it. State court procedures do not require a ceremony 
in which all participants confirm their consent to the decision, as do 
village procedures. Thus it is impossible to say whether the decision is 
executed until someone tries e.g. to redeem the land or takes action al-
lowed only to an official heir, etc. But that may happen long after the 
decision. This is not just a technical problem in the sense that an out-
side observer cannot know for sure whether or not people live according 
to the decision. For the losing party may also consciously refrain from 
further action for the time being, until the political situation in the 
village, and the personal strength of his lineage head has changed in a 
way which promises good chances for a reversed decision if the case is 
taken to the court again. This frequently happens in Minangkabau vil-
lages. The main disputes are longstanding conflicts between lineages or 
lineage segments over property, which in slightly different constella-
tions flare up over and again. In the village dispute processing fol-
lowing a court decision, the previous court decision has enormous pres-
tige. Even if it is generally known that the witnesses have lied and the 
decision was wrong, a court decision tends to be treated not as a deci-
sion between the parties originally concerned, and binding on them alone, 
but as a more or less absolute establishment of rights and legal posi-
tions. It takes the return from abroad of an influential lineage member, 
or the coming of age of a strong personality in the lineage, for success-
ful action against such a court decision to be taken before a village in-
stitution (cf. Chapter 5). 
The effect of state court decisions lies not so much in their direct 
realization - because so many judgments are reversed on appeal, and of 
the remainder only a part is fully realized - but rather in the effect 
they have on village dispute processes. In renewed court proceedings, on 
the other hand, previous decisions have much less effect. It is rather 
easy for the disputants to formulate basically the same dispute in such a 
way that it is accepted as a new dispute by the courts. Very often the 
judges do not even realize that the disputes concern the same conflict. 
As the subject-matter is changed by the parties, who are themselves often 
not the same persons as in the previous case, the courts have no way of 
avoiding such a repetition, and the rule that a dispute may not be de-
cided twice by the court (ne bis in idem) is of little value. 
Conclusione 
The traditional model according to which legal rules determine the out-
come of a dispute in a rather mechanical way does not provide a satis-
factory understanding of the role legal rules play in processes of dis-
pute management. Such processes can be better understood if we take a 
broader look at the various ways in which substantive and procedural 
rules and principles are used by the participants in such processes. 
I have analyzed these different kinds of use by conceiving of a dis-
puting process as consisting of four stages which resemble van Velsen's 
stages with the exception of his pre-trial and my post-trial stage. I 
have considered the operation at each stage of both substantive and pro-
cedural rules. In the first stage the substantive rules are primarily 
used to structure the dispute. This is the kind of norm-use Comaroff and 
Roberts wrote about in their article in 1977. In the second stage sub-
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stantive norms are used as a standard for relevance and credibility of 
events. As such they are an important element in the construction of the 
factual basis for the court's decision. Abel (1970) drew our attention to 
this kind of norm-use in his observation on Kenya's courts. In the third 
stage all decisions, tentatively or definitely made at earlier stages, 
take on their final form. Norms are used here in part in the same way as 
in earlier stages. But they are also used to justify the consequences at-
tached to the events as constructed by the court, lb what extent they are 
a justification, as Moore suggested (1978), and how far the consequences 
are determined, though not exclusively, by the norms, can only be evalu-
ated if we look at the final decision as a result of decisions made at 
previous stages and not as an isolated decision, the second question is 
how far procedural norms, in the Minangkabau state courts based on Dutch 
law, influence the outcome of a dispute. This is a complex problem. The 
procedure of state courts not only affects the factual basis of the de-
cision by imposing a far more rigorous selection of facts in the first 
and second stages. It also affects the legal rules themselves and trans-
forms them into rather inflexible substantive rules, divested of the pro-
cedural elements they have in village processes of decision making. 
In my discussion of the fourth stage, the realization of the decision, 
I have pointed out that decisions are by no means always executed in the 
way intended. Compensation is probably rarely fully paid. The common tac-
tical approach seems to be that if it can be avoided the decision should 
not be carried out. Furthermore, though in the short term a number of de-
cisions seem to be realized, long-term realization is rare. An execution 
in the sense that everything is completely realized in the way intended 
by state courts is an exception rather than the rule. It seems there-
fore that in this stage the process is governed more by adat principles 
of procedure than by western procedure. 
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Notes 
1. See for an overview of the Indonesian formal legal system Damián and Hornick 
1972. 
2. Adat in its broadest sense means as much as culture, the way of life. In a 
more restricted sense it refers to all normative rules governing social 
life. The term 'adat law* was a Dutch invention and refers to the legal 
norms in adat. In state courts the terms are used synonymously. See for lit-
erature on Minangkabau adat law F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979; K. von Benda-
Beckmann 1981, 1982, 1984a,b; Tanner 1969, 1970, 1971; Westenenk 1918a; 
Willinck 1909. 
3. Shortly after the conference in Bellagio, Comaroff and Roberts 1981 appeared 
with a fascinating study of the relation between norms and processes m two 
Tswana chiefdoms. It would require a long discussion to do justice to their 
highly sophisticated treatment of that relation. Since this volume is meant 
to be a publication of the conference papers, I shall have to leave such a 
discussion for a later moment. 
4. My stages somewhat resemble those suggested by Van Velsen (1969: 146 ff ) . 
For the purpose of this paper I leave out the pre-trial stage, but my model 
could be easily included in a more comprehensive one, which would have to 
differentiate the pre-trial stage (cf. Felstiner, Abel, Sarat 1980/1981). I 
include a post-trial stage, which to my knowledge has never been done in an 
analytical model, although many authors do pay considerable attention to 
that stage. See also Cochrane 1972; J.F. Holleman 1974: 19 f. 
5. See for a discussion of the term mupakat Koesnoe 1969. 
6. Bukit Hijau is a pseudonym for the village in which I stayed together with 
my husband Franz von Benda-Beckmann during a 16-month fieldwork period in 
1974-1975. One of the reasons for choosing that particular village was that 
a relatively large number of court cases had originated there. For a more 
comprehensive description of conflict management in a village see K. von 
Benda-Beckmann 19Θ1. 
7. See for an overview of village institutions K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981: 
118 f. 
8. Between 1874 and 1935 adat councils formally were not recognized as institu­
tions of dispute settlement, although in practice they were never abolished 
and courts even referred disputes back to elicit a decision from the adat 
council before they would consider them (Guyt 1934; 1936). In 1935 village 
justice was officially recognized. Every person who wants to go to the state 
court directly is entitled to do so. In land disputes this is hardly ever 
done. 
9. Comaroff and Itoberts (1977) speak in this context of a 'paradigm of argu­
ment '. Cf. also above. 
10. Since I have written extensively about evidence elsewhere I shall only give 
a summary here. K. von Benda-Beckmann 1984a; cf. Tanner 1971: 196-198. 
11· I have called the courts' use of norms centrifugal, because judges are most 
interested in the outer boundaries of norms. In contrast, villagers are more 
interested in the basic meaning of a norm, in its kernel. Therefore I have 
referred to their approach as centripetal, K. von Benda-Beckmann 1984a. 
12. Of all civil disputes 15% end with a settlement, but of these only one 
third concern lineage land, whereas of the total number of civil disputes 
two thirds concern lineage land. (In my survey: N= 499; settled cases = 74; 
land disputes™ 332; settled land-disputes = 26). In contrast, of all dis­
putes involving bank loans, in which banks are a party (N=71), 46.5% (=33) 
are settled. Cf. К. von Benda-Beckmann 1980. 4 ff; F. von Benda-Beckmann 
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1979: 307. 
Dutch judgments only mention the means of evidence on which the decision is 
based. Indonesian judgments therefore provide far more useful information 
for a researcher than Dutch judgments. 
Koesnoe ( 1984) goes so far as to say that adat law has no pre-existing sub­
stantive rules at all. I do not agree with this statement, although the Mi­
nangkabau have far fewer rules in the sense of programmatic statements men­
tioned at the beginning of this paper than for instance Dutch law has. Mi­
nangkabau adat has far more principles - in the sense Dworkin (1977) uses 
the terra - than rules, but these may come very close to rules. Cf. Woodman 
1984. These principles are not the same as the operational principles Koes­
noe has in mind. Both principles in the Dworkiman sense and rules can be 
found in the constitutional, the institutional and the realizational cate­
gory of Koesnoe's analytical framework and they vary greatly in the level of 
abstraction. It should be noted that, according to our research findings, 
Koesnoe1s categories do not correspond with the Minangkabau folk categories, 
whatever merits they may have as analytical tools. Minangkabau adat has four 
categories, all referring to social life; there is no category referring to 
the laws of nature only. Also, there is no Minangkabau author who differen­
tiates adat categories according to the level of abstraction, as Koesnoe 
does with his three categories. Although he is correct in stating that 
Minangkabau authors do not agree about the precise meaning of each category, 
there is a marked agreement that they concern a differentiation according to 
the source of adat. They determine who made the various kinds of adat and 
whether and by whom they may be changed. The Adat Nan Sabana Adat is accord­
ing to all authors the adat which always has been with the Minangkabau 
people and cannot be changed. Only in the last respect do they resemble the 
laws of nature, which also cannot be changed. Cf. F. and К. von Benda-Beck­
mann 1977: 29 ff. Cf. also J.F. Holleman 1974: 18f. 
Korn complained about this change in 1941. He wrote: "The legal rules are 
... formulated much more strictly than is necessary or desirable in the mild 
practice of small societies" (1941: 315). 
K. von Benda-Beckmann 1982: 46 f. On a more general level we have discussed 
the problem of transformation of adat rules in F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 
1981a. 
Some courts do not limit this period, because adat law does not have any­
thing comparable with a statute of limitations. It is not uncommon for a 
court to be required to decide on an alleged illegal act of 50 years ago. 
The oldest case still pending in 1975 was based on a conflict which had 
started in 1909 and had come to court for the first time in 1919. As a re­
sult of the chaotic political period starting in the early forties and end­
ing in the late sixties, many such cases have been brought to court several 
times under several regimes (Dutch - Japanese - Dutch - Sukarno - Suharto) 
without conclusive results. One court often - but not always - follows a de­
cision by the court of appeal in Medan and allows compensation for five 
years only. It has thus introduced an element of forfeiture to make up for 
the lack of a statute of limitation (Pengadilan Negen Bukitinggi nrs. 
1970/1; 1968/29; cf 1974/6). 
••вннн 
A private conversation before the village council session starts. 
Members of the village council 
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Forum Shopping and Shopping Forums: Dispute Settlement 
in a Minangkabau Village in West Sumatra, Indonesia 
A variety of institutions can deal with disputes in Minangkabau.x Some 
derive their legitimation from adat, the indigenous Minangkabau system of 
normative rules and usages2 , others from the national - formerly colonial 
- legal system. Adat institutions function on the local level only, main-
ly in villages, but also in urban areas. Some state institutions - the 
mayor and the Village Council and the officer of the Office of Religious 
Affairs - also work on the local level, whereas others - state courts, 
Islamic courts, the public prosecutor - work on the district level. Still 
other institutions on the sub-district level - the police and the sub-
district officer - inevitably become involved in some disputes, although 
they have no official jurisdiction. The fields of jurisdiction of these 
institutions overlap. Minangkabau disputants therefore can choose between 
several institutions. In analogy to private international law I shall 
speak of 'forum shopping' here, because disputants have a choice between 
different institutions and they base their choice on what they hope the 
outcome of the dispute will be, however vague or ill-founded their expec-
tations may be. 
There is, however, another side to the problem. Not only do parties 
shop, but the forums involved use disputes for their own, mainly local 
political ends. These institutions and their individual functionaries 
usually have interests different from those of the parties, and they use 
the processing of disputes to pursue these interests. So besides forum-
shopping disputants, there are also 'shopping forums' engaged in trying 
to acquire and manipulate disputes from which they expect to gain politi-
cal advantage, or to fend off disputes which they fear will threaten 
their interests. 3 They shop for disputes as disputants shop for forums. 
Indeed, manipulating with disputes seems to be a favorite pastime of many 
functionaries. 
In this paper I shall first give a description of the various institu-
tions which play a role in dispute processing in Minangkabau, along with 
some more general ethnographic background. Then I shall illustrate the 
bilateral shopping process with an extensive case history. 
The jurisdiction of a forum depends in principle on the nature of the 
dispute. But since most disputes have several aspects, the definition of 
the dispute is a means to establish jurisdiction and thus a means of fo-
rum shopping, both for parties and functionaries. Once jurisdiction is 
established, functionaries compete in their shopping activities mainly 
with procedural arguments. I shall explain why they prefer these to sub-
stantive arguments about the dispute itself, and will suggest that this 
has to do with the socio-political structure and principles of decision-
making of village life. Another question I want to address is whether 
there is a limit to manipulations and forum shopping. Though village in-
stitutions and functionaries are very actively engaged in the processing 
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of disputes, disputes are rarely and only with great difficulty given a 
final solution on the village level. Yet if functionaries systematically 
disregarded the interests of parties, villagers would ultimately cease to 
ask for their services and the shops would soon become empty. Why do vil-
lagers still make use of village institutions? In particular, I shall in 
this connection consider the extent to which the state courts function as 
an alternative to village institutions and suggest that this is only to a 
certain extent the case. Por village functionaries play such an important 
role in state court procedures that they can hardly be bypassed by 
parties. The state courts, by their interpretation of adat law, help to 
sustain the control and manipulation of disputes by village functionar-
ies, and thus promote forum shopping and manipulation. 
Ethnographic Background k 
The Minangkabau of Sumatra's west coast number approximately three mil-
Lion people, of whom 86% live in villages.s Minangkabau is a predominant-
ly agricultural area. The main subsistence crop is rice, which is culti-
vated on irrigated or dry land. Coffee, cinnamon, nutmeg and chili pep-
pers are grown as cash crops. Some villages specialize in crafts like 
weaving, basket making, embroidering, blacksmithing or the like. Bukit 
Hijau, where my research took place, had no such specialization, though 
some villagers engaged in petty trade and some women made baskets and em-
broideries for sale.6 Most villages have several fishponds. Fish is ge-
nerally used only for private consumption, but some is sold. 
The village, nagari, is the lowest level of state administration. It 
usually comprises several hamlets and often has a considerable popula-
tion. Bukit Hijau is quite a large village, having some 10,000 inhabit-
ants. But the nagari is also a village republic in the adat sense. Apart 
from the occasional, loosely structured village federations lareh, it was 
in the past the politically autonomous territorial unit par excellence. 
1. Pre-colonial time 
In pre-colonial times village life was governed by adat. Though the 
Minangkabau became Moslems some time in the 16th century, the norms of 
Islamic law were only to a very limited extent accepted as standards for 
social relationships and behaviour (Taufik Abdullah 1966; Dobbin 1977). 
The core of Minangkabau social and political organization - the principle 
of matrilineal descent and of property holding by matrilineal descent 
groups - was not changed. 
Each villager is on the basis of matrifiliation incorporated into sev-
eral groups which are generally based on matrilineal descent. The basic 
social and political unit in Bukit Hijau (see diagram 1) is called buah 
gadang. 7 Its members share common inherited property, harato pusako -
mainly land - and are headed by a panghulu. A hundred panghuluships are 
recognized according to village adat, but only about twenty are now oc-
cupied. The buah gadang are grouped into two hierarchies of authority and 
decision-making, forming two spheres of socio-political competence. 
First, according to the principle of pusako (common matrilineal heritage) 
the buah gadang are grouped together in suku pusako, or simply suku, 
headed by a panghulu suku. In Bukit Hijau there are nine suku pusako. 
Common suku membership presupposes common matrilineal descent, although a 
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common ancestress cannot always be traced for every buah gadang of a suku 
pusako. The suku are exogamous. When one buah gadang dies out, another 
within the suku pusako should inherit its lineage land and the titles of 
its lineage functionaries. The second principle according to which the 
buah gadang are grouped is adat, used here in the restricted sense of 
nagari government. These groups are referred to as hindu, of which there 
are twelve in Bukit Hijau. The political hindu affiliation crosscuts the 
pusako divisions. Each hindu has three functionaries: a panghulu hindu, 
who at the same time is panghulu of his own buah gadang, a juaro adat who 
is an executive officer β and an anak mudo, who is used as a messenger, 
amongst whose tasks it is to cite the village legend, tambo, at cerem­
onies. On the lower levels of authority, including the buah gadang, the 
two spheres have functionaries in common and are not separated. These 
functionaries are the mamak, the sub-lineage head, and the panghulu, the 
lineage head. Above the level of buah gadang they split into two hier­
archies: the suku pusako hierarchy, concerned mainly with the administra­
tion of lineage land and titles of lineage functionaries, and the hindu 
adat hierarchy, which is involved in village government. 9 
Besides the adat and pusako structures, there is one more pre-colonial 
structure in Bukit Hijau, which is based on territorial principles. This 
is the buek structure of the neighbourhoods.10 These neighbourhoods have 
their own regulations, buek perbuatan11 , concerning common facilities 
such as the maintenance of surau, bachelor houses and later prayer 
houses, and mutual help in daily affairs. Representatives of each sub-
lineage together are the urang sabuek who decide in buek affairs. Impor­
tant decisions are taken by all members of the buek. 
The highest authority for all three systems is the Adat Council, which 
nowadays comprises the representatives of the twelve hindu, be they pang­
hulu or juaro adat. 1 2 
Two principles lie at the heart of Minangkabau decision making, both 
being expressed in the adat saying (see R.M.Dt. Rajo Panghulu 1971: Θ0): 
"Kamanakan barajo ka mamak 
mamak barajo ka panghulu 
panghulu barajo ka mupakat 
mupakat barajo kapado alua 
alúa barajo kapado mungkin dan patuik 
patuik dan mungkin barajo kapado bana 
bana itulah nan manjadi rajo". 
The kamanakan are subject to the mamak 
the mamak is subject to the panghulu 
the panghulu is subject to the mupakat 
the mupakat is subject to the power of reasoning 
the power of reasoning is subject to what is 
possible and appropriate 
what is appropriate and possible is subject 
to truth 
it is truth which which becomes king. 
One principle is hierarchical in character. In the process of decision 
making a person is subject to his mamak, who in turn is subject to his 
panghulu, as the first two lines of the adat saying indicate. According 
to another saying, decisions must be made at the lowest possible level 
and only if this is impossible, the matter must go up a step and so on 
until it becomes a nagari matter and the Adat Council handles the case. 
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"Bajanjang naiek - batanggo turun", you must go up the stairs and go down 
the ladder. But decisions must in turn have the consent of all persons 
concerned, down to the lowest level. The mamak or panghulu of the group 
in which the decision is made leads the deliberations and the way to the 
next step, if necessary. And in this respect he must be followed by his 
subjects. Complementing this hierarchical principle there is an egalitar­
ian principle: every decision to be valid must be made unanimously by all 
members of the institution dealing with the matter: mupakat is always re­
quired (see F. von Bend a-Beckmann 1979: ΒΘ ff). I shall return to these 
principles later. 
2. Colonial and poet-colonial periods 
Bukit Hijau and its political organization have been influenced by the 
colonial administration since the early 19th century, and the subsequent 
national and provincial governments have also exerted a strong influence. 
The Dutch, who had established trade posts in some coastal places in the 
middle of the 17th century, conquered the Padang Highlands, the center of 
Minangkabau, between 1Θ22 en 1Θ37. Village judicial institutions were of­
ficially recognized by the Dutch in the first period of the colonial ad­
ministration. Until the seventies of the 19th century criminal offences 
were officially tried by adat functionaries (see Kahn 1976: 86; Taufic 
Abdullah 1971: 6). However, from 1837 on European administrators handled 
disputes concerning public order, politiezaken (see Couperus 1882: 64 
ff). Since many disputes concerning land and inheritance involved viol­
ence, they exerted considerable influence on the administration of jus­
tice. From 1874 - 1935 village administration of justice was officially 
not recoqnized, although in practice it never disappeared. In 1935 it was 
officially rehabilitated, but appeal to the State Court was always pos­
sible. 1 Э Thus 'village justice', dorpsjustitie, has been performed by 
adat institutions and institutions of local administration the composi­
tion of which has undergone several changes before and after Indonesia's 
independence. The provincial regulation in force during the time of our 
field research, SK 015/GSB/1968, provided for a mayor, Wali Nagari, ap­
pointed by the district head, a council of representatives, Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Nagari (DPRN), chosen in general elections, and the 
Village Council, Kerapatan Nagari, of which the mayor was the president. 
The DPRN was abolished in 197 5 and its functions were taken over by the 
Village Council, which now advises the mayor.15 The village is further 
subdivided into village sections, jorong, each with a section head, Wali 
Jorong, and a section council, with functions similar to those of the 
buek, namely in neighbourhood matters. The borders of these two types of 
neighbourhoods overlap partly and the section head usually is an import­
ant member of the buek as well. 
Headed by the mayor, the Village Council acts among other things as a 
mediating body, hakim perdamaian, in disputes. For this mediating task it 
is divided into three sections: an adat section, a religious section, and 
a general section. In practice the mayor decides all disputes submitted 
to the Village Council with his section heads only. These disputes usual­
ly concern adat questions, sometimes but not necessarily connected with 
problems of public order. The Village Council was supposed to act accord­
ing to the local adat, i.e. observing adat principles of decision-making. 
In fact it decided cases submitted to it in a rather authoritarian way. 
Matters concerning religious affairs are usually settled in the prayer 
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houses by religious leaders. The village registrar of Marriage, Divorce 
and Remarriage (Pembantu Pegawai Pencatat Nikah Thalak Rujuk, P3NTR) 
deals with marriage affairs (see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 129). Ac­
cording to the administration kept in the village hall the Village Coun­
cil decides some 10 disputes per year (see Table 1 ) . It is impossible to 
assess how many cases are dealt with by the mayor informally. 
Adat government and the local arms of the state administration exist 
side by side. The power of the adat leaders has increasingly weakened and 
many panghuluships are vacant, due to the decreased prestige of the of­
fice and the struggles within the buah gadang between rival sub-lin­
eages. 1 6 Nevertheless, the adat structures still exist, and adat leaders 
still have enough power to make local administration impossible without 
them. On the other hand, the institutions of local administration, most 
members of which usually are also adat or Islamic leaders, are strong 
enough to make adat government impossible without their cooperation. 
Above the village level there are still more institutions to which 
Minangkabau disputants can bring their cases. Each district in West Suma­
tra, each comprising 70-Θ0 villages, has a State Court, Pengadilan 
Negeri. This is the lowest level of the regular State Court hierarchy. 
Appeal, banding, lies open to the High Court, Pengadilan Tinggi, in 
Padang and review, kasasi, to the Supreme Court, Mahkamah Agung, in 
Jakarta. 1 7 Judges are trained lawyers, ideally with the full university 
law degree, Sarjana Hukum. The lower courts still have a number of judges 
with only an administrative college degree or the first law degree, 
Sarjana Muda. At university lawyers are trained mainly in national - and 
Table 1 
Caseload Village Council, 1973 - July 197 5* 
Tc 
І! 
sawah (wet ricefield) 
garden 
fishpond 
surau (men's house) 
land translations 
ulayat land*** 
wakaf (pious endowment) 
unclear 
Total Issues** 
jtal** 
;sues 
12 
2 
3 
1 
4 
1 
1 
3 
27 
relationship of parties 
intra-
lineage 
10 
1 
3 
1 
3 
3 
21 
iFaB 
1 vs 
1 CH 
-
-
1 
-
1 
1neigh-
Ibour-
Ihood 
1 
1 
-
1 
3 
• 1 inter 
Isuku 
1 
1 
1 
-
1 
2 
outcome 
set-I not I un- 1 
tied 1 set-1 clear 1 
Itledl 1 
5 
1 
2 
1 
2 
11 
6 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
12 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
The total of registered disputes was 22. The real number of disputes 
dealt with by the Village Council must have been considerably higher, 
judging from the numbering on the settlement proposals. In 1973 the 
highest number was 13, but only 7 cases were registered; in 1974 the 
highest number was 10, but only 5 cases were registered. 
Some disputes involved more than one issue, which accounts for the 
difference between the total number of registered disputes (22) and 
total issues (27). 
land, not belonging to the pusako of a particular suku, but to the 
community as a whole. Cf. F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 139 ff. 
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Table 2 
Caseload according to the registers of the State Courts in Bukittinggi 
(1968-1974), Batusangkar (1969-1974) and Payakumbuh (1968-1974) 
A. 
Types of Dispute 
house/shop 
land and/or pusako 
land transactions 
other transactions 
gelar* 
pancaharian** 
inheritance 
distribution (pembagian) 
divorce 
debts 
Total cases*** 
Type of Party 
bank 
representation by 
mamak kepala waris 
Disposition without Final 
amicable settlement 
withdrawals 
Civil Disp 
Bukittingi 
55 
157 
86 
7 
-
12 
59 
12 
2 
68 
272 
47 
100 
Judgment 
44 
39 
ites (oon tent 
Batusangkar 
10 
114 
53 
4 
5 
7 
31 
7 
1 
16 
141 
12 
110 
18 
27 
ious) 
Payakumbuh 
6 
61 
30 
3 
1 
12 
24 
4 
1 
18 
86 
12 
47 
11 
4 
Total 
Issue 
71 
332 
169 
14 
6 
31 
114 
23 
4 
102 
499 
71 
257 
73 
70 
B. Petitions 
Types of Dispute 
name change 
adoption 
nationality 
declaration as heir/wali 
pension 
other 
Total Cases*** 
5 
16 
7 
29 
3 
4 
65 
3 
2 
-
25 
31 
5 
44 
-
3 
1 
10 
13 
14 
33 
8 
21 
8 
64 
47 
23 
142 
* Right to use a particular title. 
** Privately-acquired property. 
*** Some cases involved more than one issue, which accounts for the d 
ference between the total number of cases and the total number of 
sues. 
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thus western - law. Each student must follow a course in adat law, but 
this deals with no more than some general principles. Since many judges 
went to school outside Minangkabau, they have had no training in Minang-
kabau adat law during their university studies. However, most of them are 
ethnic Minangkabau and grew up in West Sumatra and thus were socialized 
there, although generally not in a village. So they have some notion of 
Minangkabau adat and learn about adat law when acting as judges. All 
judges, including those who are not Minangkabau, speak and understand the 
local language fluently. The spoken language in Minangkabau courts is 
mainly Minangkabau, but the written language, including records taken 
during the sessions at which Minangkabau is spoken, is Indonesian, or 
sometimes a mixture of Minangkabau and Indonesian. 
The registers of three courts show that of all civil disputes 86% are de-
cided on the basis of adat law, the rest being disputes involving banks 
suing for outstanding debts, which are decided on the basis of national 
statutory law (see Table 2; see also F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 293). 
Thus only rarely is reference made to written law.1B Nearly all disputes 
in the adat sphere concern lineage land or houses (often built on lineage 
land). By contrast, petitions usually do not involve adat law, with the 
exception of a rare case of adoption and some of the actions for a dec-
laration that the petitioner is the rightful heir or wali of a child. 
Since many disputes involve violence, they may be presented to the 
court either as a civil claim or as a criminal offence. In criminal cases 
the public prosecutor seems to settle disputes unofficially. How fre-
quently he does so I do not know. The criminal law officially used in the 
courts is statutory western law, based on French and Dutch criminal 
law.19 The law of procedure is also western law, modelled after the Dutch 
law of procedure, but with some simplifications and adaptations to the 
particular situation in Indonesia.20 
The state courts do not apply Islamic law. This is left to the relig-
ious courts, Pengadilan Agama, which mainly deal with marriage problems. 
78% of the caseload of the Pengadilan Agama which I studied is made up of 
petitions asking the court to declare a previously unregistered marriage 
valid. Disputes concerning property were only very rarely decided by the 
religious courts (see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 128).21 
Apart from the courts, there are other state officials to whom disput-
ants may turn: the police, the military commander, the sub-district of-
ficer, and the officers of the Office of Religious Affairs. 
The Fishpond of Batu Panjang 
I want now to illustrate the shopping activities of the various partici-
pants with a typical case history. I observed many other similar instan-
ces during my research. This case had not yet come to an end by the time 
I left the village, but the very fact that no consensus had been reached 
makes the case all the more typical : a characteristic of village litiga-
tion is that it is very difficult to reach a final consensus in disputes, 
especially in the Adat Council but also in the other forums. 
One day Katik Basa,22 together with a close junior kinsman. Rajo Putiah, 
approached the chairman of the Adat Council. They complained that they 
felt ostracized by the neighbourhood. They did not "feel like people from 
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Bukit Hijau any more, but rather as if they were outside Bukit Hijau". It 
turned out that in the neighbourhood Batu Panjang there was a dispute 
about a fishpond that originally had belonged to Katik Basa's sub-lin-
eage. The neigbourhood needed money to repair its prayer-house and had 
decided that Katik Basa's fishpond, which was situated near the prayer-
house, should be enlarged and the fish be sold for the benefit of the 
neighbourhood. The pond had been used for communal purposes since 1950. 
But now the neighbourhood wanted the pond completely for itself, enlarged 
with some of the surrounding land on which members of Katik Basa's sub-
lineage had planted 30 banana trees, 2 orange trees and 4 clove trees. 
Dt. Andiko Rajo,23 a panghulu of a different lineage within Katik Basa's 
suku pusako, had given his consent to the enlargement. He had felt en-
titled to hand over the pond, since the panghuluship of Katik Basa's lin-
eage was vacant and he was the most closely related panghulu. But Katik 
Basa had refused to cooperate since he, as the head of his sub-lineage, 
had not been formally asked for the pond. 
It was apparently at Dt. Andiko Rajo's instigation that the leader of 
the neighbourhood, Angku Duo,21* had gone to the mayor to complain about 
Katik Basa's behaviour. The mayor suggested that they should go to the 
police. The police commander of the sub-district found that there had 
been a violation of public order and locked up Katik Basa and Rajo Putiah 
for three nights. Upon their promise to refrain from making further 
trouble they had been set free again. The police commander had written a 
letter to the mayor, with a copy to be handed to the chairman of the Adat 
Council, saying that the problem should be dealt with "in the family and 
according to village adat". The mayor, however, did not give the copy to 
the chairman of the Adat Council, because in his view the Village Council 
(i.e., he himself) should mediate in the dispute. But the chairman of the 
Adat Council, being also an information officer of the sub-district whose 
office was next door to the police, managed to get hold of a copy of the 
letter. He went to Dt. Rajo Panghulu, an elderly panghulu and highly re-
spected member of the Adat Council, who often acted as his adviser. In a 
secret meeting, which I was allowed to attend, they decided that the Adat 
Council should deal with the case. Dt. Rajo Panghulu suggested that the 
Adat Council should decide to send the matter back to the neighbourhood 
which should try to find a solution. Should the neighbourhood be unable 
to do so, the Adat Council could take up the matter once more. 
A month later, nine members of the Adat Council assembled to decide 
what to do. There was some discussion as to why the Adat Council had come 
together: because it was ordered to do so from above or because it was 
asked from below? It was clear to everyone that the reason for taking up 
the case was in the first place because the police had requested it to do 
so. This being established, it was agreed that parties be heard. A week 
later there was another session at which Angku Duo and another member of 
the neighbourhood, Malano Gadang, Katik Basa, the owner of the land ad-
jacent to Katik Basa's on the other side of the pond, two panghulu of the 
neighbourhood, and the section head participated, as well as eleven Adat 
Council members. Dt. Kuniang had not come this time, "because no official 
token had been handed over",25 symbolizing the formal submission to the 
Adat Council's jurisdiction. He therefore considered the Adat Council to 
have no jurisdiction in the case, as he had told us. The two neighbour-
hood panghulu stayed inside during the whole session and participated 
freely in the discussions. Angku Duo and his companion and Katik Basa and 
his neighbour were asked to leave the room and come in one after another 
46 Village Justice and State Courts 
to answer questions put to them by the Council. 
Angku Duo and Malano Gadang were heard first. Angku Duo remained si­
lent most of the time, while Malano Gadang answered the questions put to 
them by the chairman. He stated that there had been a problem about the 
fishpond, but that the neighbourhood (umpuek) had brought it to a solu­
tion. Pressed about the alleged ostracism, he denied that Katik Basa had 
been excluded from the neighbourhood (buek perbuatan). 2 6 Although the 
neighbourhood had already tried three times to meet with Katik Basa, he 
had never turned up. Therefore no unanimity had been reached yet about 
measures against Katik Basa. Malano Gadang also explained why the neigh­
bourhood had gone to the police and observed that the police had "return­
ed the matter to where it came from" (kumbali kapado asa mulonyo). When 
the chairman asked Malano Gadang what the police had meant by saying 
this, he hesitated and could not give an answer. A short discussion flar­
ed up in the Council about the meaning of "to where it came from". Did it 
mean "back to whom the pond belonged when the dispute (persengketaan) 
started" or "to the very beginning"? That is, did the police officer re­
fer to the time when Katik Basa tried to prevent the enlargement and thus 
mean that the pond should go back to the neighbourhood? Or did he mean 
that the pond should go to Katik Basa, because it belonged to him before 
the neighbourhood asked for it? This question was asked many times in the 
course of the proceeding, but was never answered unequivocally. 
The second person to be heard was the section head. He explained that 
the police had been called in because Katik Basa had "made trouble" and 
that the police had returned the matter to the neighbourhood, which 
should settle it in such a way that Katik Basa would not suffer any dis­
advantage. "Does that mean that the pond has been returned to Katik 
Basa?" the chairman asked. "Yes ....noil" the section head replied. "The 
pond has been transferred to the neighbourhood. But it is still Katik 
Basa's property (hak milik).27 The pond had already been used by the 
neighbourhood (kampuang).2θ Therefore, the neighbourhood made a regu­
lation (perbuatan) transferring the pond from the kampuang to the neigh­
bourhood (buek)". Dt. Rajo Panghulu pressed this point a bit further: 
"Who took out the fish and brought them to the prayer house and who got 
the proceeds?" Malano Gadang started to explain that the fish had been 
caught by Katik Basa's suku members, but Dt. Putiah cut in and said: "If 
there are three kitchens (in a kampuang) all three must be taken into ac­
count. Did you leave out Katik Basa (when making the decision)?" "Yes", 
Malano Gadang replied, at which he was severely reprimanded. They should 
not have excluded Katik Basa, not when it came to paying compensation, 
but above all not when decisions were taken. In an attempt to clear up 
the problems of the various rights different persons had to the pond 
someone put forward the question whether the water in the pond belongs to 
the owner of the pond and vice versa. Dt. Panghulu Rajo quoted a proverb, 
saying that the water belongs to the owner of the land over whose land it 
runs, but running water seemed to some of the others present to be a dif­
ferent matter from water in a pond. Nobody really took up the argument 
and the discussion drifted into an exchange of more general remarks and 
questions, such as why my husband was not present. After a while the 
chairman gave a new impulse to the meeting by suggesting that Angku Duo, 
Malano Gadang and the section head had given enough information. Angku 
Duo stated emphatically that Katik Basa had not been ostracized by the 
neighbourhood. After that final statement he and his companion were asked 
to leave. The section head, however, remained. 
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Katik Basa and Rajo Putiah had entered the room while the section head 
was being questioned and had listened silently to the discussion. Upon 
the chairman's invitation they gave their version of what had happened. 
The pond and the fish belonged to their suku pusako. The neighbourhood 
had a right to ask for it, of course, if it needed funds for the prayer 
house. And of course Katik Basa as a good member of the neighbourhood was 
prepared to cede the pond. The point was not that he did not acknowledge 
the neighbourhood's right, but that it had not proceeded properly. There 
should have been an official session (sidang) to which all members of the 
neighbourhood were officially invited (diundang). Although others had 
been invited, he had not been and therefore he had not attended the meet-
ings. The neighbourhood had decided to enlarge the pond without him, but 
with the consent of Dt. Andiko Rajo. However, Dt. Andiko Rajo had had no 
right to give his consent, because he was of a different lineage. When 
the fish had been caught and brought to the prayer house he, Katik Basa, 
had not interfered. But when people came to enlarge his pond he had tried 
to prevent this. They had called the police and he had been held for sev-
eral nights. "Now this all happened before the problem (soal) started", 
he said. When he was held in custody the neighbourhood had met and decid-
ed to exclude him from the neighbourhood. He had only become aware of it 
when nobody had come to eat and drink with him when he had prepared a 
communal meal after his most recent harvest.29 
The discussion following Katik Basa's statement moved around the ques-
tion who had to deal with the problem. It soon became clear that the 
neighbourhood representatives refused to cooperate any further in the 
proceedings. They gave no useful information, insisting that the problem 
was a matter of the neighbourhood and could be handled there perfectly 
well. Dt. Andiko Rajo had not even shown up for the Council's meeting. He 
was "ill", they said - which is often a way of indicating that one pre-
fers not to come. Either you are ill or it rains. 
The Adat Council decided that it did not yet have enough information 
to settle the case, and therefore should go have a look in the neighbour-
hood. The Council went a week later: not all members, but the chairman, 
Dt. Panghulu Rajo, two juaro adat, Dt. Ketek, who was a friend of the 
mayor and was probably sent by him to see what happened, and myself. Dt. 
Putiah, who had reprimanded Angku Duo for leaving out Katik Basa and who 
on that occasion had also emphasized that the Adat Council had met only 
because the police had ordered it to do so, did not come along this time 
"because he could not walk so far" - presumably a polite way of saying 
that he felt uncomfortable about the involvement of the Adat Council. 
At Batu Panjang the small party scattered. The chairman made a sketch 
of the pond and the houses around it, while the others talked quietly 
with people who happened to be around. Katik Basa and Rajo Putiah, though 
present, remained silent most of the time. One of the reasons for taking 
a look in the neighbourhood was that Dt. Andiko Rajo had let it be known 
in the meantime that he considered the pond to be pusako property of his 
lineage. He later dropped this claim when it became clear that his lin-
eage land was not adjacent to the pond, which made his claim quite impro-
bable. 
But then something else transpired. Behind the fishpond dispute lurked 
another dispute about the panghuluship of the lineage to which Katik Basa 
belonged. Katik Basa, as the head of his sub-lineage, had claimed that he 
was entitled to it, but other sub-lineages had disputed this claim, and 
no solution had yet been found. Katik Basa appeared to have used the 
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fishpond as a test case: by establishing his sub-lineage's rights to the 
pond he hoped to further his claim to the vacant panghuluship. But Dt. 
Andiko Rajo was not interested in another panghulu in his suku, for as 
long as there was none he could unofficially represent the other lineage, 
as he had tried to do in this case. All this became clear in the small 
chats which are always such an important part of settlement procedures. 
Information is gathered in seemingly unstructured conversations, often 
through intermediaries. 
Afterwards everyone went back to the village hall where the neighbour-
hood panghulu were expected to give further information, so that a solu-
tion might be found. Dt. Andiko Rajo again did not turn up and the neigh-
bourhood panghulu successfully sabotaged the session. They merrily pro-
duced innumerable adat proverbs, but no concrete information. The chair-
man did his best to enlist their cooperation, emphasizing that he did 
"not want 'answers' (jawab) - which is what the courts would ask for -
but merely 'information and explanation' (bahan, keterangan)", and that 
"the Adat Council only wanted to 'give advice' (memberi anjuran perda-
maian), not to decide". But to no avail. They simply evaded every ques-
tion, often giving answers not fitting the question. Dt. Malano, a neigh-
bourhood panghulu said: "What do you want? We have Katik Basa's admission 
(to the police). As far as there is an adat issue involved, that will be 
submitted to the hindu". "What do the neighbourhood members think of the 
dispute?" the chairman asked. "That is up to them; we cannot decide 
that", Dt. Malano replied. Dt. Putiah tried to elicit some more informa-
tion about the ostracism: "According to our findings Katik Basa does not 
seem to have been excluded. How about that?" to which Dt. Indo Basa, a 
neighbourhood panghulu of a different suku pusako from Katik Basa's re-
plied: "It is Dt. Malano's and Dt. Andiko Rajo's right and responsibility 
to mediate in that matter. It is their suku". Gradually everybody became 
merrier and merrier. And finally Rajo Putiah, Katik Basa's kinsman, 
brought in tea and fried banana's after which Dt. Putiah once more tried 
to proceed with the discussion, but without success. The chairman then 
made an end to the session: "Since Dt. Andiko Rajo is not present, no 
more information can be expected. We should finish now, I think". 
The final solution the Adat Council arrived at was as clever as it was 
without substance. It decided that, since the dispute concerned a neigh-
bourhood matter, it should "be returned to its source (kapado asa mulo-
nyo), to be settled acording to neighbourhood regulations, leaving nobody 
out". Having thus formally decided, the Adat Council washed its hands of 
the matter. Of course this was no solution and everybody knew it. When I 
talked about the case with Dt. Panghulu Rajo, he laughed and said that 
the case was not settled yet. There would be a lot more trouble, but that 
was the neighbourhood's problem. And so the dispute still hung in the air 
when we left several months later).293 
Conmente 
There were several closely related aspects of the case in dispute: 
1. The problem of the panghuluship in Katik Basa's lineage; this dispute 
was still at the lineage level but could eventually evolve into a con-
flict in which the suku had jurisdiction. 
2. The briefly posed question of whom the fishpond belonged to - a pusako 
matter which therefore also concerned the suku. 
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3. The question of whether the neighbourhood was entitled to ask for the 
fishpond - a neighbourhood matter. 
4. The question of who had to give his consent was again a pusako matter, 
and thus ultimately a suku problem. 
5. When Katik Basa did not cooperate with the neighbourhood, it did (or 
did not) decide to exclude him from neighbourhood activities. This be-
came a matter of concern of the Adat Council since the question of 
whether the neighbourhood was justified in doing so is an adat mat-
ter. 
6. Any potentially serious trouble is always a matter of concern of the 
mayor and the police. 
How did parties shop among these institutions? The neighbourhood, through 
its representative Angku Duo, had from an early stage taken an active 
part in the shopping. When Katik Basa did not agree with the neighbour-
hood, Angku Duo went to the mayor and the police, acting as a party. But 
when the Adat Council moved in, the neighbourhood competed with the Coun-
cil as an institution of dispute settlement, and tried to draw the dis-
pute back to itself. Its members emphasized that the fishpond was a 
neighbourhood facility. They used every available argument which tended 
to establish that the Adat Council had no jurisdiction, and observed that 
for their part they did not try to usurp the jurisdiction of others. They 
gave no information on the hindu matter, nor on the suku matter, because 
that could have led to the impression that they wanted to assume the 
suku's or hindu's competence. Thus, they moved back and forth between the 
role of a party and that of a forum. 
The mayor played the game cleverly, by treating the matter as if it 
only concerned ' trouble making ' , a matter he and the police had to deal 
with. He practically ignored the other elements of the dispute and re-
frained from further involvement. Although he had refused to hand over 
the copy of the police's letter to the Adat Council, taking the position 
that the dispute should have gone to the Village Council instead, he did 
not really try to draw it to the Village Council. 
The head of the police, quite new at his post, was interested in 
making a good impression on the local village leaders. He kept Katik Basa 
and Rajo Putiah three nights at the office, to make sure they would re-
frain from 'making trouble', but did not try to decide the case. Rather, 
he sent it back to be solved according to village adat. He thus had shown 
on the one hand to be a good guardian of the public order and on the 
other hand a person with respect for local adat and not an authoritatrian 
police officer. 
Katik Basa only started to shop when he was confronted with the neigh-
bourhood, the mayor and the police. The closest related panghulu in his 
suku, Dt. Andiko Rajo, had taken sides with the neighbourhood, so no help 
could be expected from that quarter. When he felt ostracized by the 
neighbourhood, he had a good reason to go to the chairman of the Adat 
Council, the mayor's main opponent in village politics, hoping to win his 
support. Ostracism is a serious adat matter and the chairman took it up 
at once, seeing an opportunity to win a round in village politics from 
the mayor, who had disregarded adat and had sent Angku Duo to the police 
instead of the Adat Council. 
The Adat Council was not of one opinion as to whether and why it 
should take up the case. Everybody realized that the main reason for 
dealing with it was the letter from the police. This was emphasized by 
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several members, whereas the chairman and Dt. Panghulu Rajo stressed the 
adat question, thus providing an adat basis for the Council's involve-
ment. One member stayed away after the first session. He was a good 
friend of the mayor and also chairman of the adat section of the Village 
Council. According to him the Adat Council had no business in the matter, 
since no token had been offered to the Adat Council. The neighbourhood 
should handle the dispute as the police had said. 
Thus far the shopping of the parties and functionaries had been primarily 
waged in terms of jurisdiction. Everyone involved was concerned to empha-
size that aspect of the dispute which justified the involvement of one 
forum rather than another. But once jurisdiction was assumed, competition 
between the functionaries was expressed in different terms. Everything a 
functionary did was scrutinized, every mistake was noted. This in itself 
is not very remarkable; what is remarkable is the kind of criticism used 
in this competition: the arguments concerned adat procedure and hardly 
ever the norms of substantive law. For example : 
- Katik Basa said to the neighbourhood representatives: "Of course you 
may have my fishpond, but you must ask for it properly". 
- The chairman of the Adat Council reproached the mayor for advising the 
neighbourhood to go to the police, for this is considered to go against 
adat. 
- The elderly Dt. Putiah severely criticized the neighbourhood for having 
excluded Katik Basa from the discussions. 
- When the ostracism was discussed in the Adat Council, the neighbourhood 
people said: "We have not made a decision yet, because Katik Basa did 
not attend the meetings. Your [that is Dt. Putiah's] criticism is not 
justified". 
- Katik Basa had not turned up at the neighbourhood discussions because 
he did not 'know' about them. Of course he knew, but he had not been 
formally invited. 30 
- The neighbourhood criticized Dt. Panghulu Rajo for coming to Batu Pan-
jang, because no members of his suku lived in the buek and he therefore 
had no business there.31 
- The mayor reprimanded the chairman of the Adat Council for going to Ba-
tu Panjang without his consent. Even judges of the State Courts were 
not allowed to do that. 
- The mayor also criticized the chairman for trying to impose his person-
al decision, rather than deliberating until consensus was reached. 
- The Adat Council gave a procedural decision when it handed the case 
back to the buek. Dt. Kuniang even said that this was already more than 
it should have done since no official token had been handed over sym-
bolizing the formal submission to the Council's jurisdiction. 
I could go on giving examples, but think I have made the point suffi-
ciently clear. When behaviour is discussed and assessed by functionaries, 
this is mostly done in terms of procedure, and quite detailed 
interpretations and opinions are given. References to substantive law are 
made in the form of proverbs, but these usually have an ambiguous mean-
ing. Different interpretations of these adat proverbs are hardly ever 
used as counter-arguments. On the contrary, functionaries seem careful to 
avoid discussing rules of substantive law. Only on two occasions during 
the second session of the Adat Council did something of a concrete dis-
cussion about substantive law start to develop. When the buek members 
were questioned by the Council, the functionaries asked for facts and 
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wanted to discuss those, without venturing any opinion on the substantive 
rights of the parties. The buek members, however, who at that time un­
equivocally acted as parties, explained and justified their behaviour in 
terms of substantive rules. Since the buek had a right to claim a fish­
pond for communal purposes and since Katik Basa had refused to cooperate, 
they had the right to catch the fish and enlarge the pond without his co­
operation. For a moment it seemed as if the Adat Council would take up 
the agument, but then the discussion was cut short. At a later stage in 
the session the buek people changed roles from party to institution and 
from then on refused to argue in terms of substantive law or even talk 
about facts. Instead they put forward all possible arguments as to why 
the Adat Council should refrain from further involvement. At the final 
session the two panghulu representing the buek did not show a trace of 
willingness to discuss the conflict proper. They left no doubt that they 
considered themselves as a competing forum and not as a party. The only 
other brief instance in which an evaluation of behaviour in terms of sub­
stantive rules was made was when the section head talked about the vari­
ous rights which the persons and groups concerned had to the fishpond. 
But the discussion quickly shifted from substantive rules to procedural 
problems, such as whether all 'kitchens' should participate in the deci­
sion-making process. Katik Basa, who had invoked the Adat Council, was 
most interested in a discussion about the conflict and lingered quite 
some time upon his substantive rights. But no functionary took up these 
arguments whereas procedural points were discussed elaborately. 
It is quite unlikely that discussion of the facts of the case could 
have taken place without the participants having certain substantive 
rules in mind. These rules were in fact generally known to all, but so 
were the procedural rules. The point is, however, that substantive rules 
were not overtly used to evaluate the facts and behaviour, whereas proce­
dural rules constantly were. Proverbs containing principles of both sub­
stantive and procedural law were quoted, but that had a different pur­
pose. Whenever they were cited, the tension relaxed and the threat of 
open confrontation seemed to recede. Everyone can agree that the proverb 
is indeed appropriately cited and should be applied to the particular 
case, without having to agree to or disagree with one interpretation. At 
the abstract level at which the principles are presented, they are well-
known and accepted by all. Disagreement only comes with concrete inter­
pretation and that is carefully avoided. Citing proverbs has a very 
soothing effect. It is an appeal to the sense of belonging together, 
which is a welcome change from the tension of obvious disunity caused by 
the dispute. It also expresses a hope that a solution may be found, how­
ever profound the disagreement may seem. 
Adat Procedure ав the Framework for Villaqe Polities 
In order to understand the preoccupation with procedural rules and the 
unwillingness to discuss substantive rules, we must first take a closer 
look at adat political organization and the allocation of authority, of 
which jurisdiction and procedure can be regarded as the legal dimension. 
The political organization of a Minangkabau village rests on a delicate 
balance, the scales of which are the two principles of decision-making 
which have been mentioned earlier: decision by unanimity and leadership 
by hierarchically-ranked officials. 
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The hierarchical principle gives a chain of authority vested in of-
fices. Solutions for problems must be found at the lowest level of auth-
ority, and if no solution is found the case must be taken higher up, step 
by step, until a solution is found. As far as disputes between members of 
a lineage are concerned, its adat officials act exclusively as a forum 
and must remain impartial. If they cannot solve the dispute, it usually 
means that one of the parties does not agree with their proposal. When 
the dispute goes up a step, an official will be tempted to favour the 
party who agreed with his solution, although ideally he should remain im-
partial and merely put the problem before the higher forum at the more 
inclusive level. If the parties do not belong to the same lineage, the 
functionaries of both lineages together act as a forum. But if the dis-
pute reaches a more inclusive level, each functionary will act as the 
representative of his lineage member, and thus as a party himself. This 
dual role structure, with the possibility of switching roles - of which 
the neighbourhood in our case is a good example - is implicit in the 
structure of adat procedure. 
The other principle is egalitarian in character and thus crosscuts the 
first. Decisions must be made by a process of joint deliberation which 
continues until unanimity is reached. And all participants - all members 
of a lineage or sub-lineage; the representatives of the buah gadang on a 
higher level - have in principle an equal say. In Minangkabau ideology 
this principle is based on the fact that different lineages originally 
founded the nagari on the basis of equality. No lineage should therefore 
have a higher position than any other. 32 Internal lineage problems, main-
ly pusako matters, are the business of the lineages themselves. Higher 
adat institutions have only as much authority as has been conceded by the 
lineages and is necessary to sustain a common government, and decisions 
can only be made with the consent of the lineages concerned - a demand 
most scrupulously observed when lineage affairs concerned. 
People thus tried to prevent absolute hierarchies from developing; at 
least, lineages tried to preserve their own autonomy, which was also 
safeguarded economically by their lineage property. Wider organization 
was necessary, of course, but when spheres of socio-political competence 
were differentiated and entrusted to different institutions, these insti-
tutions, though hierarchically structured internally, stood on a more or 
less equal footing. The Adat Council was the highest authority, but it 
could assume jurisdiction only after lower officials had been unable to 
solve a problem, and when parties formally put the problem to the Adat 
Council by handing over a token, tando, a piece of family property, 
usually a ring or a kris. Unless both parties had formally submitted 
themselves to the Council, it was not competent to deal with the matter. 
If one party should continue to refuse to submit to the Adat Council, the 
Council could eventually punish him with a form of ostracism. 
The fact that the principles are understandable within the traditional 
Minangkabau context does not explain why they are still adhered to. The 
colonial government established a local government system based on adat 
principles, but it put these principles of adat authority to work in a 
different framework. It took official political and judicial authority 
away from adat functionaries, thus restricting their sphere of influence. 
It also established state courts - to which I shall return shortly - pro-
viding villagers with an alternative forum of dispute settlement. That 
such restriction of traditional authority and the provision of an alter-
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native did not result in a total breakdown of adat authority is in part 
due to the fact that authority was primarily based on kinship, and kin­
ship in turn was based on economic and political relationships. Villagers 
kept going to adat functionaries with their disputes, and were not con­
cerned whether or not these were officially recognized by the local admi­
nistration (see Guyt 1934: 127). Since the colonial administration had 
taken over most of the functions of government, the field of action of 
adat leaders was increasingly confined to the treatment of disputes. 
Dealing with disputes thus became an important instrument in the struggle 
for power at local level. Adat being the only source of legitimate power 
for adat leaders, they had no choice in this struggle but continually to 
restate adat principles as the legal basis for their activity. This was 
not difficult, because the principle of 'common deliberation until con­
sensus has been reached' had not been attacked from outside the adat sys­
tem. On the contrary, it was elevated by Sukarno to a principle of Indo­
nesian democracy, and forms an important part of the state ideology. ээ 
Thus national political and social ideals did not require a change, but 
rather reinforced the local principles of decision-making in disputes. I 
do not want to suggest that the way in which decisions are actually made 
in village institutions has not undergone change. But the changes which 
have taken place do not have an impact on my assertion that most argumen­
tation is carried out in terms of jurisdiction and procedure. зц 
It is in the field of dispute settlement that adat functionaries still 
can exert power. Jurisdictional disputes between institutions and func­
tionaries are thus the legal expression of the struggle for power. 
Given the adat principles of decision-making and the fact that power is 
being contested it is hardly ever in the interest of an institution or 
individual functionary to discuss the dispute in the light of substantive 
rules. Interpreting substantive rules and applying them to the facts un­
der dispute comes very close to imposing an opinion on how a case should 
be resolved. 36 The person who does so would be considered authoritarian. 
Besides, since the final solution always is a result of giving and 
taking, and never a clear cut application of definite rules, it might 
weaken a functionary's bargaining position if he prematurely made sub­
stantive statements about a possible solution. It is in the interest of 
every functionary to take a definite standpoint as late as possible in 
the process of decision-making. 
It is clear then that it is not in the interest of adat functionaries 
to emphasize substantive rules as long as competition can be carried out 
in other terms. But they have every reason to scrutinize procedural ques­
tions very closely. Given the basic fact that the most important criteria 
for a valid decision are unanimity and representativeness, it becomes 
crucial that the procedural rules expressing these two principles be 
strictly observed. Criticizing others in procedural terms is an effective 
way to compete for power. On the other hand, it also avoids an overt com­
petition for power, which would too obviously violate the two principles. 
One protects one's own structural interests while giving the impression 
of adhering strictly to traditions and the Minangkabau way of life, and 
without committing oneself to any opinion concerning the dispute proper. 
For functionaries in the ambiguous position between party and institu­
tions, such as the buek members were in our case, procedural arguments 
are particularly attractive because they leave open the option to act as 
a forum at a later stage. Ordinary people who participate exclusively as 
parties, such as Katik Basa, have little interest in extensive discus-
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sions about procedure. They want a solution of the dispute. But because 
different solutions can be expected from different forums, they must take 
part in the discussions about jurisdiction and procedure in order to get 
the functionary of their choice involved. Therefore, Katik Basa emphasiz-
ed that he had been ostracized, thus establishing the Adat Council's ju-
risdiction, and that he had been wrongly ostracized, providing the Adat 
Council with a procedural argument against the jurisdictional claim of 
the neighbourhood. 
Dispute processing in the Minangkabau village thus is characterized by 
competition for power among the functionaries involved and carried out in 
terms of jurisdictional and procedural arguments. It is important to 
realize that there is not only competition between institutions or indi-
vidual functionaries but also within institutions. Institutions like the 
Adat Council or the Village Council are by no means homogeneous bodies. 
This is in part due to the fact that the various forums overlap in per-
sonnel. Some adat functionaries are members of the Village Council as 
well as of the Adat Council, others are panghulu suku as well as panghulu 
hindu. Since only about twenty out of one hunderd panghuluships are oc-
cupied, it would be quite impossible to prevent a certain overlap of per-
sonnel. The result is that within the Adat Council there are several fac-
tions, each centered around one influential person, but changing in exact 
composition with every dispute or even every session. In the case of the 
fishpond one faction was formed by Dt. Rajo fenghulu, together with the 
chairman. Another faction consisted of Dt. Kuniang and Dt. Ketek, two 
friends of the mayor. Neither of them was very influential in village 
politics generally. Dt. Kuniang stayed away after the first session. He 
chose to identify with the Village Council of which he also was a mem-
ber. 
Not all Council members become part of a faction. Dt. Putiah, an influen-
tial village politician himself, in this case chose to act not as a 
center of a faction but as intermediary between the various factions. He 
did not like the Adat Council's involvement and stayed away as much as 
possible, without washing his hands of the matter completely. Such per-
sons, standing between the factions, and being trusted and respected by 
all because of previous successful settlements, play an important role in 
unifying forums and thus in the settlement of disputes. They participate 
in many private discussions, which take place at night in the private 
homes of functionaries and in small circles of three to five persons. 
During these sessions functionaries talk a great deal about procedure, 
but they also feel free to give their opinion on the dispute proper. When 
it becomes clear that opinions of the various functionaries lie too far 
apart and no agreement can be reached without open confrontation, either 
the session will break up fairly quickly and be followed by new negotia-
tions in small gatherings, or, if an immediate solution is not absolutely 
necessary, the matter will be left open until something happens which 
makes a solution possible or necessary. Successful mediation of this kind 
brings as much prestige as mediation in public stages of the dispute. 
Such intermediaries filter information and attitudes from one faction to 
the other, avoiding an open confrontation. They act as a mediator, not so 
much between parties, as between functionaries. 
But as I have stated before, successful mediation, between the parties 
and between competing institutions and functionaries, is not easy. Many 
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sessions break up because no consensus can be reached. However, the sig-
nificance of institutional dispute settlement activities should not only 
be judged in terms of whether the dispute is successfully settled in sub-
stantive terms. Take the case of the fishpond. The Mat Council could not 
reach consensus and did not decide on the dispute proper, but sent it 
back to the neighbourhood to be decided there. However, it did so only 
after reprimanding the neighbourhood for having excluded Katik Basa from 
the deliberations. The Council made clear that it was not prepared to 
tolerate gross abuse of adat principles and that, if the neighbourhood 
continued to do so, the Mat Council would step in again and decide. In 
other words, the Mat Council gave the neighbourhood another opportunity 
to exercise its autonomy, at the same time indicating the limits of that 
autonomy.37 So the refusal of the Mat Council to decide the dispute in 
substantive terms does not mean that it failed altogether as a dispute-
settling institution. Rather, it shows how functionaries handle the di-
lemma between, on the one hand, the difficulties of coming to an agree-
ment when so many persons with different views and interests are involv-
ed, and on the other hand the necessity of checking the "faux pas" of 
lower institutions. I certainly do not want to suggest that the parties 
involved, or even the functionaries, saw the fishpond case in such a 
positive light as I try to put it here. But it might give a clue to the 
answer of the question of why the village system of dispute processing 
has continued to exist, and why the Mat Council is still in use even 
though it often is unable to give a final solution to a dispute. Although 
most decisions are made on lower levels, the Mat Council affords a 
check that adat principles are adhered to. 39 
Alternatives and Limits to Forum Shopping 
The state courts are an alternative to dispute processing within the vil-
lages. Through their mere availability, they form a threat to the autho-
rity of village institutions and provide a check on excessive dispute-
manipulation at the village level. The villagers are perfectly aware of 
the fact that courts give judgments which can be executed and that they 
can overrule previous settlements arrived at in the village. And the 
courts are by no means only a theoretical alternative. Villagers regular-
ly employ courts in their forum shopping, thus demonstrating the relativ-
ity of village dispute settlement. 39 
Whereas village institutions thus have to compete with the state 
courts in addition to their rival village institutions, the state courts 
themselves do not compete with village institutions. The judges always 
ask the parties whether village institutions have tried to settle the 
case. If not, they try to persuade the parties to go back and try to 
settle the case in the village. State courts are even empowered to re-
quire a decision of the 'village mediator' (hakim perdamaian), but they 
hardly ever send the dispute back to the village against the wishes of 
the parties. The judges realize that there is little chance for a suc-
cessful mediation if both parties do not agree to try to find a solution. 
Besides, nearly all cases have already undergone a series of unsuccessful 
attempts at settlement in the village. 
We have seen that finding a conflict solution on the village level is no 
easy matter. The question arises as to whether it would not be easier for 
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the villagers to go to the state courts directly, get a decision, and 
have done with it, rather than going through the long and painstaking 
procedures of village institutions without any assurance that a solution 
will be found. Of course, it is not always in the parties' interest to 
have their dispute settled quickly. Some parties profit from a long pro­
cedure, be it in the village or elsewhere, because they get the material 
benefit from the disputed property in the meantime. They will exhaust all 
shopping possibilities in the village and then perhaps go to the state 
court just to postpone a final decision. But other parties have an in­
terest in a shorter procedure. Why do these people go to village institu­
tions and not directly to the state courts? For one thing, going to court 
is expensive, time-consuming and hazardous. Villagers find it difficult 
to calculate their chances, which makes large expenses all the more 
risky. They tend to conceive of the state courts as distant and frighten­
ing. Parties often feel as if they have lost all influence on their dis­
pute once it is submitted to the court. This is especially so when they 
have put their dispute in the hands of a representative. The persons who 
have an interest in the dispute are moved to a passive role, and those 
who are not involved in the conflict proper - judges and representatives 
- take over.1*0 The judges, the villagers claim, do not understand adat 
and are corrupt (although villagers themselves value adat most when it 
serves their own interests and do not hesitate to deviate from it when 
that is not the case). 
The factors mentioned above do not seem sufficient to explain the con­
tinued use of village institutions. My own observations of dispute be­
haviour in Bukit Hijau suggest that part, at least, of the explanation 
must be sought in the existence of social control at the village level 
which is strong enough to keep villagers from taking their problems di­
rectly to the state courts. But what sort of social control could this 
be? Part of the answer can be inferred from court statistics. From the 
court registers"1 it appears that only 11.4% of the disputes about pusako 
(lineage) property are between kaum (sublineage) relatives. The rest are 
disputes between different kaum of the same suku or between kaum of dif­
ferent suku (see also F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 307). At first glance, 
these data support the well-known theoretical proposition that the more 
multiplex and permanent the social relationships between parties are, the 
more the solution of a conflict will be sought and achieved at a relativ­
ely low and informal level of dispute processing (cf. Gluckman 1967; 
Kuper 1971; Gessner 1976; Black 1976). 
Low "relational distance" (Griffiths 1983c: 149; 1984; Black 1976) 
does not, however, explain the particular mechanisms by which dispute 
processing is contained within the village. These mechanisms do not so 
much lie in the multiplexity of the parties' relationship as such but 
rather in the control of dispute processing by the adat functionaries 
and, in particular, by the constant reinforcement of this control by the 
state courts. For people do go to court directly. Women come to court 
every day to sue for a plot of rice land, claiming that it is their 
pusako but that someone else works on it. Such grievances are not ac­
cepted by the courts. For according to adat - as interpreted by the 
courts - only the official representatives of a lineage or sublineage, 
the mamak kepala waris, may file a suit about lineage property. ц2 Cases 
in which a mamak appears as representative form an important part of all 
cases coming to court. In 51.5% of all contentious claims at least one of 
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the parties was a mamak kepala wans. If one leaves out the disputes in 
which a bank was involved, the percentage is 60% (see Table 2). The women 
are told that they cannot sue on behalf of their family. Their mamak 
should do that. If they reply that their mamak refuses to sue, they are 
told that they can either sue their mamak or go home. Usually they go 
home, since it takes too much courage to stand up against one's own ma-
mak. And he is not the one they want to sue in the first place. Even if 
they should win, that would not give them back their plot of land. 
The mamak themselves, on the other hand, often do not want to go to 
court because of the ambiguity of their position as both party and dis-
pute managing authority. Usually they have no direct economic interest in 
the land in dispute, and they may have political reasons for not wanting 
to go to court. They may even consider court involvement an infringement 
on their jurisdiction. The policy of the courts to hear only the mamak 
kepala wans thus reinforces the control over disputes by the mamak. The 
considerable number of persons, mainly women, who would be willing to go 
to court directly, cannot do so. 
The control which adat functionaries have over disputes is further 
strengthened by the role they play in court procedures. Many cases con-
cerning land-transactions are decided on evidence given by witnesses, 
land-transactions are a main issue in 33,86% of all claims. "*3 
Minangkabau rarely have documentary evidence of a transaction. Tradition-
ally, transactions are made before witnesses: if they concern land, be-
fore the mamak of the lineages which own land adjacent to the land con-
cerned. hh Judges told me that if there is a document, they can be sure 
that something is wrong. In most cases the only way to prove the exist-
ence of a transaction is by providing witnesses. Thus parties are de-
pendent on adat functionaries even when they go to court. 
There is another reason why adat functionaries play an important role 
in court cases. The outcome of many disputes depends on the kinship rela-
tions between a deceased person and the parties. Adat functionaries are 
by definition experts with respect to this kind of knowledge, which in-
cludes a detailed knowledge of the history of one's own suku pusako and 
hindu, as well as of the nagari history and constitution as a whole (see 
F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 134). The exact percentage of cases in which 
this kind of information was a central issue cannot be inferred from the 
registers. However, 73,27% of all claims involved either land or pusako 
or both. Considering that the majority of the decisions we read did in-
deed involve this kind of information, it is clear that in this respect, 
too, adat functionaries are very important indeed. 
Finally, disputes can often be decided only on circumstantial evidence 
involving inferences from the fact that a person acted in certain func-
tions during feasts, ceremonies and the like. In order to understand 
these various roles and functions judges need evidence of local experts 
on specific village adat. These experts are also by definition adat func-
tionaries. Women, even if they reputedly know the local adat well, cannot 
be and are not heard as experts. 
Adat functionaries thus play a decisive role in many court procedures. 
They are fully aware of this role and so are the villagers. Both know 
that adat functionaries are not likely to be very cooperative in court 
when they have been bypassed in the village. Thus, the state courts are 
only to a limited extent a real alternative to village institutions. 
Their own procedural demands tend to help preserve the old patterns of 
village processing. 
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Summary 
This paper has described how parties in a dispute shop among the various 
institutions of dispute settlement in a Minangkabau village and how the 
institutions shop for disputes. This reciprocal shopping proceeds in the 
first place in terms of arguments over jurisdiction. Depending on Which 
aspect of the dispute is emphasized, a different institution can assume 
jurisdiction. Once jurisdiction is established, everything that happens 
and has happened in the case is publicly evaluated in terms of procedu-
ral norms. Functionaries from that stage on argue mainly in terms of pro-
cedure and so do parties, especially those with an ambiguous role of par-
ty and institution. I explained that this is a consequence of the socio-
political structure of the village and also of adat principles of deci-
sion-making which reflect the socio-political structure. Decisions must 
be made unanimously and accepted by all persons concerned. It is, how-
ever, difficult to reach consensus. Many conflicts remain unresolved due 
to the manipulations of village functionaries. Yet there are limits to 
such manipulations. In the village, these limits are mainly drawn by the 
Mat Council. Though it rarely decides disputes, it does check the other 
village institutions. The state courts also set limits to jurisdictional 
and procedural manipulation in the village. But they have a double and 
contradictory function. On the one hand, villagers can always go to the 
state courts, which have the power to make and execute decisions. This 
has weakened the authority of village institutions. On the other hand the 
state courts do not function as a real alternative. Besides being unpre-
dictable and expensive, their procedural requirements tend to reinforce 
shopping activities and manipulation with disputes on the village level. 
For village functionaries play a decisive role in court procedures and 
therefore cannot easily be bypassed by the villagers. 
Forum Shoppinq 59 
A aknotìleñqement 
I want to thank Franz von Benda-Beckmann, John Griffiths, J.F. Holleman, Karen 
Portier, Brille van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, Herman Slaats, Fons Stri]bosch and 
Lynn Thomas for their helpful comments. The responsibility for tnis paper re-
mains, of course, with me. The field research upon which this paper is based was 
carried out in 1974-75 in West Sumatra with a grant from the Stiftung Studien-
kreis für Internationale Begegnung und Auslandsstudien; it was carried out to-
gether with F. von Benda-Beckmann (see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979). 
Notes 
1. In her study of Minangkabau disputes Nancy Tanner (1969, 1970, 1971) also 
paid attention to the existence of a "variety of potential remedy agents and 
settlement establishments..·· [which provide) a context in which disputants 
may engage in considerable maneuvering and ally-seeking as part of their dis-
pute strategies" (1969: 24). However, she discussed the question of how 
Minangkabau make use of the three bodies of substantive law available to 
them. She did not go into the question I am concerned with in this paper, 
namely how people maneuver and seek allies. She explicitly left this question 
open (1969: 57; see also 1971: 97-99). For a general account of the different 
legal institutions in Indonesia see Ter Haar 194Θ, Gautama and Hornick 1972, 
and Hooker 1975. 
2. A more general meaning of adat is culture in its broadest sense. 
3. For a description of similar shopping activities see Gulliver 1963 and 1973. 
The choice for Arusha disputants was between three traditional institutions: 
age group, compound and lineage. There seems to be a definite preference for 
the age group. In Minangkabau there is no such clear preference. It all de­
pends on the occasion. 
4. Oi the history of Minangkabau see Dobbin 1975, 1977; De Josselin de Jong 
1951, 1975; Joustra 1923; De Pooi] 1890; Westenenk 1913, 1916, 1918a and b; 
Willinick 1909. For recent field research in Minangkabau see F. von Benda-
Beckmann 1979; Kahn 1975, 1976; Kato 1977; Mochtar Nairn 1973, 1974; Scholz 
1977; Tanner 1969, 1970, 1971; Thomas 1977. I have changed the name of the 
village in which I carried out the main part of my field research. 
5. This was in 1974, when I did my field research; cf. F. von Benda-Beckmann 
1979: 3. During the sixties this figure was more or less the same, see Tanner 
1969: 21. There is little reason to believe that it has changed significantly 
during the past six years. 
6. Dobbin (1977: 29 f) reports that Bukit Hi]au used to be famous for its gun­
powder and for its cassia, a tree closely related to cinnamon, which was sold 
to American ships from about 1790 on. In the beginning of the 19th century 
several sources report on the remarkable quality of Bukit Hi]au coffee 
(Nihui]S (1824) and Korthals (1834: 70) as cited by Dobbin (1977: 30)). 
During the period of our research hardly any coffee was grown for purposes 
other than private use. As far as I know there was one cinnamon garden, 
planted only one or two years before we arrived. 
7. Other terms used in the literature on Minangkabau referring to this group: 
buah paruik, paruik, famili, kaum. Cf. F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 61; De 
Josselin de Jong 1951: 49 ff. 
8. The juaro adat is the adat functionary responsible for order in the village. 
He was often likened to a general. Possibly in pre-colonial times he led in­
ter-village wars. Juaro adat have their own council, the rapat ]uaro adat. 
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During my research I attended one meeting of the juaro adat, and no others 
came to my attention. 
9. In theory the situation is more complex. Cf. F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 64 
ff. For dispute settlement procedures, the other levels do not seem to have 
a function anymore. I have therefore left them out of my diagram. 
10. The buek structure antedates the foundation of the nagari; possibly it is 
the oldest form of supra-buah gadang structure. It was probably used as the 
basis for the sidang system, an attempt to establish a theocracy during the 
Padri era in the beginning of the 19th century. See also Dobbin 1977: 30 f. 
Several buek joined to form a sidang, the centre of which was the mosque, 
and which was governed by mosque functionaries. In the course of time this 
sidang system was 'adatized' and integrated into the adat constitutional 
system. The functionaries, Angku or Tuangku are now considered to be both 
adat and Islamic functionaries and usually lead buek decision-making pro­
cedures. 
11. The terra buek perbuatan or perbuatan is usually used for regulations, but 
sometimes to indicate the neighbourhood itself. Umpuek is sometimes used as 
an equivalent for buek, sometimes to denote a part of the buek. The word 
kampuang is sometimes used to refer to a cluster of houses of the same suku 
pusako, and in a wider sense synonymously with umpuek or buek. Cf. F. and К. 
von Benda-Beckmann 1978: 12; F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 79 ff. I shall sim­
ply use the term neighbourhood in my case history and if necessary add in 
parenthesis the Minangkabau term used in casu. 
12. The Angku or Tuangku of each sidang are sometimes considered to be a member 
of the Adat Council. In the case history described below, however, the Angku 
was definitely not treated as a member. Cf. F. and К. von Benda-Beckmann 
197Θ: 12. 
13. Par. За, Reglement op de Rechterlijke Organisatie en het Beleid der Justitie 
in Nederlands Indie, Staatsblad 1935 - 102. 
14. The Inlandse Gemeenteordonnantie Buitengewesten of 1935 permitted the vil­
lage council, perwakilan negen, to make regulations and even impose a maxi­
mum of three days detention or fines up to fl. 10,—. If there was an adat 
court, this was allowed to punish according to adat. See also Sihombing and 
Sjamsulbahri 1975. This situation did not change until after independence. 
By Maklumat 20 - 1946 general elections were to be held to choose the nagari 
government: the mayor. Wall Negen, and the village council of representa­
tives, the Dewan Perwakilan Nagari. During the Sukarno period the provincial 
administration changed the village government structure several times. Some­
times a model was chosen which was based on western principles. See also 
Iskandar tomai 1964. 
15. Surat Keputusan Gubernur Sumatera Barat 155 and 156/GSB/1974. 
16. For a discussion of the changes in the strength and authority of panghulu in 
the 19th century, under colonial influence, see Taufik Abdullah 1971: 6 ff; 
Kahn 1975: 88 f f. On the role and authority of panghulu in the pre-Padri 
period, see Dobbin 1975: 80 ff. 
17. Undang2 tentang Ketentuan2 Pokok Kekuasaan Kehakiman, law no. 14 of 1970. 
See Damián and Hornick 1972, Hooker 1975 on the development of the judicial 
system. 
18. However, in urban areas some principles of Dutch law, such as the principle 
of bona fides, are occasionally used in judgements. They are incorporated 
into adat law, as a modern development, rather than being used in a western 
law context. See F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 307. 
19. I did not include criminal cases in my systematic research at the state 
courts, but confined myself to civil cases. Therefore I shall leave criminal 
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cases out of this discussion. See for statistics on the criminal caseload of 
one Pengadilan Negen, Tanner 1971: 235 f f. 
20. Rechtsreglement Buitengewesten of 1927. I intend to deal with problems aris-
ing from the dualism - western procedural law, adat substantive law - in ci-
vil court cases in Minangkabau in another publication. In one of the three 
courts studied civil cases are usually handled by a chamber of three judges, 
although it is not uncommon that during some sessions only one or two judges 
are present. The other two, smaller, courts acted usually with a single 
judge and only occasionally with a chamber of three judges. These last 
courts had several judges without the required law degree, whereas the for-
mer had only one without a law degree. 
21. In the 1960's about a third to a half of the caseload was made up of divorce 
cases. See Tanner 1971: 230. 
22. In this case history I have replaced the participants' names and titles with 
fictitious ones. 
23. The title of a panghulu consists of at least two components: the title 
Datuek (Ind.: Datuk), generally abbreviated to 'Dt.', which indicates the 
office of lineage leader (panghulu or panongkek ('deputy panghulu')) and 
another title belonging to the stock of titles which is the lineage's pro-
perty (sako). 
24. Angku Duo is a title, gala, (Ind. gelar) for the office of neighbourhood 
head, used both as a term of reference and as a term of address. 
25. According to adat the parties have to indicate their willingness to subject 
themselves to the jurisdiction of a decision-making adat functionary or in-
stitution from the lineage level upwards by handing over a token, tando. 
26. See footnote 11 for the meaning of umpuek and buek perbuatan. 
27. The term used here was hak milik, a general term for 'ownership' , usually 
used by civil servants and in state courts, but not so often by adat 
leaders. See F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 351 ff. 
28. Karapuang here was used in the sense of cluster of houses. See footnote 11. 
29. Katik Basa speaks here as his sub-lineage's representative. The meal is pre-
pared by the women of his sub-lineage the night before the harvest. The men 
of the sub-lineage and the women's husbands help in cutting the rice and do 
the threshing, which is exclusively men's work. The women also cut, and they 
fan and dry the rice after the men have threshed it. The meal usually is 
served around 11.30 a.m., when most of the threshing is done. Katik Basa may 
or may not have participated in the harvesting. His presence or absence was 
not discussed and was unimportant for the matter in dispute, since he spoke 
for his sub-lineage as a group. If he already had been under the impression 
that he might be ostracized, his presence would have been very unlikely. 
29a When I visited Bukit Hijau in September 1980 Dt. Rajo Panghulu told us that 
the dispute had come to an end because Katik Basa had died two years be-
fore. 
30. The word 'tahu' is used for official knowledge, acknowledgement. Since Katik 
Basa was not properly invited to a session for which a formal invitation was 
required in his opinion, he said he did not 'know' about the session. There 
is no doubt that he was fully aware of the session being held, because in 
neighbourhoods such important happenings cannot and do not remain unknown to 
anyone. A proper invitation would have been an invitation brought to him by 
the Angku Duo himself, or by another important member of the neighbourhood, 
and with a formal speech. In many court procedures one finds the expression 
that something had been done 'tanpa setahu dan seizin' of the plaintiff. 
What is meant here is also that the plaintiff formally and officially had 
not known about it and had not given his consent, regardless of whether in 
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fact he was aware of it. Judges tend to take the words in their general 
meaning and want to know whether in fact the plaintiff knew. See also 
Logemann 1924: 129; F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 193. 
31. This argument also concerns the question of jurisdiction. The neighbourhood 
made it clear that in their opinion a suku matter rather than an adat matter 
was involved and that the Adat Council consequently had no jurisdiction. 
Therefore Dt. Panghulu Rajo, as a member of the Adat Council, was not sup-
posed to come to Batu Panjang. 
32. This is true for the founding lineages only, not for 'newcomers', who have a 
somewhat inferior status. Cf. F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 63-64. 
33. Van den Steenhoven 1973: 693; Koesnoe 1969; Damián and Hornick 1972: 498; F. 
and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1980: 49; Hooker 1975: 296. The same principle of 
decision-making is known under different terms in most societies throughout 
Indonesia. Under the term musyawarah, of Arabic origin but referring to an 
Indonesian institution, it was elevated to a principle of state ideology 
under bukarno, as one of the elements of the Panca Sila, the five principles 
of Indonesian society. 
34. Ter Haar reported as early as 1929 that the actual procedures in the higher 
adat institutions were strongly influenced by state court procedures (see 
also K. and F. von Benda-Beckmann 1980: 139). For example, the phrases used 
by the chairman at the beginning of the questioning of the parties were lit-
erally the same as used by state courts when questioning witnesses. For rea-
sons of space I cannot go into this matter here. 
35. This is the case not only between traditional functionaries but also between 
them and the Village Council, which is appointed to mediate in disputes by 
Surat Keputusan Gubernui Sumatera Barat 015/GSB/1968 and 115/GSB/1975. 
36. See Tanner 1971 for other examples of disputes in Minangkabau. 
37. For a comparable decision of an Adat Council, see Tanner 1971: 136. In her 
discussion of the case she also mentions the role of procedure in the pro-
cess of settlement (1971: 141 f f). 
38. Galanter (1981) pays special attention to what he calls the "centrifugal 
flow of legal signals". It is not the number of actual decisions which make 
out the importance of a legal institution, but the signals through which it 
makes clear what it will do, should the dispute be submitted to it. This 
greatly influences the bargaining strategies of the parties, even if they do 
not go to that institution. 
39. In the period from 1968-1975, 16 cases were submitted to the state court 
from the village in which we lived. This may not seem like much, but one 
must bear in mind that the disputes were mainly between lineages or sub-
lineages and thus involved 2 to 30 adult persons on each side. This number 
was the highest of all West Sumatran villages in terms of absolute numbers, 
and near the top in relation to the number of inhabitants. 
40. What happens here has a striking similarity with what Christie describes in 
criminal cases: conflicts which are the 'property' of the conflicting per-
sons are taken away fron them by emotionally uninvolved professionals (1978: 
295-297). In other parts of Indonesia where judges belong to a different 
ethnic group from the parties and do not speak the local language this is 
said to be an even more striking feature of disputing in state courts. 
41. This research comprised the caseload of the courts in Bukittinggi and Paya-
kumbuh from 1968-1974 and Batusangkar, 1969-1974 (see Table 2). 
42. For an early critical view of this interpretation see Korn 1941: 302. 
43. The percentage is probably much higher, because a land transaction may play 
a role even though it is not mentioned in the registers as the main issue. 
44. on the function of the village head in Toeloengagoeng on Java as a witness 
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to land transactions, see F.D. Holleman 1920: 393-398. A more general dis-
cussion of the function of witnesses, inspired by the observations of 
F.D. Holleman, is logemann 1924: 114 ff. 
Official inspection of the site by the state court. Panghulu (1) and anak mudo. 
Official inspection of the site by the village council 
IV 
Evidence and Legal Reasoning in Minangkabau 
Introduction. 
Legal pluralism in non-western societies has been approached from three 
perspectives (Griffiths 1981). One has its roots in colonial jurispru-
dence. Studies of this kind are mainly concerned with the problems aris-
ing from the existence of two or more bodies of substantive law and their 
different adjudicatory institutions. Much attention is paid to technical 
legal questions such as: Which law governs a given legal relationship? 
How is the jurisdiction to be divided between the various institutions of 
dispute settlement? Which criteria determine the choice of law in those 
cases in which the bodies of law conflict? Questions of the like are the 
subject matter of interpersonal law (Dutch: intergentiel recht).1 Al-
though they consist to a great extent of discussions of a legal dogmatic 
character, they often also go into the politics and ethics of law, for 
example in matters concerning the recognition of native law or the rela-
tive 'appropriateness' of western law for the indigenous population.2 
The second approach focusses on changes in one body of law under the 
influence of another. Usually such studies deal with changes in indige-
nous law and institutions of dispute management, resulting from the 
introduction of colonial or otherwise western-styled laws and courts.3 
Occasionally changes in the national law under the influence of folk laws 
are the central theme (cf. Fitzpatrick 1980). 
The third and anthropologically most interesting approach can be char-
acterized by its focus on the 'selective use of legal systems' (cf. 
R.E.S. Tanner 1970). These studies are predominantly actor oriented and 
give descriptions and analyses of the behaviour of parties and decision-
makers in disputes. The central questions in these kinds of studies are: 
To which institutions of dispute management can, and do, parties turn in 
a pluralistic legal system? How do they perceive the possible outcomes? 
What are the factors determining their choice of a particular adjudi-
catory or mediating institution, or their choice of substantive law? How 
and to what extent do the various participants use disputes to their own 
political and economic advantage? Anthropologists who, until recently, 
had virtually ignored the pluralistic legal situation, have lately begun 
to pay considerable attention to this type of problems. "* 
In this paper I shall address yet another aspect of legal pluralism, 
which until recently has been somewhat neglected by legal anthropolo-
gists; namely the situation in which parts of two legal systems are used 
in the same process. In such processes the constitution and procedures 
are based on one - usually (ex-)colonial - legal system, whereas they 
apply the substantive law of another - usually indigenous - legal system. 
Such a constellation exists in various forms in many third world coun-
tries. The simultaneous use of elements of two different legal systems 
inevitably leads to conflicts of law which cannot be solved by choice. 
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Generally there is no clear distinction between procedural rules and sub­
stantive rules in indigenous legal systems. From an analytical point of 
view what is substantive and what procedural law is ultimately arbitrary, 
and empirically the distinctions made rarely run parallel in various le­
gal systems. Folk legal systems are usually far less differentiated than 
western legal systems. Characteristic of the legal formulation of rights 
and duties is that there is always a strong procedural element explicitly 
or implicitly included (cf. К.von Benda-Beckmann 1982). In the official 
legal systems of (ex-)colomal states the boundary between substantive 
and procedural law is usually determined by the western standards of the 
incorporated colonial law. When in a pluralistic context folk substantive 
law must be applied this inevitably means that the procedural elements 
are cut off from the more substantive rules. We should keep in mind, 
therefore, that folk law application in the folk procedural setting is 
something quite different from folk law application in the state courts 
and that it may lead to very different outcomes. Throughout the whole 
disputing process facts are interpreted and rules applied and at all 
stages of the process selections of relevant facts are made by the vari­
ous participants. Indeed, law application is not limited to the simple 
application of rules to facts. Crie cannot look at facts without a precon­
ceived idea of a rule. The choice of a rule, on the other hand, depends 
on the selection of facts. And usually a judge does not find his solution 
as a result of a logical subsumption of facts under a rule. This often is 
only a test, a rationalization, after the decision has been taken. 5 There 
are many disputes in which both the applicable rules and the occurrence 
of the events are undisputed, but where the meaning of the events or 
their relevance is disputed.6 Substantive rules in such cases are applied 
not in the sense of attaching certain consequences to events, but in the 
sense of defining and giving meaning to them. 
In this paper I shall describe and analyze such a situation as it 
exists in West Sumatra, Indonesia. The organization and procedural law of 
the Indonesian state courts are laid down in statutes, based on ex-colo-
nial law and to a great extent resemble the Dutch model of state courts.7 
As in other rural areas of Indonesia, the bulk of civil disputes in West 
Sumatran state courts concern problems of inheritance, donations, land 
pledges and money lending, and are governed by adat law, which in the 
case of West Sumatra is the folk law of Minangkabau.8 Adat, or adat law, 
is according to the official legal system of Indonesia the appropriate 
law to be applied in such matters. Statistically, in 86% of all civil 
disputes adat law is applied by the state courts of West Sumatra (cf. К. 
von Benda-Beckmann 1981: 124; 1982: 39). The courts' practice, set 
against the background of village justice, provides us with a good basis 
for studying the relationship between substantive law and procedure and 
the role of non-indigenous procedure for the outcome of disputes. 
I shall focus on the production and evaluation of evidence, a part 
of the procedure in which substantive law and procedural law are perhaps 
more intertwined than anywhere else. The stages in which evidence is pro­
duced and evaluated are particularly interesting also for two practical 
reasons. 
First, as Van Vollenhoven has noted (1931: 271), "among eastern as 
well as western peoples, and in criminal as well as civil disputes, the 
factual element dominates". Therefore, in the majority of disputes the 
outcome depends more on the evaluation of the evidence, than on the legal 
rules as such. Van Vollenhoven estimated that in disputes among Euro-
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peans, about 80% of the issues were 'issues concerning facts'. If we add 
to the facts the meaning of events as interpreted through legal rules, 
this might according to my own research be a fair estimation for present 
day court practice in West Sumatra. An understanding of the questions 
concerning evidence is therefore crucial for an understanding of state 
court procedure. 
Secondly, it is particularly in the interaction of the various par­
ticipants (judges, parties, experts, witnesses, public) at these stages 
of the disputing process that the often divergent notions of procedural 
and substantive elements come into the open. These largely escape the at­
tention of the observer at other stages, and may well have been unclear 
to the participants themselves. It is here that what seemed to be a dis­
agreement about the occurrence of evens frequently turns out to be a dis­
agreement about the interpretation of these events. Moreover, one usually 
finds here the clearest confrontation between the various interpretations 
of the dispute, between the paradigms put foreward by each of the par­
ticipants.5 This part of the process therefore tends to cause acute mis­
understandings, irritation and divergent views about what 'law applica­
tion' is about among the various participants. 1 0 
After a short introduction to Minangkabau social and legal organi­
zation I shall present the situation of legal pluralism in the field of 
procedure and evidence in the state courts. I shall then illustrate in 
more detail the major points raised with a close analysis of one dispute, 
'The Case of the Refused Mattress', which took place in the village of 
Bukit Hijau11, and wich finally was fought out in the state court of 
Bukittinggi.12 The illustration serves to show that the application of 
adat law by the court judges is something quite different from that which 
Minangkabau villagers and village functionaries conceive of as dispute 
settlement according to adat. I shall suggest that the most important 
reason for this difference is that judges have learnt a specifically 
western kind of legal reasoning which differs greatly from the kind of 
reasoning used by villagers. Many authors on comparative law have made 
the observation that western methods of legal reasoning differ from those 
of other legal cultures (cf. David 1978: 12 ff). The problem is that 
these statements often remain very general and hardly give a clue as to 
what impact this difference may have on concrete disputes (but see Ter 
Haar 1929; Kòllewijn 1954; Sauveplanne 1975). In this paper I am concern-
ed with such concrete questions. I shall suggest that the difference in 
reasoning has consequences for the perception of what the dispute is 
about and for the evaluation of the reliability of the evidence on the 
one hand and of its relevance for the basic questions of the dispute on 
the other (cf. N. Tanner 1971: 196 f). 
Tradì'tional and State Court Procedures in Minanakabau 
1 .МтпапакаЪаи воагаі oraamzation - гі lane vroaedures 
The Minangkabau are a matnlineal ethnic group who inhabit the province 
of West Sumatra, Indonesia, a predominantly agricultural area. They num­
ber approximately three million people, of whom 96% live in villages. 
Another three million live outside West Sumatra. The main subsistence 
crop is rice, which is cultivated on irrigated and dry land, alter­
natively with vegetables, grown for home consumption and as cashcrops. 
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Coffee, cinnamon, nutmeg and chili peppers are the other main cashcrops. 
Fish, chicken and eggs are produced for home consumption and for petty 
trade. Some villages specialize in crafts such as weaving, basket making, 
embroidering, gold and silver smithing and blacksmithing. 
The village, nagari, is the lowest level of state administration. It 
usually comprises several hamlets and often has a considerable popula­
tion. Bukit Hijau, with 10,000 inhabitants, is one of the largest nagari. 
The local government consists of an elected mayor, a secretary, the Vil­
lage Council, ward heads and ward councils (cf. К. von Benda-Beckmann 
1981). Magari were traditionally the highest autonomous political units, 
apart from some loosely structured village federations. 
The basic social and political units within the villages are the lin­
eages (buah gadang)1", matrilineal descent groups of greatly varying 
genealogical depth, headed by a lineage head (panghulu) and his deputy 
(panongkek). Lineages are often divided into sublineages (]urai, kaum) 1 S 
headed by a sublineage head (mamak, mamak kepala wans, the mother's 
brother who is the head of the heirs). 
Every lineage holds its own inherited property (harato pusako), mainly 
irrigated rice fields. Every lineage is part of a named clan-segment 
(suku) of which there must be at least four in each nagari. Apart from 
the common features, there is quite some variation in the supra-lineage 
structure of villages. Bukit Hijau has an uncommonly complicated struc­
ture, which I have described elsewhere.16 
According to adat, at all levels of authority, no sharp distinction 
was made between the various tasks of government and the administration 
of justice in disputes. The sublineage and the lineage heads are respon­
sible for order and peace within their groups. They represent their 
groups in inter-group activities and organize dispute management proce­
dures. Disputes must be dealt with at the lowest possible level and only 
if no settlement can be reached do they go to a more inclusive level. The 
highest institution of dispute management is the Adat Council, which may 
consist of the clan segment heads only or of all lineage heads together. 
All decisions must be made by consensus. At the lower levels the direct 
disputants participate in the deliberations. At the higher levels, above 
the lineage, they are represented by their lineage heads. However, they 
still must consent to the decision. A decision is not 'round', not valid, 
without their consent (cf. К. von Benda-Beckmann 1981: 121 f). 
The involvement of adat leaders and institutions is not confined to 
mediation or adjudication, i.e. reactions to disputes. They also play an 
important role in the management of trouble free social life. At major 
social events, mainly those involving the status of persons or their re­
lationship to property (marriages, funerals, installation of adat func­
tionaries, property transactions), they are either present or they are 
formally given notice and have to give their implicit or explicit consent 
to the transaction. In the words of Logemann (1924: 114 ff), they are en­
gaged in 'preventive law care'17. The participation of adat functionaries 
guarantees - preventively - that no infringement on the law has been 
made; that the transaction is in accordance with adat. Furthermore, their 
presence also guarantees that the rights and interests of other people 
besides the contracting parties are properly protected. In most cases the 
presence of such witnesses prevents future disputes about the transac­
tions from arising; hence the term 'preventive law care' . In the rare 
cases in which conflicts do arise in spite of all preventive activities, 
the same functionaries can testify as to what happened. But this is a 
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secondary function. Far more important is the preventive one.18 
This connection between the role of adat functionaries in trouble-free 
situations and in disputes is also reflected in the Minangkabau ideas 
about proper dispute management. According to these, the best guarantee 
for a solution to which all parties agree is a maximum of involvement -
but not partiality - of the adat functionaries, and a maximum of informa-
tion about social life in general, as well as the particular context of 
the dispute and the background of the persons involved. And they have 
this knowledge and information largely because of their role in preven-
tive law care. This in turn has consequences for the admissibility and 
evaluation of evidence. In Minangkabau adat, several means of evidence 
were recognized and ranked according to their importance. Willinck in 
1909 (911 ff), ranked them as follows: 
1) 'Personal knowleone' of adat functionaries. They usually know their 
village community well, as a consequence of their engagement in pre-
ventive and reactive law care, although nowadays not all adat func-
tionaries have a thorough knowledge of the whole community. There is 
no reason why they should not use this knowledge as fully as possible. 
Nor is there any reason why certain channels through which knowledge 
can be gathered should be excluded. Checks on partiality do not lie in 
special rules and restrictions on access to information and equal 
chances of being heard. They lie in the requirement that parties must 
agree with the solution and in the threat of being left out of social 
occasions and of no longer being asked to handle disputes. Being con-
tinuously unable to generate agreement means not only a disgrace in 
itself, it also threatens to cut the adat functionary off from es-
sential information, nowadays one of the most important sources of his 
power. 
2) Admissions. They make an end to traditional village procedures and to 
civil court disputes (cf. Van Vollenhoven 1931: 289). 
3) Tando, "visible or tangible tokens, representing the legal bonds be-
tween parties" (Willinck 1909: 914). Such tokens can exist of an ob-
ject, e.g. a keris or a ring, given by a debtor to a creditor or by 
the representive families of an engaged couple. They may also exist of 
a periodic payment of a small amount of money, for example by a share 
cropper or a pawnee to the owner of the land. Further more, tando can 
mean visible indications of non-visible relations, positions or situ-
ations. If, for example, a man lives in a certain type of house and 
wears black clothes and a keris this is a tando, an indication that he 
is lineage head. 
4) Witnesses. Around the turn of the century witnesses were hardly used 
at all in village dispute processes. Willinck mentions only one type 
of witness of any importance: the owner of the plots of land adjacent 
to the disputed plots, orang pasipandan, in land disputes (further 
called: neighbour-owners) who played an important preventive role in 
all land transactions. Their testimony was sufficient to decide the 
case. In so far as other witnesses were heard, women, strangers, gen-
erally untrustworthy persons and persons not in full possession of 
their wits were excluded as witnesses. Close relatives and persons who 
had a long standing conflict with the disputants could not testify. 
However, because witnesses were only needed when adat functionaries 
did not already know what had happened through any other source of 
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information, they were not needed very often and the restrictions did 
not play an important role. 
5. Adat oath. This was a last resort. If everything else failed supra-
natural powers were called in to decide the dispute. The adat oath 
must be distinguished from the oath on the Koran used in the state 
court (cf. Van Hasselt 1882: 67). 
6) Written evidence. This was unknown according to Willinck, but the 
Regeeringsrapport of 1864 (Report to the Government 1864: 289) men-
tioned an increase in the use of written contracts. This was later 
confirmed by Guyt (1936: 45). In several villages, mosque functiona-
ries kept a book containing landtransactions. Bukit Hijau did so be-
tween 1883 and 1897.X 
Today, the adat institutions still exist in Bukit Hijau, but only 
about twenty out of the 130 panghuluships are occupied. Their task now 
is limited to preventive law care and dispute settlement, since the local 
administration has taken over most of the other tasks of village adminis-
tration. The traditional means of evidence are more or less maintained as 
described above, but due to the fact that only a few lineage heads are in 
function, much more emphasis is laid on witnesses. However, the same res-
trictions are still valid. Women are not heard by the Adat Council. Writ-
ten documents are accepted, but the Adat Council always makes sure that 
it also has additional information. The adat oath is no longer in use, as 
far as I know. 
2. The emevqenae of the state system 
When the Dutch entered the central highlands of Minangkabau in the 
1820's, they promised to refrain from interference with village affairs. 
However, in the course of time they installed several courts throughout 
Minangkabau which were allowed to apply adat law in civil disputes ac-
cording to adat procedures, but were nonetheless controlled by the colo-
nial administration and staffed with native colonial officers. The vil-
lage institutions of dispute settlement, however, were in principle rec-
ognized. For the Europeans a separate court hierarchy was created. 
In 1874 the Regulation on the judicial organization of the West 
Coast of Sumatra brought a fundamental change. Village justice was for-
mally, though by no means in practice, abolished, to be rehabilitated 
again in 1935 as a mediating institution. However, village justice ac-
cording to adat was not restored to its original form. The Dutch had in-
troduced a village head and a Village Council which, although staffed 
with adat functionaries, did not replace the original Adat Council. Thus, 
since then there has existed within the village a dual structure of ad-
ministration, one based on adat, the other based on the regulations of 
the colonial administration. Notwithstanding numerous changes in the 
state local administration, the dual structure has been maintained up to 
the present time (cf. Sihombing and Sjamsulbahn 1975). In 1974, Bukit 
Hijau, like all Minangkabau villages, had a mayor, a secretary, a Village 
Council and a Village Board of Representatives. Village government regu-
lations make a clear distinction between administration, which is the 
task of the secretary and the mayor, and conflict management, which is 
the task of the Village Council, headed by the mayor, but consisting of 
representatives of the adat sphere, the Islamic sphere and the local 
intellectuals. The Village Council is the official mediating institution 
and was meant to replace the Adat Council. In practice the two councils 
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co-exist and the Village Council in fact consists of the mayor and the 
secretary, together with one or two friends. Therefore, the two highest 
institutions which deal with disputes are the Adat Council on the one 
hand and the mayor, the secretary and two friends on the other. And al­
though a number of lineage heads are members of both the Adat Council and 
the Village Council, they hardly ever participate in the Village Council 
(cf. К. von Benda-Beckmann 1981: 122). Although the Village Council is a 
mediating institution and should adhere to adat procedures, in fact it is 
inclined to make rather authoritarian decisions. It does admit women as 
witnesses, but not strangers, and it tends to value written evidence 
higher than the Adat Council does. 
Outside the village context, the 1Θ74 regulation consolidated the then 
incipient dualistic court system, one for the Europeans in which Dutch 
colonial substantive law was applied and one for Indonesians. In these 
Indonesian courts, adat law was applied mainly in civil matters, as adat 
criminal law had been gradually substituted by colonial law and official­
ly abolished in 1872. The change was radical, mainly because of the Regu­
lation's procedural implications. Before 1874 most of the courts with 
which the Indonesians were confronted worked more or less according to 
traditional procedures, as did institutions of village justice. After 
1874 all officially recognized courts were bound by Dutch rules of proce­
dure, including the law of evidence, although some minor adjustments to 
the Indonesian situation had been made. In essence the law of civil pro­
cedure was the same in the Dutch Indies as in Holland. This has not 
changed since. The current law of civil procedure in West Sumatra was 
laid down in the Rechtsreglement Buitengewesten (Rbg.), introduced in 
1927, which is not basically different from the procedures introduced in 
1874. The court system was unified for non-Japanese during the Japanese 
occupation and more radically after Indonesia's independence. The Law of 
1970 constituted the present court hierarchy, which consists of a state 
court (pengadilan negeri) located in every district, a court of appeal 
(pengadilan tinggi) in every province and the supreme court of Indonesia 
(Mahkamah Agung) in Jakarta. 2 
Judges are trained lawyers. Ideally, they should have a full law de­
gree, but there are some older judges who went to an administration 
school only and some very young ones with a first degree only. In univer­
sity, law students are primarily trained in national law. At the most 
they may perhaps follow one course on the principles of adat law. The 
specific adat law of an area is learnt on the job. In West Sumatra the 
great majority of judges are ethnic Minangkabau and the few men who are 
not are married to Minangkabau women. Most of them grew up in villages 
but left them when they went to secondary school and university. They all 
speak and understand the Minangkabau language fluently and much of the 
process is carried out in Minangkabau, mixed with Indonesian. The offi­
cial documents are written in Indonesian, larded with Minangkabau expres­
sions . 
In their work in court, judges are bound by the code of procedures, 
Rbg. The elements which are most relevant for the purpose of this paper 
are briefly mentioned here. In the first place, judges are at liberty to 
gather information concerning the dispute. However, in practice they have 
only limited access to information, because they usually live in the dis­
trict town, not in the village in which the dispute takes place (cf. Van 
Rouveroy van Nieuwaal 1976: 221 f; J.F. Holleman 1969: 117). Village 
functionaries live, by definition, in the village of the dispute, and 
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have therefore far better access to information. Second, in contrast to 
adat, the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff (par. 283 Rbg.), who 
must prove his claim at the risk of failure. Only rarely is it put on the 
defendant, namely in those cases where it is easy for him to prove his 
right and where, at the same time, it is very difficult for the plaintiff 
to prove his claim. Minangkabau judges keep close to this burden of proof 
rule and dismiss claims if the plaintiff's evidence is not deemed suffi­
cient, without considering the defendant's arguments and evidence. This 
also happened in the case described at length below.21 
Third, of the written evidence, authentic deeds are given the highest 
priority: their content binds parties and the judicial authorities, un­
less there is evidence to the contrary. Other deeds bind parties only if 
they admit to having signed them. Other written evidence can only serve 
as proof in connection with further evidence (par. 285 ff Rbg.). With re­
gard to witnesses, three restrictions should be mentioned: testimony of 
one witness is not sufficient proof (par. 306 Rbg.); close relatives gen­
erally may not testify (par. 172 section 1, 2, 3 Rbg.); minors and per­
sons not in possession of their full wits may not testify (par. 172 sec­
tion 4, 5 Rbg.). Apart from these restrictions judges are theoretically 
free in their evaluation of evidence. They could follow the adat way of 
evaluating evidence to a large extent, but m practice they follow the 
ranking order of the Rbg. and treat adat means of evidence, such as tan-
do, as circumstantial evidence. They also are little inclined to attach 
great value to the testimony of neighbour owners and adat experts. 
3. The etate courte and villaqe justice in villaqe vercevtion 
Village justice and state courts are alternatives which villagers take 
into account in their dispute strategies. That is not to say, however, 
that they fully understand what the courts do, nor that they can cal­
culate their chances well. Some remarks about their perception of the two 
systems should be made here, as a background against which the case 
material must be seen. 
There is a definite preference for village institutions above the 
state court. People still adhere to the ideal that only functionaries who 
are involved in daily life and who know the specific adat of the village, 
can provide satisfactory solutions to disputes. However, they also know 
that village functionaries are not beyond being partial and that the out­
come of a dispute may depend on the power constellation at the moment of 
the dispute. They complain about the partiality of village functionaries, 
but they complain that, even worse, functionaries do not know the adat 
any more, or even that they imitate courts and pass on decisions rather 
than try to reach consensus. 
They are less familiar with the way courts work. The ideal of an im­
partial judge is familiar, although they also know that many judges are 
not at all neutral. They complain that judges tend to be partial to the 
highest bidder. In general, it is fair to say that going to court is a 
gambling game for most villagers. However, they do make use of the 
courts, when they feel that they can obtain a more favourable solution 
there than within the village, but the frequency with which Minangkabau 
make use of state courts is relatively low. The state court of Bukitting-
gi has an average of 39 civil disputes per year; Batusangkar had 23,5 and 
Payakumbuh 12 per year (cf. К. von Benda-Beckmann 1981: 123). Thus, a 
sharp distinction is drawn between the two types of dispute management at 
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the ideal as well as at the practical level The ideals are different, 
but neither is fully put into practice.73 
In the following sections I shall examine how the judges of the state 
court deal with questions of evidence in a case which went through vari­
ous village institutions before it was finally brought to the state court 
in 1971, which decided in 1973. 
The Саве of the Refused Mattvess 2и 
Sutan Pangeran, now aged 72, had been a black sheep all his life. He had 
been the first man to marry outside the nagari, thus breaking the endo­
gamy prescription, and had happily slaughtered a goat to appease the vil­
lage functionaries for this self-willed act. He had also cooperated in a 
somewhat shady manner with the Dutch, for which he was not appreciated 
very much in his village. Being one of the last, or as he claimed him­
self, the very last member of the lineage of Datuk Tuah, who had died in 
197 0, he controlled much land and could afford to live a relatively gen­
erous life. He loved hunting and had two very expensive hunting dogs, the 
only outer signs of his wealth, since he was always shabbily dressed and 
his house contained hardly any prestige objects. He liked to mix in vil­
lage politics. As a close friend of the mayor, and a former military man, 
he was an active and influential member of the Village Council, which in 
many ways was the rival of the Adat Council. 2 j 
While Datuk Tuah was alive, he had managed the lineage. He had been 
informed of, and had given his consent to most contracts concerning his 
lineage land. When Sutan Pangeran and his elder brother Haji Baruddin had 
pawned lineage land under their control m the fifties and early sixties, 
Ha]i Baruddin had signed the contracts as head of the sublineage, Datuk 
Tuah as panghulu, and Sutan Pangeran as 'heir' (ahli wans) of Haji 
Baruddin. In 1962 the same three men sold two plots of wet ri'-e fields, 
with a yearly yield of 7 50 kg. unhusked rice to Katik Basa. When Haji 
Baruddin died in + 196 5, Sutan Pangeran succeeded him as sublineage head. 
The troubles started when Datuk Tuah died in 1970. The death of a pang­
hulu is always an occasion of great political activity and fighting for 
power within the lineage, which is a reason why only + twenty out of a 
total of 130 panghuluships were occupied in 1974/7 5. On such occasions 
all kinds of relatives, distant or close, attempt to get recognition as 
close relatives and heirs of the deceased panghulu. Until his death, 
Datuk Tuah, who had been an adat expert, had been the person legitimized 
to decide who belonged to his lineage and who not. After his death no-one 
succeeded to the official headship. Sutan Pangeran did not want to be in­
vested as panghulu, because that would have meant giving up his free way 
of life. The main fight over the succession had been between him and an 
old man of 70, Angku Mudo, who wanted to be recognized as a close rela­
tive of Datuk Tuah, because that would give him access to much land, as 
well as to the panghuluship. It is customary that a closely related sub­
lineage member comes to the house in which the deceased panghulu died 
with a mattress on which the deceased is then carried to the grave yard. 
Angku Mudo had come to the house in which Datuk Tuah had died, in Koto 
Barat, the neighbouring village of Bukit Hijau in which the deceased had 
lived with his wife. However, Sutan Pangeran had been present and had 
taken care that the mattress was refused. The corpse of the late Datuk 
Tuah was carried on another mattress to Bukit Hijau. Sutan Pangeran knew 
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what the consequences of acceptance would have been and he did not want 
to have Angku Mudo recognized as his close relative: because that would 
mean that Angku Mudo, as his heir (ahli wans), would have the right to 
interfere in his landtransactions. 
Angku Mudo was angry about Sutan Pangeran's successful attempt to deny 
him the status of heir within the lineage of Datuk Tuah. He went to the 
Adat Council, complaining that Sutan Pangeran ought to recognize him as 
his heir. The Adat Council tried to convince Sutan Pangeran that he 
should settle the question of his successor, since he was the last living 
member of his sublineage. If he persisted in his denial that Angku Mudo 
was the closest relative who would inherit when he died, then he should 
at least settle the question of who should inherit. The Adat Council sug-
gested that he marry a woman from his own suku. This is sometimes done 
when a lineage is almost extinct, in order to continue it."Take a concu-
bine from your own suku. Choose a woman and marry her", they suggested. 
Because he would break the suku exogamy rule he would have to slaughter a 
buffalo as an adat fine, 'to appease the panghulu', as they called it. 
However, Sutan Pangeran did not want to follow that suggestion. Instead 
he claimed that there still existed closely related lineage members, but 
they had lived in another village for several generations under a newly 
established panghuluship. These balahan, as such close relatives living 
in another village are called, would be entitled to his pusako, provided 
that they would move back to Bukit Hijau, for the right to cultivate lin-
eage land can only be exercized by persons living in the village. Most 
members of the Adat Council were not convinced that there were balahan, 
because Sutan Pangeran could not prove that there was a Datuk Tuah in 
that other village. Adat required that the panghulu in the new village 
carried the same title as the original head. Sutan Pangeran did little 
to convince the Adat Council of his contention. To us he explained: "I 
just sat there and did not answer, I let them talk because they could do 
nothing except go to court". They had no means to make him take up their 
suggestion. Shortly after, Sutan Pangeran once more defied the adat func-
tionaries, as he had done so often before. Instead of marrying a woman 
from his own clan segment to settle the inheritance problem before he 
died, he married a young woman from another lineage, with whom he had a 
son, his great pride. 
Shortly before the marriage, Katik Basa, who had bought the two plots 
of wet rice fields from Sutan Pangeran and his brother in 1962, initiated 
conversion of these fields from pancaharian, the personally-acquired 
property according to adat, into hak milik, private ownership. The im-
portant effect of such a conversion is that the land ceases to be govern-
ed by adat and falls under statutory law instead. It never becomes part 
of lineage property anymore and the owner can dispose of it freely. Katik 
Basa had registered the land with the District Land Registration Office, 
which had publicly announced that the conversion had been applied for. 
Angku Mudo learned of this announcement and saw a chance to start a court 
procedure to have his status of lineage member of Sutan Pangeran - and 
thus of his heirship - recognized by the court. 
Angku Mudo went to court in December 1971. He claimed that the land for 
which conversion had been applied for, which was worth 6 0,000 rupiah, 
had been controlled by his mamak Angku Tuo who had also received the 
harvest until his death in 1960. After he had died, Sutan Pangeran and 
his older brother had taken the land and had sold it in 1962 to Katik 
Basa without Angku Mudo's consent or acknowledgement, or of any of their 
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other heirs. Angku Mudo and Sutan Pangeran belonged to two different sub-
lineages (jurai) within the same lineage.г The lineage had not been 
split and thus the rice fields were lineage property and must stay within 
the lineage through the generations. Therefore this sale had been against 
the law or against the special adat of Bukit Hi]au. He had learned about 
the sale when he had read the public announcement of the District land 
Registration Office in November 1971. Angku Mudo claimed that with the 
application for title conversion, the defendants had wilfully taken away 
from him the rice fields, which were lineage property. He had tried to 
come to a peaceful settlement about the sale and registration, but the 
defendants were unwilling to cooperate and therefore he had had no other 
choice than to go to the state court. This was Angku Mudo's complaint and 
he asked the court to : 
- declare that he was the rightful sublineage representative, so that he 
was entitled to sue for his sublineage; 
- declare that the disputed land was lineage property of his lineage; 
- declare that Sutan Pangeran was not entitled to sell the land without 
his consent and that of the other heirs; 
- nullify the sale and reinstate the original status of the land, i.e. 
lineage property of Angku Mudo's lineage. 
Sutan Pangeran did not deny having sold the land without Angku Mudo's 
consent. He did not say from whom he and his brother Ha]i Baruddin had 
inherited the land, but stated that he did not need Angku Mudo consent, 
because they belonged to different lineages. His panghulu was Datuk Tuah 
(now vacant), whereas Angku Mudo's panghulu was Datuk Panghulu All. They 
were not of one lineage property, the grave yards of their respective 
lineages were different, they did not share an adat house, nor lineage 
forest, all of which were essential characteristics for common lineage 
membership. Angku Mudo was therefore not an heir. Initially, he even 
claimed that Angku Mudo was not such a close matrilineal relative that he 
would inherit the lineage property if Sutan Pangeran's lineage should die 
out. In other words he was not even a 'prospective heir' , ( 'wans nan 
kabuliah', litt, 'the heir who shall receive'), a person who would in­
herit lineage property but who had not the right to interfere during the 
life time of the decedent. 2 9 However, at a later stage of the process he 
admitted that Angku Mudo was his prospective heir. The second defendant, 
Katik Basa, stated that he had bought the land from Haji Baruddin, Sutan 
Pangeran's elder brother, with the consent of their panghulu, Datuk Tuah, 
who at that time had been still alive, and of Sutan Pangeran as witness. 
There had been another witness present, a member of Angku Mudo's lineage, 
but in the course of the court process this witness does not play a 
role.30 
In the ensuing deliberations of the court it is agreed by the parties and 
the court, that the validity of the contract depends on the relationship 
between Sutan Pangeran and Angku Mudo. If they belong to one lineage they 
still share lineage property and Angku Mudo's consent would have been 
necessary for a valid sale. If, on the other hand, they belong to dif­
ferent lineages, as Sutan Pangeran claims, then Angku Mudo has nothing to 
do with the sale. It would have been solely the business of Sutan Pan­
geran's lineage of which he would have been the last member. Sorting out 
the undisputed facts and the contested assertions always takes a lot of 
time and usually the court can only decide at the end of the process what 
is actually undisputed and where the real points of disagreement lie. 
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Likewise, it can only at the end really decide what information is rele-
vant for a decision in the dispute and what not. After some initial dis-
agreement the following facts were eventually considered undisputed: 
- the panghulu of Angku Mudo has the title Datuk Panghulu Ali; Sutan Pan-
geran's panghulu has the title Datuk Tuah; 
- several pawning contracts, made before the disputed sale, were made 
without Angku Mudo's presence because at that time there were still 
lineage members of Sutan Pangeran alive; 
- now Sutan Pangeran is all by himself and therefore Angku Mudo has be-
come his heir, or at least 'prospective heir'. 
What remains disputed, i.e. whether or not Angku Mudo is a lineage member 
of Sutan Pangeran, is specified in more detail. The court extracts from 
Angku Mudo's arguments six separate contentions with which he tries to 
support his claim. 
1. His genealogy indicates the relationship, but none of the witnesses 
could confirm its correctness and it is disputed by Sutan Pangeran, 
who produces his own genealogy which differs in the essentials. The 
statement of two witnesses to the effect that Angku Mudo and Sutan 
Pangeran are 'of one property' or 'of one lineage' or 'of one suku' 
are rejected as being too vague and lacking a basis. One of the wit-
nesses cannot tell at all how he has obtained the information. The 
other says he knows it to be true because "that was what the old 
people said". A 'letter of explanation" by Haji Jamillah, the widow of 
the late Datuk Tuah, indicating that the parties are closely related 
is also rejected as evidence, "because it is not made under oath, nor 
is there any additional evidence to support the statement". The court 
therefore rejects Angku Mudo's genealogy and other direct evidence for 
common lineage membership, between him and Sutan Pangeran. 
2. Angku Tuo, Angku Mudo's mamak, from whom Sutan Pangeran and his older 
brother had taken over the land, had appointed Rukaya, a woman from 
Angku Mudo's sublineage, as his heir because his own sublineage would 
be extinct after his death. To prove this, Angku Mudo brings Datuk 
Panghulu Ali as a witness who testifies that Angku Tuo had declared 
himself to be the last member of his sublineage, and that he had ap-
pointed Rukaya as his successor. This evidence is rejected by the 
court. In the first place because there is no other witness who can 
testify to its veracity. In the second place, according to Minangkabau 
adat there must be a ceremony at which such a woman is officially ap-
pointed as heir. She may not be given the lineage property directly, 
or as they say: "If the thread is torn, it must be twirled with silk". 
Since Datuk Panghulu Ali could not confirm it and there is no other 
evidence that such a ceremony has taken place, the court cannot know 
whether she was truly appointed as heir or not. The court regards it 
as unlikely because it was undisputed that Haji Barudin and Sutan 
Pangeran had a right to pawn other lineage land on their own. Had she 
been appointed as heir, and thus become a member of their lineage they 
would have needed her consent. 
3. During the Dutch era, Angku Mudo paid a debt for Datuk Tuah to get him 
out of detention. Submitted as evidence is a letter of explanation 
from a former village head, affirming his payment of Datuk Tuah's 
debt. It is also confirmed by Datuk Palimo, an elderly and respected 
adat expert and the panghulu of Katik Basa. Angku Mudo claimed that 
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according to the adat proverb "the mamak stands at the door of the 
debts, the kemanakan stand at the door of payment", his payment im-
plied common lineage membership. However, Datuk Palimo, when asked by 
the court to give his interpretation, says, that the kamanakan (lin-
eage members) of the proverb may apply to the whole clan segment and 
not to the lineage only. The court follows this interpretation and re-
jects the payment as evidence, not because it doubts its truth but be-
cause it does not accept it as supporting the claim. 
Datuk Tuah was invested with his title of panghulu in the adat house 
of Angku Mudo's sublineage. The court questions two witnesses on this 
point. One states that the adat house of Datuk Tuah had burnt down. 
Since a panghulu title must be given in an adat house, a traditional 
long house, they had made use of the adat house of Angku Mudo's sub-
lineage. But that did not make them lineage members. Datuk Palimo, the 
other witness asked about the installation of Datuk Tuah says, that 
within the clan segment one could make use of each other's adat house. 
But that by itself does not imply common lineage membership. The first 
witness also states that Datuk Panghulu Ali is the deputy, panongkek, 
of Datuk Tuah. 
Strangely enough, the files do not indicate what Datuk Panghulu Ali 
himself stated about his status. The court holds that, since the 
plaintiff and the first defendant appear to belong to two different 
panghulu, it is altogether impossible for them belong to one lineage 
or one common lineage property complex, because "there cannot be two 
cocks in one ricepot", meaning there cannot be two lineage heads in 
one lineage. This point regarding his status of deputy therefore could 
have supported Angku Mudo's claim but was not taken up. 
Datuk Tuah acted as adat guardian for the marriage of a woman from 
Angku Mudo's lineage. Two witnesses questioned on this point confirm 
this. The reason according to them was that at that time Datuk Pang-
hulu Ali had not been in function. Since the consent of a panghulu was 
required for the marriage, the closest panghulu in function, Datuk 
Tuah, had done the honours. But that did not mean that Datuk Tuah and 
Angku Mudo were of one lineage. The court goes along with this argu-
ment and holds that this point does not prove Angku Mudo's claim. For 
the same reason does a 'letter of explanation' concerning the adat 
guardian prove nothing, and nor does the letter of permission to marry 
from Datuk Tuah. 
The last argument for Angku Mudo's claim is that after Datuk Tuah's 
death Angku Mudo's sublineage had sent a mattress to Datuk Tuah's 
house to fetch the corpse. Angku Mudo had intended to bring the corpse 
to his house first and arrange the installation ceremony (which can 
only be held before the deceased panghulu is buried), at which he 
would be formally given the title Datuk Tuah. However, he did not man-
age to bring the corpse to his house, because Haji Barudin and Sutan 
Pangeran refused to cooperate. Until 197 5, when we left the village, 
all his efforts to succeed Datuk Tuah had been in vain. Witnesses 
heard on this point affirm that the mattress had been sent, but state 
that it had not been accepted and that the deceased had not been 
transported on that mattress to Bukit Hijau for his burial. Angku 
Mudo's defence is that although the mattress had indeed been refused, 
it had been refused on purely religious grounds, so that no negative 
inferences regarding his membership in Datuk Tuah's lineage should be 
drawn from the refusal. The court holds that even if it were possible 
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in Bukit Hijau to refuse a mattress sent by a lineage member on relig-
ious grounds, the court vrould follow nevertheless the general Minang-
kabau adat rule. According to that rule a mattress sent by a lineage 
member must be used, because sending a mattress expresses lineage mem-
bership. Refusal therefore means a denial that Angku Mudo belongs to 
Datuk Tuah's lineage. 
Thus, in the end, none of the evidence produced supports Angku Mudo's 
claim in the eyes of the court. Some of it is considered irrelevant. 
Other evidence is rejected because the court is not convinced of its 
truth. 
The undisputed facts and contentions mentioned before are also considered 
to be irrelevant for Angku Mudo's claim: 
- Angku Mudo had not participated in the pawning contracts of Haji Baru-
din as long as there were still heirs of Sutan Pangeran, nor had his 
participation been required. He became (prospective) heir of Sutan Pan-
geran only after all other (sub)lineage members had died and Sutan Pan-
geran was left all by himself. The court holds that Angku Mudo there-
fore cannot be of one machete, one pawning, of the same lineage, with 
Sutan Pangeran. 
- Being 'prospective heir' is not the same as a regular heir. It merely 
means that if Sutan Pangeran dies, Angku Mudo gets his lineage proper-
ty. But it does not include any right to these goods as long as Sutan 
Pangeran lives, who until his death has the full right to all lineage 
property. Angku Mudo therefore has no right to obstruct any transac-
tions concerning this property. 
The court rejects the claim without going into the extensive evidence 
produced by Sutan Pangeran for Whom nine witnesses testified, who submit-
ted his own genealogy and a letter of explanation by members of his clan 
segment and one of Pangeran Basa, an adat functionary and former village 
head at the time When the disputed sale had been made, as well as two 
more letters of explanation. The pawning contracts between Haji Barudin 
and several men and vromen from other clan segments were undisputed and 
therefore needed no further consideration. 
The underlying conflict between Angku Mudo and Sutan Pangeran involved 
far more than the validity of a contract. This was merely one aspect and 
not even the most important one. The land under dispute was not very 
valuable in itself, but the total value of all land controlled by Sutan 
Pangeran and implicitly claimed by Angku Mudo was many times as high. 
Sutan Pangeran was one of the wealthiest men in the village. And Angku 
Mudo would be very glad to share in that wealth. Moreover the conflict 
also involved the title to the panghuluship of the lineage and of the 
clan segment. Sutan Pangeran was not interested in the leadership him-
self, but he certainly hated the idea that someone else would interfere 
with his business. 
Having followed this court dispute so far, it will come as no surprise 
that Sutan Pangeran was quite content with the outcome of the dispute. 
The sale was legally valid and Angku Mudo was denied all rights to inter-
fere with his transactions during his life-time. What is more, he had 
managed to avoid the question of the balahan, the relatives in the other 
village. Until his death he could go on as he had been doing the better 
part of his life, to act on his own without bothering about others. What 
would happen after his death was a different matter. The last word had 
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not been said about that, however. Katik Basa was, of course, also glad 
that the sale was declared valid. It may be surprising that Angku Mudo, 
and even more so his younger lineage members, also had good reason to be 
quite happy with the outcome. Although his immediate claim had been 
denied for lack of evidence, he had certainly strengthened his position 
in the competition for Sutan Pangeran's future inheritance. Ttie court had 
declared him, as head of his sublineage, to be Sutan Pangeran's prospec­
tive heir. He could not interfere with and profit from any dealings as 
long as Sutan Pangeran was still alive, but that probably would not last 
very long and after his death he would have a good basis for his claim to 
the inheritance. Even though the balahan question could crop up at any 
time, a court decision stating him to be prospective heir could provide 
very strong evidence that Angku Mudo was indeed Sutan Pangeran's heir in 
a future village procedure. And even if the dispute had to be fought out 
again in the state court, the present decision could then well prove suc­
cessful evidence. There are several examples in which the court based its 
decision on an earlier decision between different persons and in a 
slightly different dispute.31 Moreover, the court decision provided also 
a good basis for a successful claim by Angku Mudo's sublineage to the 
panghulu title in the future. If Sutan Pangeran did not sell all the lin­
eage land, the future of Angku Mudo's sublineage would therefore be very 
rosy indeed. Reason enough therefore to be satisfied. 
The Judee' Reasoning and the Relevance of Evidence 
Many villagers, both regular farmers and functionaries, have great prob­
lems in understanding the courts' treatment of disputes. One of the most 
important reasons is the specific type of reasoning that judges employ. 
In this section I shall endeavour to make a close analysis of this rea­
soning in the presented case, and try clarify what makes it so incompre­
hensible for persons lacking a formal legal training. I realize that the 
reasoning in the decision is not the same as the reasoning used through­
out the process. However, I think that the points raised in this section 
are symptomatic of the whole process, although they may be more accentu­
ated in the final decision. These points are that the differences in ana­
lytical approach and in the use of norms have a decisive effect on the 
evaluation of the relevance of evidence. Moreover, because the courts' 
reasoning is not understood by villagers, witnesses, called to testify 
for one party, quite often turn out to testify against it. They do not 
expect the kind of questions which are put to them, because the questions 
are based on assumptions they do not share with the courts. Very often 
this leads to a considerable amount of frustration and confusion, even 
for people who are otherwise very well able to state their points of 
view.32 
The central question was whether the sale of the disputed land had 
been valid or not, i.e. Whether Angku Mudo's consent had been required or 
not. This depended on whether the parties belonged to two sublineages 
within the same lineage or to two lineages. Neither position could be 
proven directly, by means of a genealogy, because these differed in the 
essentials. Therefore, extensive circumstantial evidence was required. 
Each party came up with several arguments to prove his standpoint. Doth 
argumentations run along the same lines, namely that belonging to one 
lineage has certain social implications (cf. also Pengadilan Negen 
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Bukittinggi 1970/39). According to Sutan Pangeran, belonging to one lin­
eage implies, among others, to share a common pusako, a grave yard, an 
adat house, a panghulu and lineage forest. His argument is that, since he 
does not share any of these features with the plaintiff, they do not be­
long to the same lineage. Angku Mudo accepts these implications of the 
term. But he tries to convince the court that they share an adat house 
and common debts. He also adds two more features: a panghulu acting as an 
adat guardian belongs to the same lineage as the bride. Turthermore, 
someone who sends over a mattress to fetch the corpse of a deceased 
panghulu belongs to his lineage. Moreover, he claims that Angku Tuo from 
whom Sutan Pangeran had taken over the disputed land, had declared him­
self to be the last living member of his lineage and had given the dis­
puted land to Rukayah, a kemanakan of Angku Mudo. 
In the same way that the term lineage needed further specification, 
the arguments specifying that term in turn needed specification them­
selves. To prove that Angku Mudo and Datuk Tuah - and thus Sutan Pangeran 
- shared common debts, Angku Mudo maintains that he had paid a debt for 
Datuk Tuah to get him out of цаіі. tfobody disputed this fact. But the 
question was, whether such a payment was one of a "common debt at the 
door of which the kemanakan stand". And further, even if this were the 
case, what is the group to which the proverb "the mamak stands at the 
door of debts, the kemanakan at the door of payment" refers? Here the 
court does not give its own interpretation, but puts the question to a 
panghulu, Datuk Palimo, who is heard as expert witness on this issue. 
Datuk Palimo, who spent several years in ¡jail himself accused of murder 
in one of the main political struggles in Bukit Hijau, explained that the 
group which pays each other's debts is the clan-segment. Thus, the court 
concluded, Angku Mudo's payment does not necessarily imply that he is of 
one lineage with Datuk Tuah. The argument of the adat house develops in a 
similar way. The question is: what does it mean to share an adat house? 
According to Angku Mudo it implies that if a panghulu uses his adat house 
for a ceremony, he and the panghulu are of one lineage. But pressed by 
the court as to what the largest group sharing an adat house is, Datuk 
Palimo gives another interpretation. Not the lineage but the clan-segment 
is the largest group that shares an adat house in this sense. Therefore, 
the court holds that the ceremony in Angku Mudo's adat house does not ne-
cessarily imply common lineage membership. No more did Datuk Tuah's act-
ing as adat guardian imply lineage membership, because according to mar-
riage customs the consent of a panghulu is required. Since Angku Mudo's 
panghuluship was void, a panghulu of Angku Mudo's lineage or even clan 
segment could act as adat guardian for his kemanakan. This was the opin-
ion of the groom at that wedding, heard as witness here. He also denied 
that Datuk Tuah's use of Angku Mudo's house implied common lineage mem-
bership. His own house had burned down and in such a case it is common to 
use one belonging to relatives. Once more the interpretation of events, 
or the interpretation of a concept was disputed, rather than the facts as 
such. 
This was also the case with the issue concerning the mattress. There 
was no doubt that the mattress had been sent and had not been used to 
bring the body of Datuk Tuah from the neighbouring village to Buklt Hljau 
and that therefore his purpose of being given the title of panghulu had 
been denied him. Angku Mudo's interpretation was that the mattress had 
been refused on religious grounds only. The witnesses questioned about 
this issue had a different interpretation: since he had not succeeded in 
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fetching the body nor in getting the title, he could not be a member of 
Datuk Tuah's lineage. The court said it would adhere not to the partic-
ular Bukit Hijau custom but the general custom, namely that a mattress 
sent by a lineage member must be used. If it is not used, the sender is 
not a lineage member. 
Another key issue was: what does it mean that Angku Mudo is the 'heir' of 
Sutan Pangeran? What kind of heir is Angku Mudo? Angku Mudo first tried 
to convince the court that he was heir as lineage member, because Rukaya, 
a kamanakan of him, had been appointed as heir by Angku Tuo, and that the 
disputed land had been 'given' to her. But what does the term 'given' im-
ply here? The court held that according to Minangkabau adat there must be 
a ceremony. Since there was insufficient evidence to prove there had been 
a ceremony, he was a 'prospective heir', an heir who would receive only 
after the death of the owner, and was not entitled to interfere with the 
defendant's matters during his lifetime. 
The court did go into considerable detail in this dispute. It pursued 
the issues back and considered at each stage the implication of essential 
rules and concepts. But even though in the course of the dispute it got 
quite a lot of background information, it stuck to the issues concerning 
lineage membership and the meaning of heir and did not go all the way 
down to the bottom of the dispute. It did not, for example, go beyond the 
question of whether the mattress had been used or not. It did not ask 
whether it had been correctly refused, a question which is all the more 
crucial because the defendant himself had had a hand in the refusal and 
had been a major opponent to Angku Mudo's appointment as panghulu. The 
court was probably very wise not to ask this question, because it would 
have been caught in a vicious circle from which no escape would have been 
possible. The only way to legitimate the refusal would have been on the 
ground that Angku Mudo was not of one lineage with Datuk Tuahl However, 
this was probably not the only reason to stop here. If the dispute had 
been pushed further back the court would have had to deal with the poli-
tical struggle between Sutan Pangeran and Angku Mudo, even with the de-
aired succession of Datuk Tuah by Angku Mudo to which Sutan Pangeran had 
serious objections, because it would curtail his freedom. He himself had 
no ambition to become a panghulu, because that would mean abandonment of 
his 'naughty' way of life, as he explained to us chuckling. He would 
rather go pig-hunting than be bothered with family matters. State Courts 
are very reluctant to mix in political infights and tend to treat dis-
putes as non-political problems. Sometimes they have to deal with dis-
putes concerning panghuluships, but they only accept them when they can 
treat them as land and inheritance disputes. 
There is another question which was left aside. It was mentioned sev-
eral times that Sutan Pangeran fell under Datuk Tuah and Angku Mudo under 
Datuk Panghulu All. From this the court inferred, following several wit-
nesses, that the two could not belong to one lineage. Yet two witnesses 
also said that Datuk Panghulu Ali was the deputy (panongkek) of Datuk 
Tuah. According to our research findings in Bukit Hijau, a substitute was 
of the same lineage as the panghulu himself. Both were lineage functio-
naries, both carried the title datuk, but only the lineage head was 
panghulu. It was also usage - and probably more than that - that they 
belonged to different sublineages.33 The witnesses may have been confused 
because the term kaum is used for sublineage in Bukit Hijau, whereas it 
denotes lineage in the terminology used by the courts. And so the witness 
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may have thought that the judge asked whether they could belong to one 
sublineage, whereas the court wanted to know whether they could belong to 
one lineage. It is strange that Angku Mudo did not take up the point, be­
cause it would have turned an argument against him into a strong argument 
in favour of his claim. But he may have been confused as well. The court 
should have asked whether Catuk Panghulu Ali was a panghulu, in which 
case he would be a 'cock' of which there cannot be two in one ricepot. 
If, on the contrary, he was indeed a deputy, then the court should have 
asked whether he was Datuk Tuah's deputy or someone else's. The court did 
not deal with this question at all. Did it not see the problem or did it 
not want to see it? It is impossible to tell, which is all the more un­
fortunate since the argument that there cannot be two panghulu in one 
]ineage was a major ground for dismissing Angku Mudo's claim. 
Moreover, various informants made lists of panghulu and their deputies 
for us. According to these lists, Datuk Panghulu All was indeed the 
deputy of Datuk Tuah. Datuk Panghulu Ali could, of course, have cleared 
up this question, but he may have had his own reason why he did not want 
it to publicly stated that he was a deputy only. 
There is a good deal of difference between the individual judges as to 
how interested they are in the details and backgrounds of disputes and as 
to how deeply into the case they are willing to go. Some are much more 
interested in the details and backgrounds than others. And there are dis­
putes in which the court shows surprisingly little interest in the cir­
cumstances. But on the whole they make a great effort to understand con­
flicts. The complaint, heard from many persons who have been involved in 
a court dispute, that judges do not understand the disputes, refers not 
so much to a chronic and unavoidable incompleteness of information, al­
though this complaint is also frequently heard; it refers much more to 
the peculiar kind of reasoning of University trained lawyers. Every law 
student learns how to analyse a dispute, how to pick out the legal issues 
and to look for evidence. This case is a very good example of such an 
analysis. зц As we have seen the central issue was broken down into a 
series of issues, each of which was treated as a separate question. For 
each issue the evidence was checked against the applicable norm, but the 
issues were not related to each other. In the end the checklist was sim­
ply ticked off; the pieces were not put together again. This analytical 
way of reasoning is very difficult to understand for villagers, who are 
used to relate all details to each other, or to 'confuse the issues', as 
judges derogatively call this more integrative approach. This inteqvative 
approach does not mean that villagers are unable to discern the various 
issues of which a dispute consists. Much discussion is spent on the de­
tails but it never remains very long at one issue. After a short while 
others are invariably brought up, so that the dispute as a whole is never 
pushed in the background. And it seems impossible that any issue can 
get a definite decision unless the whole dispute is decided. This feature 
of village procedures makes judges call the approach confusing because 
the issues are not neatly kept apart. However, it is only confusing, if 
you expect a series of decisions after an analytical dissection of the 
dispute, but not if you expect one decision on the whole dispute only. 
The judges' way of reasoning is difficult to understand for villagers, 
not only because of the analytical approach, but also because they have a 
different way of dealing with norms. The conclusion that Angku Mudo's 
payment of Datuk Palimo's debt did not prove conclusively anything about 
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their common lineage membership because all members of a clan segment 
belong to the "kemanakan who stand at the door of payment", is absurd in 
the eyes of villagers. According to their reasoning closer relatives 
would be more inclined to pay than far relatives. Payment thus could very 
well - although not necessarily - mean common lineage membership. If it 
had been the only evidence, it would have been too little by any stan­
dard. But it was not, there was more evidence: the use of the adat house 
and acting as a guardian, for example, and perhaps the matter of the 
mattress. If the court had decided that these together were too weak as 
evidence, it would have been understood - if not accepted as correct - by 
most villagers. After all, there is no clear rule as to how many elements 
make up common lineage membership. It is left to the concrete situation 
how the elements are weighted. Usually it is a matter of give and take 
and the decision depends on negotiation and the relative power of the 
persons involved. And quite often no decision is reached, because both 
parties refuse to give in. Since the courts do not want to get involved 
in this type of negotiation, which goes against anything they have learn­
ed about proper procedures, and about how law should work, they stick to 
their own kind of norm application which could be characterized as cen­
trifugal, because it is directed towards the outer boundaries. The vil­
lage approach is more centripetal, focussing on the kernel of a norm, 
rather than on the boundaries.35 
Reliability of Evidence 
Differences in evaluating the relevance of facts account for some of the 
most salient differences between village justice and state court proce­
dures. The other main source of divergence is the difference in evaluat­
ing the credibility of evidence, which is the central theme in this sec­
tion. I shall confine my discussion to written evidence and witnesses, 
since these are by far the most important means of evidence. The other 
means listed in par. 2Θ4 Rbg, are either not proper means of evidence or 
they are hardly used at all. 36 
2. Written evidence 
Villagers know that courts attach great value to written evidence. There­
fore, they submit every piece of paper which in one way or another is re­
lated to the dispute. As a result, the character and value of written 
evidence varies greatly. There are five types of written evidence: 
1. Contracts 
Contracts are regularly produced and, if properly signed, form highly 
credible evidence, especially notary deeds. Notary deeds, however, are 
rarely produced. The problem in land disputes often is, that it is diffi­
cult to ascertain whether all required heirs have actually signed. In 
fact, that question is often crucial, such as in The Case of the Refused 
Mattress. Sutan Pangeran produced a series of contracts, signed by him­
self, his brother and Datuk Tuah, in order to prove that Angku Mudo was 
not a member of his lineage. Had Angku Mudo been a lineage member, Datuk 
Tuah would have made sure that he had been called to sign in his capacity 
as heir. Since he had not signed, the argument was that he was not a lin­
eage member and his cooperation or consent had not been required for the 
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land sale of 1962. Angku Mudo produced as a counter argument a 'letter of 
explanation' (see below under 4) from his clan segment. However, that 
letter stated merely that 'for sale the cooperation of all heirs is re­
quired, for pawning (their) acknowledgement'. The court did not pursue 
the exact meaning of that adat saying, but simply said that this state­
ment did not in any way support Angku Mudo's claim. 
2. Genealogies 
Since in many court disputes the questions of kin relationships are a 
central issue, it is very common that each party produces its own gen­
ealogy. It is equally common, as in The Саве of the Refused Mattress, 
that these genealogies differ in the essentials. They are usually only 
made when there is a conflict. It often depends on political lobbying 
whether one can recruit important lineage members and possibly also the 
mayor to sign, to give it a more official character. The whole lineage 
hardly ever signs. In fact, if one could bring the whole lineage to sign 
such a genealogy the dispute would have been solved. The President of the 
State Court in Bukittinggi strongly advocated that everybody should be 
obliged to have a genealogy. He prophesized a short-term increase of dis­
putes, but after that a great decrease, because then the court could 
simply dismiss any claim concerning kin relationships which could not be 
supported by a genealogy. However, villagers do not like the idea that 
the political constellation of one particular moment should determine the 
genealogy for the future. They are very well aware of the fact that often 
the exact relationships have been forgotten and that what are called 
bloodrelationships are rather political alliances which can easily fall 
apart in the next generation. Two segments within a sublineage may feel 
very close in one generation and live in enmity in the next. It may all 
depend on one or two individuals who happen to be powerful personalities 
and get along well together. Too many people have an interest in an open 
system with possibilities to shift alliances. And they realize that offi­
cially acknowledged genealogies would not only have important conse­
quences for state court procedures. That would not be too serious in it­
self, for it does not happen too often that a family is involved in a 
state court procedure. But such genealogies would very likely become im­
portant in the villages themselves. The introduction of compulsory gen­
ealogies would then consolidate a fundamental shift in the term lineage 
which in part has taken place in the administrative and adjudicative 
sphere already. Most lineages are made up of several matrilmeal descent 
groups. Sometimes the relationship between descent groups has been for­
gotten. In other cases everyDody knows that blood relationship never 
existed. The term lineage is multi-referential, of which common descent 
is only one aspect. There are other means of incorporation, as well as 
other indications for group membership. In the state courts and in public 
administration blood relationship is considered to be the main character­
istic of lineages. The requirement to prove lineage membership exclus­
ively by means of a genealogy, under the exclusion of all other means of 
evidence, would make the term lineage an inflexible, um-referential 
term, defined through kinship solely, instead of a flexible, multi-
referential term. 3 7 
3. Decisions by officials 
Usually disputes have had a history of settlement attempts when they fi­
nally reach the state court. Some of these attempts have resulted in a 
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decision, which may have been written down and signed by adat function­
aries or administrative officials, and sometimes one of the parties. 
Courts are required to take such decisions into consideration (par. 143a, 
161a, Изд.), but they rarely attach great value to them. They can hardly 
ever ascertain whether all required persons have taken part in the deci­
sion making process (Pengadilan Negeri Padang Panjang 1963/12). 
4. Letters of explanation by parties, administrative or a adat function­
aries and other officials. 
Such letters written by one of the parties are considered worthless evi­
dence. If others confirm the truth of their content, such a confirmation 
is treated as an ordinary testimony, which in turn needs additional 
proof. Persons who are unable to go to court, because they are too old, 
such as the widow of Datuk Tuah and one of the former mayors, or because 
they are ill, such as Rajo Kayo, who had been ill since a fiercely dis­
puted installation of a panghulu38, may write a statement instead. The 
court treats such statements as testimonies. In this case it dismissed 
them as evidence, because the writers had not stood under oath. Letters 
of explanation written by adat functionaries have a different character. 
They are not meant as a substitute for a regular testimony, but are 
statements of adat functionaries in their capacity as such. They are 
meant to carry the authority of the adat functionaries. With such a let­
ter the adat functionary indicates to the court that there is no need for 
evidence because he knows how the situation should be interpreted. How­
ever, as we have seen with the statements by the two clan-segments, the 
message does not come across. The court does not recognize village func­
tionaries as legitimate interpreters of disputes. Instead, the letters 
of explanation are treated as ordinary testimonies. And worse, they are 
often disregarded, because they do not contain the information wanted by 
the court. Had the writers been present in the present case, the court 
could have asked them on those points, but by themselves the letters had 
even less value than testimonies, the more so, because they not only 
contained a statement of what the writers observed, but also of what they 
knew from other sources. The problem is that adat functionaries do not 
realize what kind of information the court needs, and that the court does 
not recognize their legitimation as interpreters. 
5. Miscellaneous 
In this group I include all kinds of registrations and permissions by 
various kinds of authorities, such as the announcement of the registra­
tion of the disputed land by the Office of Land Registration and the let­
ter of permission by Datuk Tuah as adat guardian. Except when there is a 
notary deed, these documents are not obligatory evidence. In this case 
the announcement of the registration was not taken into consideration be­
cause the evidence supporting Katik Basa was not considered. It would 
probably not have been accepted as evidence for his title to the land, 
because the registration itself had not yet taken place. The letter of 
permission to marry by Datuk Tuah did not say anything relevant for the 
question of lineage membership, according to the court. The courts are 
also prepared to accept photographs as evidence (Pengadilan Negeri 
Bukittinggi 197l/l). 
Written evidence thus is generally quite liberally provided, but the 
kind of documents to which the Indonesian statutory law attaches special 
value is only rarely available. The documents are usually inconclusive 
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and need at least additional evidence. Hardly any court dispute is de­
cided exclusively on the basis of written evidence, but The Саве of the 
Refueed Mattress illustrates that at least one category of evidence, 
namely contracts, provides strong evidence. The plaintiff could not dis­
mantle the validity of the pawning contract between the defendants, al­
though the court was in principle prepared to accept such evidence. It 
was not convincing enough. 
2. Witnesses 
Witnesses play a crucial role in almost all disputes dealt with by the 
state courts, because written evidence only rarely is sufficiently avail­
able. Very often, such as in The Case of the Refused Mattress, the claim 
can only be proven by means of circumstantial evidence. Witnesses are 
then needed to prove most of the elements of such evidence. State courts 
distinguish between two kinds of witnesses, adat functionaries and ordi­
nary witnesses. 
1. Adat functionaries 
Adat functionaries are heard both as regular witnesses and as experts in 
local adat. Thus, Datuk Palimo was heard because he was generally con­
sidered to be a real expert in the village on Bukit Hi]au adat. The court 
asked him about the local interpretation of adat proverbs, but made it 
also clear that it reserved for itself the right to apply them to the 
dispute. 
Adat functionaries are also recruited to testify on kin relationships, 
because in the eyes of villagers they are the experts on such relation­
ships. However, the courts do not regard this knowledge as 'personal 
knowledge' in Willj.nck's sense, which would make all further proof super­
fluous. It should be kept in mind that one circumstance under which a 
dispute reaches the state court is when there is a disagreement as to the 
truth of the personal knowledge of the panghulus. This is one of the rea­
sons why judges are reluctant to assign a special status to panghulus as 
witnesses. Another circumstance is of course where there is no panghulu 
in office, as was the case in the dispute described here; thus a settle­
ment based on personal knowledge was not possible. Most judges are wil­
ling to accept as evidence statements by adat functionaries whose know­
ledge is received from forefathers and has been transmitted orally from 
panghulu to panghulu in order to preserve it through the generations. The 
requirements that witnesses may testify about observed facts only does 
not apply here. 
However not a]1 judges will accept such oral history as evidence, and 
many regard it as 'hearsay'. Facts must ordinarily be observable and 
judges follow Indonesian legal theory in this respect. Through the 
strange mixture of adat and Dutch ideas about valid and reliable evidence 
the special knowledge of adat functionaries has thus lost most of its 
high priority and for the greatest part is considered no more reliable 
than the testimonies of other witnesses. Much depends on the personal 
opinion of the judges who deal with the dispute. 
Lineage heads are generally reluctant to appear in court. One of the 
reasons is that they feel the court's dealings are an infringement of 
their own jurisdiction. They also think that judges are not competent to 
handle disputes adequately, since judges know nothing of the local adat. 
Moreover they consider their appearance in court as taking sides with one 
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of the disputants. They are forced from their role as judge or interme­
diary, who 'stands in the middle', into the role of one party's helper. 
Even though they are in reality often not at all impartial, they hate to 
appear to be so overtly taking sides. One panghulu from Bukit Hijau wrote 
to the court that he was willing to appear, but "not as a witness for one 
or the other, but to inform the court, and only on the court's explicit 
invitation" (Pengadilan Negen Bukittinggi 196B/29). Others stay at home 
and write letters of explanation instead, which results in the problems 
mentioned above, without realizing that with such a letter they also take 
sides. 
2. Ordinary Witnesses 
Ordinary witnesses may testify about observable and observed facts only. 
Because of this the testimonies of most witnesses in the present case 
were rejected. They contained information heard from others, and although 
one of the witnesses was a neighbour-owner of the disputed land, his 
testimony was valued no higher than the other testimonies. Judges are 
very sceptical about witnesses and realize that many witnesses try to 
manipulate the dispute and twist the truth in order to help one party 
win. * Administrative officials are treated as ordinary witnesses, al­
though they are perhaps more often than the others asked to give back­
ground information. 
There are several problems resulting from the application of Indone­
sian statutory requirements for the acceptance of witnesses. Witnesses 
other than adat functionaries are often more or less closely related to 
one or both parties. For evidence concerning ceremonies it may be possi­
ble to find other witnesses. Residence patterns are still uxorilocal, so 
that female sublineage members live and work closely together (cf. F. and 
К. von Benda-Beckmann 1978). If you want to prove every day events, it is 
difficult to find unrelated witnesses. And where contracts are involved 
which have not been given publicity, there is a very small circle of per­
sons who can testify and the choice is limited. But by Dutch standards, 
proper witnesses should not be related to the parties at all and cer­
tainly close relatives should not act as such (par. 172 Rbg). Most judges 
take a lenient standpoint in this matter and take ad hoc decisions to 
hear or refuse a witness. They always want to know the exact relation­
ships with the parties before they decide to hear them under oath or not. 
The decision depends, among other things, on the matter to be proven and 
on the particular social status of the witness concerning that matter. 
For example, a man who was married into a lineage was refused permis­
sion to testify that a plot of land was lineage property of the lineage 
of his wife, because "according to Minangkabau adat law men married into 
a lineage never participate in bringing lineage property of a lineage 
into cultivation". ^ 3 It is, however, difficult to ascertain how judges 
weigh a testimony from someone who is related to one of the parties. 
Sometimes they scold witnesses who claim not to be related to the par­
ties, when they turn out to be related in several respects (Pengadilan 
Negeri Bukittinggi 1974/7). But that does not necessarily prevent them 
from accepting such testimonies. They realize too well the importance of 
a testimony someone intimately familiar with the disputed events, and 
they often let that prevail above the requirement that close relatives 
may not testify. Parties quite often challenge witnesses on the ground 
that they are too closely related to the party they testify for. Usually 
the judges go on questioning, and how exactly the testimony is evaluated 
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rarely becomes clear. The fieldworker would need access to the in-chamber 
deliberations to ascertain this, which I had not. 
Another problem with this category is that the events that need proof 
often lie far back in time. Thirty years or more is no exception. This 
means that the only witnesses who can be found were young, perhaps even 
young children of 6 years old, at the time the event ook place (Pengadi-
lan Negeri Bukittinggi 196Θ/29). Judges not only accept that; they con­
sider it normal that a person's recollection goes back so far. One judge 
even rebuked a witness who used his young age as an excuse for not exact­
ly remembering 30 years later what had happened. "You were twelve then. 
Don't say that you cannot remember what happened. You were no child, you 
were a grown person. Surely you must have known who [which functionaries] 
were present". k" The requirement that witnesses must be mature persons, a 
requirement in Indonesian procedural law, but also in adat law, is thus 
taken as referring to the moment of testimony, not to the event to be 
proven (cf. par. 172, 173 Rbg.; Willinck 1909: 330 f). 
A last problem derives from the difference in opinion between state 
courts and villagers as to what their task as witnesses is. Villagers 
think that the main reason for their appearance in court is that the 
judges do not understand the dispute, or a particular issue. They come to 
court to explain and when the judge invites them to "tell all you know 
from the beginning till the end" they start explaining what the dispute 
is about and what happened. Of course they mention a lot of facts, but 
only because these are necessary for their explanation. Judges on the 
other hand, are mainly interested only in the factual aspect of the ac­
counts, except when they explicitly question experts on interpretations 
of adat. After a short while one of the judges will interrupt the witness 
and point out to him that he should only relate what happened and that 
the court will decide for itself how to interpret the information. Such 
interruptions invariably cause bewilderment, misunderstanding and irri­
tation, because the witness is convinced that that is precisely what he 
is doing. If you tell someone all you know, you tell him at the same time 
how you interpret that. Tahu is a word which not only means to know, but 
also has the connotation of understanding, sometimes of official know­
ledge. To the witnesses it does not make sense to separate factual know­
ledge from understanding. This is true for all witnesses, but in particu­
lar for adat functionaries who feel very frustrated at not being given 
enough opportunity to ventilate their knowledge and understanding of the 
situation. And because villagers do not realize what the courts expect 
from them, they miscalculate the effects of testimonies on the final de­
cision. This is particularly so for adat functionaries who are heard 
about the interpretation of the local adat. They do not understand the 
questions put to them, and I have often observed adat experts lose their 
self-assured composure when they do not follow the reasoning of the 
court. This could well have been the reason why Datuk Palimo's testimony 
turned out to be one of the main reasons for the court dismissing Angku 
Mudo's claim although Angku Mudo had called him as a witness. Datuk 
Palimo was held in quite high esteem, but he could not foresee that the 
court wanted to know the exact boundaries of adat norms and adat pro­
verbs, because adat functionaries do not reason along such lines. In fact 
it happens quite often that a witness is recruited by one party to sup­
port him but turns out to testify against him as a result of such a mis­
calculation and misunderstanding. 
90 Village Justice and State Courts 
Preventive Law Care and Evidence 
In connection with a discussion about the role of witnesses in preventive 
law care (cf. p.68 f; Van Vollenhoven 1931: 295, 297 f) distinguished two 
kinds of witnesses in disputes. The first category, which he called ox>-
zettelijk, 'intentional', contained all persons whose presence was pre-
scribed by adat for legal transactions, as well as witnesses chosen by 
parties who made a transaction. In Minangkabau panghulu, mamak, neigh-
bour-owners, as well as administrative officials belonged to this cate-
gory. They were very reliable witnesses in disputes as a result of their 
role in dispute prevention, especially the prescribed intentional witnes-
ses, who formed by far the greatest group of witnesses used in the courts 
in the beginning of this century. Because of the introduced division of 
labour between panghulus and administrative officials, they performed the 
task of dispute prevention together. Both had good reasons to stay well 
informed, because only in this way they would be asked for their services 
which in turn provided them with new information. Neighbour-owners, who 
had to attend land transactions were equally reliable witnesses in dis-
putes, even if only for a particular kind of information. A second cate-
gory of witness was called toevallig, 'accidental'. To that group all 
other witnesses belonged. They were highly unreliable and always suspect-
ed of some hidden motive for testifying, usually money. 
Van Vollenhoven's idea was important, although in my opinion it led to 
a misleading distinction. Important was the recognition of the signifi-
cance of the capacity in which witnesses testify. None of his 'inten-
tional' witnesses testified as mr. or rars. X, but always as panghulu, as 
mamak, as neighbour-owner. This capacity made the witness reliable. What 
Van Vollenhoven did not take into consideration, and what is obscured by 
his distinction, is that among the other witnesses there are only very 
few, if any, who are purely accidental, or 'chance'. Most of them also 
testify because they attended an occasion in a certain capacity. Nobody 
who attends a feast or ceremony does so for private reasons only. Their 
presence may or may not have any intentional connection with later dis-
putes and their role in preventive law care may or may not be prominent, 
but even if this element is almost completely absent, that does not mean 
that the witness was present at an event by accident. 
The tremendous increase of the population (in Bukit Hijau e.g.) 10,000 
in 1975 against 3.000 in the nineteen thirties) and a decline in the num-
ber of occupied panghuluships has meant that adat functionaries cannot 
possibly oversee the total village population or even their own lineage. 
Besides, people do not let them know as much as in earlier times. There 
is a trend towards individualization of rights, which has been described 
by several authors. " As a result adat functionaries and neighbour-owners 
are no longer always present at land transactions. And if it comes to a 
dispute afterwards, they often simply do not know what happened. These 
two factors explain a decrease in the relative importance of the adat 
functionaries' own knowledge and of the neighbour-owners as witnesses in 
village dispute management. As a result, even in the village there is an 
increase of the use of other witnesses and of written evidence, although 
this does not really weigh up against the loss of knowledge. Many dis-
putes remain unsettled. And, ironically enough, court witnesses some-
times are not asked to testify in their capacity of formal witnesses at a 
transaction but as neighbours. The main requirement is that they live 
closely together (Pengadilan Negeri Bukittinggi, 1974/7) and work on 
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fields situated closely together. The decrease of the use of adat func­
tionaries, who nevertheless still make up + 40% of all witnesses, has 
made the flaws of Van Vollenhoven's distinction more obvious than it was 
in 1931, when most witnesses still were adat functionaries and neighbour-
owners. But the fact remains that he labelled the rest too carelessly 
'chance', which they were as rarely then as they are now. I suggest that 
the dinstinction should be a more pronounced distinction in terms of de­
gree of dispute prevention. We could then make a ranking order of the 
various witnesses according to the degree in which they play a role in 
preventive law care in village life and in which they are later heard in 
court: 
At the bottom of the scale might be people working on adjacent or 
nearby fields - without owning them. They do not 'accidentally' meet each 
other frequently at work, on the contrary. They will be obvious witnesses 
on questions relating to work on the fields, although they lack the el­
ement of preventive law care. They probably know much better what goes on 
than the owners, who in turn are more likely to know about the various 
transactions concerning the fields. Between the witness who testifies be­
cause of his or her daily contact with the central person in the dispute 
and the various adat and village functionaries with their conspicuous 
role in preventive law care, lies a range of witnesses who will all be 
called to testify in some capacity or other. It depends on the kind of 
questions that need proof as to whether it is more useful to call people 
who have no role in preventive law care or witnesses who do. For ques­
tions such as who planted and harvested a certain field (Pengadilan 
Negeri Bukittinggi 1974/29), who paid the doctor's bill or school fees, 
where the deceased lived during the last years of his life (Pengadilan 
Negeri Bukittinggi 1974/16), etc., the most obvious witnesses are co-
residents and neighbours. 
A person may frequent the house of a relative and assist him/her in 
order to provide a basis to prove the relationship when it comes to an 
open conflict. Or a small boy of eight may be made to participate in a 
meal to celebrate a contract between his father and someone else, held in 
the house of his father's sister. (Pengadilan Negeri Bukittinggi 1974/ 
16). He would have been present anyway, because boys frequently visit the 
house of their father's lineage but normally he would not have eaten. His 
presence therefore is not intentional in itself, but the participation in 
the meal gives it an intentional character. 
Presence of relatives, in-laws and neighbours at ceremonies has al­
ready a higher degree of intended preventive law care (cf. Supomo 195Θ: 
108). The primary reason for such presence is the expression of sympathy 
and consolidation of social relationships. Women express their social re­
lationships not merely by their presence, but also by means of specific 
kinds of assistance (cooking, serving) or by the kind and amount of food 
offered to the hostess (cf. Prindiville 1979: 13); the men by speeches, 
seating order and payment of small amounts of money. Attending such oc­
casions is a social obligation and at the same time an opportunity to 
strengthen or weaken the relationships. All participants have a range of 
subtle means to express their approval or disapproval of the event. I 
would argue that many participants and especially the senior men and 
women also have a role in preventive law care, be it that their public 
authority is generally not as high as that of village functionaries. 
Because they are present in a certain capacity and because such occasions 
are used to strengthen or weaken relationships, they are particularly 
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useful as witnesses. They have a keen interest in registering every 
detail. 
Next on the line come the neighbour-owners. They have a personal in-
terest in attending contracts concerning adjacent land but they also have 
a public, preventive law care function. The public character of their at-
tendance is underlined by the fact that the mamak of the owning family 
acts as witness, and not the vromen who actually work the field, nor the 
person who has pawned the land, if it is pawned, who most likely has a 
better knowledge of what in fact happens. But the mamak has the public 
responsibility to stay informed, he has the official knowledge and there-
fore acts at such occasions as witness. 
Finally the witnesses who have the highest degree of intention for 
preventive law care are the adsministrative officers and adat function-
aries. According to adat only adat functionaries can acknowledge the 
validity of ceremonies or contracts by their presence or formal consent. 
In practice, administrative officials also confer a certain degree of 
validity on a ceremony or contract. 
Conclusione 
The purpose of this paper has been to demonstrate some of the problems 
resulting from the use of parts of two different legal systems in the 
same process. I have analysed a dispute in order to make clear where the 
difficulties lie and why there is so much confusion and misunderstanding 
for the various participants. This is particularly obvious in the area of 
the production and evaluation of evidence. I have shown that, although 
there are some prescriptions in each of the two legal systems which dif-
fer greatly from each other, in fact these prescriptive rules cannot ex-
plain the difficulties, because they have little practical importance, 
and judges are even willing to adjust the prescribed rules to suit the 
circumstances. The main differences between state court procedures and 
village justice lie in the area in which the courts are more or less free 
to adjust to adat procedures. However, as I have explained, judges are 
either unwilling or unable because of structural reasons to adjust to no-
tions of adat procedure, even where they are free to do so from the 
standpoint of statutory law. 
One of the major differences between State Court and village justice 
lies in the access of the various functionaries to information. Judges 
live in towns and are therefore not plugged into local information about 
people and events. They cannot interpret adat in the light of extensive 
local knowledge, nor do they know the local varieties of adat, and they 
must rely much more heavily on evidence and information produced in 
court. Their lack of local knowledge makes them at the same time suspici-
ous of accepting oral history and the official knowledge of adat func-
tionaries as evidence. Furthermore the standing and prestige of adat 
functionaries, which is still quite high in the village because of their 
role in preventive law care and their structural position in lineage and 
village, is diminished in the court context. There, they are treated more 
or less as regular witnesses, except for their knowledge of local adat. 
Judges rely less than at the beginning of this century on village func-
tionaries and neighbour-owners as witnesses, but the witnesses who are 
heard are usually heard because of the role they have in social life. The 
characterization of such witnesses as 'accidental' as opposed to 'inten-
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tional' therefore does not reflect their role in court. Rather, most wit-
nesses are heard because they have to a certain degree a role in preven-
tive law care, and I have suggested how one might order them in terms of 
their importance in this. 
Judges also differ from the village functionaries in their legal 
training which is a national university training based on the ex-colonial 
Dutch model. It leads them to separate substantive from procedural ele-
ments of a dispute which is considered strange in the village context, 
because adat does not make that distinction. Furthermore it leads them to 
adhere closely to Dutch notions of reliable evidence, even when they are 
theoretically free to follow adat notions of reliable evidence. Moreover, 
they have learnt to reason and analyse disputes differently from village 
functionaries. This different reasoning leads to different interpreta-
tions of norms and evaluations of the relevance of evidence. I have sug-
gested that the different approaches in the village and the state courts 
to the interpretation of norms may be characterized as more analytic and 
centrifugal in the case of the court and more integrative and centripetal 
by village functionaries. 
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1. See, for example, Allott 1970; Kòllewijn 1929, 1955; Lemaire 1955, 1956 and 
F. von Benda-Beckmann 1970. 
2. For a short survey of the discussions in the 19th century, see Van Kan 1927: 
161 ff,- and for the post-colonial period, see Damián and Hornick 1972; and 
Supomo 1951. 
3. For Indonesia, see Ter Haar 1929; Hooker 1978: 73; and F. and K. von Benda-
Beckmann 1981. 
4. See, for example, K. von Benda-Beckmann 1984b; E-A.B. and E.A. van Rouveroy 
van Nieuwaal-Bearends 1975 and 1984; Nader and Todd 1978; N. Tanner 1969; 
also Abel 1973a, 1980; Snyder 1980a: 775 ff; Engel 1978; Starr 1978; Roberts 
1979; F. von Benda-Beckmann 1981; Silliman 1981. 
5. Cf. Asser-Scholten 1954: 161 f. Cardozo (1954: 164): "A complicated record 
must be dissected, the narratives of witnesses, more or less incoherent and 
unitelligible, must be analyzed, to determine whether a given situation 
comes within one district or another upon the chart of rights and wrongs". 
See also K. von Benda-Beckmann 1982, 1984b; Twining and Miers 1976: 84; Van 
Gerven 1973: 75, 85; Lautmann 1972: 15 ff; Visser 't Hooft 1982: 22 f f ; 
Koopmans 1982: 79; Moore 1978: 209. 
6. An illuminating illustration is J.F.Holleman's description of the case of 
the Irate Headman (1974: 48-83). 
7. For recent studies in Indonesia H. Slaats and K. Ftortier 1984; and Koesnoe 
1977b. A similar situation can be found in the anglophone African colonies 
where English judges have to give judgement in appeals from Native Authori-
ties' (later Local Court's) judgements in which they used English principles 
of evidence (see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1970: 143 ff). Recent developments in 
Malawi show a strong tendency towards Africanization of the judicial pro-
cess, cf. Chimango 1977. For francophone Africa, see Van Rouveroy van 
Nieuwaal and van Rouveroy Nieuwendaal-Baerends 1981: 322 ff. 
8. Adat, in its widest sense, means 'way of living', culture. Adat law is a 
Dutch invention and denotes the legal rules in adat. It should be noted, 
however, that the adat law applied in state court differs from that used in 
villages. See F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981, for an analysis of this 
divergence. 
9. Roberts and Comaroff 1977, 1981: 174. This was also mentioned by Nancy 
Tanner 1969: 37 in her fascinating account of the political manoeuvering 
with the three coexisting legal systems in Mlnangkabau and the differential 
invocation of principles from Islamic law, customary law and national Indo-
nesian law. Her study was broader than the scope of this paper, because it 
covered not only state court procedures, but a wide range of other remedy 
agents as well. However, she did not address the problems arising from the 
clash of two legal systems in one institution. 
10. It is, of course, not a unique feature of Mlnangkabau state court disputes. 
Lay participants in all western state courts suffer from not understanding 
the disputing process. Much literature has been written on possible remedies 
for this enstrangement from the law and law application. However, the mis-
understandings are probably even greater in a West Sumatran state court and 
they are not limited to lay participants. Galanter 1974 gives an impressive 
analysis of the disadvantages of lay participants; cf. also Schuyt, Jetting-
hof, Lambregts, Zwart 1978: 295-296. 
11. Bukit Hijau is a pseudonym for the village in which my husband and I did re-
search during ten months of field work in 1974-1975. Except for the names of 
the towns in which state courts were located, I shall use pseudonyms for all 
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names of persons and geographical names. 
12. Although the particulars of this case are perhaps unusually colourful, the 
case is sufficiently typical of the way disputes are dealt with in West Su-
matran state courts. 
13. The Minangkabau have been quite extensively studied during the colonial era 
and during the last twenty years. Here I only present the minimal ethnogra-
phic information necessary for the specific purpose of this paper. For fur-
ther descriptions, see Kato 1982; Thomas 1977; Kahn 1975, 1976, 80; N. 
Tanner 1969, 1970, 1971; Oki 1977; Graves 1981; and F. von Benda-Beckmann 
1979; and Cordonnier 1974. 
14. The terms denoting matrilineages vary throughout Minangkabau. In Bukit Hijau 
the common term was buah gadang, others are buah paruik, or paruik. The 
term kaum is used by all state institutions, cf. P.E. de Josseling de Jong 
1951. 
15. The common term for the most inclusive sublineage in Bukit Hijau is kaum. 
Smaller parts are called jurai. 
16. For a detailed account of the social structure of Bukit Hijau, see F. and K. 
von Benda-Beckmann 1978: 6-17; F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979. On the social 
structure of Minangkabau in general, see P.E. de Josseling de Jong 1951 
1975. 
17. Van Vollenhoven 1931: 251, used the term supported observance gesteunde 
naleving of adat rules, when considering on the question why in Indonesian 
societies people generally live according to their (legal) rules and why so 
few disputes arise. Witnesses - especially adat functionaries - support the 
parties in their observance of the law. 
18. For a great range of examples in Minangkabau, see Willinck 1909: 331 ff, 
462, 508 ff, 931 ff, and Van Eerde 1901: 19-25. Both saw that witnesses 
were more than passively present, but neither fully understood their role. 
19. The use of written documents was stimulated perhaps as much under Moslim as 
under Dutch colonial influence. People interested in establishing a theo-
cratic Islamic society saw here a way to take away some of the power of adat 
functionaries; because they could usually read and write, villagers had to 
turn to them to have contracts drawn up. And if a conflict arose, parties 
did not have to turn to adat functionaries to get a solution, but could turn 
to the mosque personnel. See for a discussion of the role of witnesses in 
Muslim courts and the strong emphasis on oral evidence in Islamic law Geertz 
1983: 190 ff; Schacht 1964: 192-194. 
20. For the early history of judicial organization in West Sumatra, see Couperus 
1882; Kielstra 1887 a, b, 1888, 1889; Der Kinderen 1875; Westenenk 1918. For 
more general recent history, see Damián S Hornick 1972; I^maire 1955; Hooker 
1978: 127 ff. The formal development of village justice is described by 
Sihombing-Sjamsulbahri 1975; Kemal 1964; Sjofjan Thalib 1974. 
From 1942-1944, West Sumatra had military courts. The civil judicial organi-
zation under the Japanese got its final form with the Ordinance of the Com-
mander in Chiefs of Sumatra on 1 January 1944. The first instance court was 
the Tiho Horn; the court of appeal the Toko Horn, cf. De Weerd 1946: 38. The 
post-colonial court organization was first laid down in the Undang2 Semen-
tara 1951-1 Staatsblad 1961 - 9, then again in the Law 1970- 14, cf. Koesnoe 
1977: 140, 157. 
21. As a consequence an important part of the evidence still remains undiscussed 
here because of a lack of informations, cf. К. von Benda-Beckmann 1983. 
22. Ter Haar 1934: 50, pleaded for an abolition of all restrictions concerning 
the evaluation of evidence. 
96 Village Justice and State Courts 
23. For a comparison between traditional and Anglo-American ways of dispute set­
tlement, regarding the ways the forensic ends are achieved, see Gluckman, 
1969: 22 f. 
24. Pengadilan Negeri Bukittinggi, 1971/41. This case has been described with a 
different emphasis by F. von Benda- Beckmann 1979: 253 ff. 
25. Cf. К. von Benda-Beckmann 1981 for a discussion of the rivalry between Vil­
lage Council and Adat Council. 
26. Each panghulu and panongkek (deputy) carries an official title, consisting 
of two parts. The first part, Datuk, is common to all panghulus and panong­
kek regardless of their clan and will also be used as a term of address for 
them. The second part is considered to be lineage property, sako. The word 
panghulu is the vernacular word for lineage head. It may, however, also be 
part of the sako of a lineage. Thus, one panghulu in Bukit Hijau is called 
Dutuk Panghulu Rajo and another Datuk Panghulu Ali. 
27. The price of husked rice in 1971 was 80 Rupiah p/kg (Indonesian average). A 
yearly harvest of 750 kg unhusked rice = 375 kg husked rice. The selling 
price of the plot was therefore the gross yield of two years. In 1962 the 
land had been sold for 15,000 Rupiah. The official price for husked rice was 
3-5 Rupiah/kg, as a result of heavy government subsidies. The value of two 
years harvest would then make 3,750 Rupiah. However, it is more likely that 
the black market price, which at that time was many times the official 
price, was taken as a basis. Cf. Goldman 1974. 
28. In official documents, such as a formal claim, the general Minangkabau ter­
minology for kin relations and kin groups is normally used. What is called 
jurai in the official document refers to what in Bukit Hi]au is called kaum 
(sublineage), whereas the official term kaum refers to a buah gadang (lin­
eage) in Bukit Hi]au. 
29. The court used several terms, Minangkabau and Indonesian, to express this 
particular kind of heir: waris nan kamanjaweh/ menerima; wans nan kabuliah, 
yang akan dapat; i.e. the heir who shall receive, in contrast to the regular 
heir: ahli waris, wans, or warih. 
30. It is not clear to me why this second witness does not play a role. If he 
had been there in his capacity as waris (heir) this would have been very 
important for the defendants, because that could have meant a consent from 
Angku Mudo's (sub)lineage. However, he could have been present as owner of 
an adjacent plot of land, in which case his presence as such would not have 
any consequences. In that case he could only have been called as a witness 
in the dispute. 
31. In one instance it was explicitly stated that the question of who was the 
rightful heir was already decided in a former dispute, between the defendant 
and somebody else, and therefore needed not to be decided again in this dis­
pute, although the plaintiff was not a party in the former case. Pengadilan 
Negeri Bukittinggi: 1968/9 and 1968/18, cf. К. von Benda-Beckmann 1983. 
32. See for similar misunderstandings in Dutch social security disputes, Schuyt 
et al. 1978: 295 f. 
33. However, they may in effect belong to different lineages as a result of lin­
eage splitting. 
34. See E.A.B. and E.A. van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal-Baerends 1984, for an example 
from Togo. 
35. In other words, state courts tend to apply algorithms for solving problems 
and show a strong preference for conclusive reasoning, although this is 
neither always possible, nor always put in practice. See Twining and Miers 
1976: 140 ff, 182 ff; Visser 't Hooft 1982: 29. 
In the highly formalized discussions at ceremonies in the villagers this in-
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tegrative or centripetal approach is accentuated by the course of the dis­
cussion. A starts with an account of what happened and proposes a solution. 
В repeats to A what A said, addresses C, adds a few things and gives a mo­
dified solution. С repeats what В has said to him, addresses D, adds some 
more and presents his modified solution to E. The modification may in effect 
be the total reverse of what the preceding speaker said. But it is offered 
as a modification. Usually the voices are kept low and even, but occasional­
ly they get heated over a real disagreement to slow down again when other 
issues are taken up again. When all persons who want to say something have 
had their turn, the discussion finds its way back to the original speaker, 
cf. Van Eerde 1901: 19 ff. 
36. Some of these are properly speaking not means of evidence, but in my discus­
sion here this point is immaterial. I am interested in the sources of infor­
mation and the grounds on which judges base their decision, and on this 
basis they can all be taken into account. Cf. Pitlo 1981: 20; Asser-Anema-
Verdam 1959: 276 ff, 397/8. 
37. For more examples, see K. von Benda-Beckmann 1982. This is not a unique 
feature of Indonesian state courts. Martin Chanock (1978: 80) writes about 
customary law in Malawi: "a large portion of the administration of justice 
was turned over to precisely those people who had reason to define and, more 
importantly to administer, the law in a restrictive and authoritarian way". 
38. It had also given rise to a land dispute fought out before the State Court. 
Pendagilan Negen Bukittinggi 1971/30. 
39. Cf. Sudikno Mertukusumo 1979: 117; Subekti 1975: 38, 42; Asser-Anema-Verdam 
1953: 255 ff; and Pitlo 1981: 85 f. 
40. This was also the opinion of Der Kinderen, who made the Reglement op het 
Rechtswezen van Sumatra's Westkust of 1874 (regulation on the judicial orga­
nization of the West Coast of Sumatra). Maclaine Pont (1909) objected to 
this because the result would be that older - and according to adat 
stronger rights would have less chance to be recognized in court than more 
recent rights, cf. Van Vollenhoven 1931: 300 f. 
41. Allott 1970: 84 and J.F. Holleman 1975: 77 discuss a similar development in 
African courts under the influence of English law of evidence. 
42. Manipulations of witnesses usually take place on the factual and not on the 
interpretative level. For a good example, see Pengadilan Negeri Bukittinggi 
1961/36, discussed in F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 252. 
43. The court cited the adat proverb that "orang semenda di Minangkabau seperti 
abu diatas tunggul, masuh tak genap, keluar tak ganjil dl kaum isterinya" 
- the in married man in Minangkabau is like ashen on a treetrunk, internally 
he does not belong to, externally he is no stranger to the lineage of his 
wife. Pengadilan Negen Bukittinggi 1968/6. See also Pengadilan Negeri 
Batusangkar 1971/9. 
44. Pengadilan Negeri Bukittinggi 1974/29. In the same dispute a witness, aged 
approximately 50, testified about the burial ceremony of her father which 
she attended as a ten year-old child. See also Pengadilan Negeri Bukitting­
gi 1974/7 in which a witness testified about an event he attended as a ten 
year-old. A witness in Pengadilan Negeri Bukittinggi 1968/29 claimed even 
that he remembered all about a dispute fought out before a state court when 
he was between four and six years old. 
45. The term Van Vollenhoven uses is 'opzettelijk' (1931: 295, 297 f). Holleman 
(1981: 250) translates this word as 'prescribed', which to my mind does not 
quite have the same connotation, because these witnesses may in certain 
cases be selected by the parties. In the last sentence of page 250 the word 
'prescribed' (to use Holleman's translation) has disappeared before witness. 
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Strictly speaking Van Vollenhoven has three categories of witnesses : pre-
scribed intentional, chosen intentional and chance witnesses. I prefer the 
word 'intentional' for the first two categories, because the common charac-
teristic of these types of witnesses is that the intention behind their 
presence at the transaction was to provide for preventive legal care. 
46. Schrieke 1929; F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979; F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann 
1981; Kahn 1975, 1976. 
47. Compared to other societies West Sumatra has a low litigation rate (see F. 
von Benda-Beckmann 1981: 10) and it has decreased since the beginning of 
the 20th century. 
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The Social Significance of Minangkabau State Court Decisions 
Introduction 
The social significance of decisions in disputes is an underdeveloped 
field of research in legal anthropology (J.F. Holleman 1973). My research 
on dispute management in West Sumatra, Indonesia, has shown that events 
occurring in the period following the decision generally are not in ac­
cordance with the specific directions contained in the courts' judge­
ments, nor is the picture which the court construes of what has happened 
and its assessment of the 'facts' generally accepted by all persons in­
volved. This is nothing new and has been reported of other societies as 
well. What is surprising is that the post-trial stage has received so 
little attention in the literature dealing with dispute management pro­
cesses both in western and in non-western societies. Compared with the 
amount of data and the depth of analysis lavished on the trial and pre­
trial stages, the post-trial stage has been treated as a step-child in 
the anthropology and sociology of law. 
The purpose of this article is to look in a systematic way at the so­
cial significance of decisions, for the persons involved in the dispute, 
in the post-trial stage. After a brief discussion of the shortcomings in 
the analytical models generally used by anthropologists and sociologists 
of law and the possible reasons for these shortcomings, I shall propose a 
more adequate approach to the study of the social significance of deci­
sions in disputes. The main part of this article will consist of an il­
lustration of this approach with material from my own research. 
The neglect of the poet-trial stage 
Systematic attention to the post-trial stage is of crucial importance for 
both the paradigms in legal antropology identified by Comaroff and 
Roberts (1981: 5), as well as for the litigation research carried out by 
sociologists of law. Rule-oriented research aimed at finding out what the 
law of illiterate societies is has been heavily influenced by the Ameri­
can school of legal realism. The legal realists wanted to find the 'real' 
law, rules which were not just statements about ideal behaviour but which 
were actually applied. Real law was supposed to become manifest in deci­
sions by dispute settlement institutions in which norm-deviating behavi­
our was sanctioned and the relevant rules were enforced (see Hoebel 1954; 
Epstein 1967; Pospisil 1971). But court decisions may be as dead as paper 
law or ideal rule statements. For the very reason that it is important to 
look at decisions, it is also important to look at the post-trial stage 
and see what happens with the decision there. In order to test assump­
tions about the effectiveness of rules and decisions in social life out­
side the court context, and to make definitions of law based upon such 
effectiveness plausible, systematic research on the fate of decisions in 
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the post-trial stage would be necessary. Yet, such research has rarely 
been carried out. 
In the process-oriented paradigm there has been a shift from the study 
of decisions and decision-making in the court and court-like context to-
wards a more comprehensive study of the process of dispute management 
(see Gluckman 1961; Van Velsen 1967; Gulliver 1968, 1969, 1979). It is 
common knowledge now that often the real, underlying grievances and con-
flicts are not 'settled' in court and may continue afterwards (see Abel 
1973a; Starr and Yngvesson 1975: 559, 564). But although most authors 
assume that the conflicts have not ended in court their analytic models 
tend to stop with the court decision (see Nader 1965: 24; Griffiths 
1983c). 
This is even more striking in the recent discussions of the transfor-
mation of disputes in legal sociology in the USA. Sophisticated analyses 
of the pre-trial histories of disputes have uncovered that various trans-
formations occur on the way to a final decision. The baseline of the ob-
ject of study has been pushed back further and further to what Felstiner 
et al. (1981: 683) have called the 'unperceived injurious experience' 
(cf. Sarat and Miller 1981; Griffiths 1983a), but nobody has done the 
same at the other end of the dispute where new transformations are likely 
to occur. 
A number of authors do give attention to the results of outcomes of 
disputes, but they tend to frame their description and analysis in terms 
of purposes for which parties make use of the court system.2 Their inter-
est in the post-trial stage is mainly directed at the social relation-
ships between the disputants before and after the dispute. But they have 
not looked at the effects of the decisions in post-trial behaviour.3 
Finally, the post-trial stage has been investigated by authors who 
have done research on the 'execution' or 'implementation' of decisions. 
In such studies, the effectiveness of decisions is measured by means of a 
comparison between the content of the decision and the subsequent state 
of affairs.1* This 'effectiveness approach', as I shall call it, has two 
weaknesses. It is preoccupied with the power and authority of the decid-
ing institutions and the administrative agencies entitled to 'implement' 
the decision. As a result it fails to take into account that what happens 
with decisions does not necessarily and certainly not entirely depend on 
these institutions. Often - and in civil disputes usually - it depends on 
the parties and other involved persons.5 The second weakness of the ef-
fectiveness approach is that there is an implicit assumption of a causal 
relationship between the decision and the ensuing behaviour. Hawever, 
such causality may be more a matter of a legal doctrine than of empirical 
facts. Usually there is at best a correlation of the content of a deci-
sion with the subsequent behaviour, the precise character of which is 
very problematic (cf. Abel 1980; F. von Benda-Beckmann 1983). For even if 
the parties behave in accordance with the decision, this may be the re-
sult of other factors. On the other hand, the fact that a decision is not 
adhered to does not have to mean that it is without social significance. 
By focussing on a comparison of two fixed points instead of doing longi-
tudinal research, the analysis in terms of enforcement and effectiveness 
does not provide much insight in the relationship between decisions and 
behaviour in the post-trial stage. 
The post-trial stage thus is an important field of study for several 
different empirical and theoretical approaches. This insight is not new 
and several authors have commented on its importance (see Nader 1965: 24; 
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Griffiths 1983c: 8). However, such comments hardly amount to more than 
lip-service. It is therefore worthwhile to dwell briefly upon the reasons 
for the conspicuous lack of interest from which the post-trial stage has 
suffered, before I set out my own approach to the post-trial stage. 
Reasons for the nealeat of the post-trial staae 
At first glance the reasons for the neglect of the post-trial stage may 
seem to lie in practical research problems. Sociologists and anthropolo­
gists of law are faced with considerable technical problems when they try 
to study the post-trial stage. Most fieldworkers only have a limited per­
iod of time in which to do research. In this period it is usually impos­
sible to follow a dispute through the pre-trial, the trial and the post-
trial stage, even if the research is confined to one institution and is 
carried out within one village. However, this can hardly be the reason 
why the post-trial stage is left out. The pre-trial stage is usually 
studied on the basis of historical material, and there is no reason why 
it would not be equally legitimate to study the trial and post-trial 
stages retrospectively, too. In fact, many disputes go through several 
institutions and more than one decision is usually made. The 'interbel­
lum' could well be regarded as the post-trial stage of the earlier deci­
sion and not only as the prelude to the next institutional treatment. Al­
though the literature is full of descriptions of such an interbellum, 
they are invariably analysed in terms of the history of the subsequent 
decision. 
Another reason for the neglect of the post-trial stage could ba found 
in the size of the research area. For state courts, for example, the geo­
graphical area over which they have jurisdiction is usually so large that 
a fieldworker cannot possibly obtain the intimate knowledge of the whole 
area necessary for a comprehensive study of the post-trial stage of dis­
putes. It is perhaps not by chance that the rare studies which include a 
more intensive study of that stage concern decisions by village institu­
tions (see Gulliver 1963; Starr 1978b), while studies of state courts, if 
at all directed at the post-trial stage, are more or less all confined to 
the effectiveness approach (see Silliman 1981; Lowy 1978). In large scale 
research on the significance of court decisions, covering the whole area 
over which a court has jurisdiction, these difficulties cannot easily be 
overcome with the limited resources available to most researchers. Yet 
this does not fully explain, let alone justify, the lack of interest in 
the post-trial stage. 
The failure to look at the post-trial stage may result from the fact 
that in many classical anthropological studies the enforcement of the 
decision takes place during the trial. This happens when the deciding 
institution is at the same time the enforcing institution and does not 
dismiss the parties until damages have been paid, hands have been shaken, 
and beer been served (see Van Velsen 1969: 147; J.F. Holleman 1974). In 
other words, the part of the decision containing specific directions for 
action which can be carried out immediately is carried out while the in­
stitution is still in session. Since decision and execution are both part 
of the court process the need for looking at the post-trial stage may not 
be so obvious. However, as Van Velsen (1969: 147) indicates, payments 
made in court may be returned later on. Thus, even in such dispute man­
agement situations it cannot be assumed that the immediate execution of a 
decision tells us enough about its significance for the dispute in the 
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post-trial stage. Examination of these difficulties with research con-
cerning the post-trial stage makes clear that they cannot explain the 
lack of attention it has received. 
I suggest that there is an entirely different and more fundamental expla-
nation which has to do with notions about the definition of law and the 
locus of law-application. Although there are widely divergent approaches 
to the definition of law, they almost all seem to have in common one fea-
ture, namely that they are authoritarian. By that I mean that law is seen 
from a top-down perspective with a strong emphasis on the institution ap-
plying law or excercising social control. This perspective reflects the 
stereotype criminal process, in which the institution, once activated, 
takes over the initiative and has a monopoly on enforcement (cf. Black 
1981). Sociologists of law usually associate law with the state. Legal 
norms are those norms which can in case of norm-deviating behaviour be 
sanctioned by the community at large or by institutions representing the 
community, such as the state, the administration, the court. 6 Others 
define law as social control by the state (cf. Black 1976). For socio-
logists it seems only natural to concentrate on the activities of state 
institutions (see Griffiths 1981). Even Geiger, who has warned against 
'sanction monism' (Sanktionsmonismus), and who emphatically defines law 
both through norm-conforming and through sanctioned norm-deviating be-
haviour, has not entirely escaped the pitfall (1964: 238). Despite his 
very precise and elaborate theory of legal norms, the attention he de-
votes to norm-conforming behaviour stands in no relation to the energy 
and space spent on deviating behaviour. 
In these approaches the courts became the locus of law-application, 
and law-application by courts became the legal process. This focus upon 
the trial stage in the courts and the neglect of the post-trial stage in 
my view are reinforced by the idea of the separation of powers. According 
to this idea law making and law application is something different from 
execution. Although administrative agencies have recently received in-
creasing attention from researchers, this has been so mainly because they 
also make law and apply law or because they play an important role as 
semi-legislators or semi-judges or as dispute-initiating agencies. The 
real activity of execution remains something different and hardly 
'legal'. As a result, the 'legal' process seems to end with decisions. 
But even where, as in implementation studies, the research focusses 
upon the post-trial stage, the top-down approach and its concern with 
state institutions dominates. At the recent symposium on 'The Implemen-
tation of Court Decisions', held in Bielefeld, Germany on December 15-17, 
1983, most of the discussion was devoted to the question of how much 
power a court or other sanctioning institution could exert and how they 
could extend their grip on the execution of decisions. The people at whom 
the decisions are primarily directed, the parties, were hardly mentioned 
at all and, if so, mainly as factors disturbing the work of the institu-
tions . 
The work of most legal anthropologists is based on similar assumptions. 
Anthropologists who looked for law in stateless societies looked for 
functional equivalents and substituted the organized community for the 
state and legal authority or 'pro-tanto officials' for the courts (see 
Llewellyn and Hoebel 1967: 286). Others, working in the rule paradigm, 
define law through the concept of sanctions, which can be applied by the 
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functional equivalents of the state and the courts.7 Their insistence on 
sanctions has led to a top-down approach in which the main concern is 
with the institution and not with the people utilizing these institu­
tions, in the same way as in the sociological approaches. 
The combination of the top-down approach, of the idea that law can only 
be found in decisions, and of the idea that deciding is something funda­
mentally different from executing has had serious consequences for the 
methodology and research interests in the sociology and anthropology of 
law. Until quite recently,8 the field of trouble-free social life and of 
dispute prevention was virtually unnoticed, because it did not involve 
activities of law-applying institutions. J.F. Holleman's call for the 
study of trouble-less cases (1973) has hardly lost its urgency. In stu­
dies of dispute management the assumption sketched out above have led to 
a certain blindness for the post-trial stage, resulting in a general neg­
lect of the fact that execution is usually not exclusively 'monitored' by 
the deciding or enforcing institution, but by parties and other people 
involved in the dispute (see Galanter 1974: 138). 
Of course, most legal anthropologists and sociologists do not sub­
scribe to all the implications of their basic assumptions concerning law 
and law-application. They have not generally subjected their research and 
analyses to the logical consequences of their definitions.9 Yet, few have 
been prepared to give up their explicit or implicit notions of law (see 
Bospisil 1971: 92), and the model has continued to exert its influence on 
research as well as on attempts to develop alternative models. Even those 
who, like Griffiths (1981), have emphatically rejected the classical 
taxonomie approach and have convincingly criticized the doctrine of legal 
centralism according to which the state has a monopoly on law, leave the 
post-trial stage out as a phase in their model of litigation (see Grif­
fiths 1983c). 
A longitudinal perspective 
The purpose of this paper is to look in a more systematic way than is 
usually done at the social significance of decisions in the post-trial 
stage. ° In order to get an insight into this significance a number of 
questions have to be asked. In the first place one needs to know how the 
decisions are interpreted by the various persons involved. To answer this 
it is necessary to distinguish the various elements which are usually 
combined into one decision. 
1. Decisione гx 
A decision in a dispute usually consists of a number of different ele­
ments. In the first place a decision-making institution construes a pic­
ture of what has taken place (see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1976). This in­
volves a selection of relevant information, based on the normative frame­
work in which the claim is set (see Comaroff and Roberts 1981: 84). It 
also involves labelling and interpreting rights, duties, relationships 
between persons and the status of objects12, and judgements on the vali­
dity of transactions and on the liability or guilt of (one of) the par­
ties (see Ebpitz 1980: 57). To this complex of elements the institution 
may, but does not have to, attach consequences in the form of instruc­
tions to the parties to do something (pay a certain amount of money. 
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openly confess guilt, publicly shake hands, prepare a meal, provide beer, 
return disputed objects, etc.) or to refrain from something (interfering 
with the activities of the opponent, exploiting a plot of land, etc.). Of 
course, the directives are not always clear and decisions may be ambigu­
ous.
 1Э
 Each of the elements of its decision may be interpreted different­
ly from what the court meant, and each may have different effects in the 
post-trial stage. One should not, as often is the case in the effective­
ness approach, limit one's study of the post-trial stage to the last ele­
ment, the directives for action. 
2. Choices of action 
Secondly we have to inquire what parties do after a decision has been 
made and whether and how people orient their subsequent activities to the 
decision and norms stated or implied in it. In the third place we need to 
know whether people rationalize and justify their subsequent behaviour in 
terms of the decision. Within this framework the question whether and 
under what circumstances decisions tend to be carried out is an important 
one, but is only part of the analysis.1μ The role, power and legitimacy 
of the deciding institutions and of possible enforcing institutions are 
variables, the importance of which is an empirical question. Of course, 
the post-trial behaviour of the parties occurs in 'the shadow of the 
court' and even an inactive enforcing institution may be a significant 
factor of the behaviour of the parties (cf. Galanter 1981; Spittler 1980; 
К. von Benda-Beckmann 1981). But unless an institution has a monopoly on 
enforcement it should not stand at the centre of our attention, nor 
should its importance be taken for granted. l s 
Once the final decision has been made, parties, and perhaps the en­
forcing institutions, have to make up their mind what to do next. There 
are several possible courses of action. In the first place, the parties 
may comply voluntarily with the decision. Payments are made, objects 
change hands, disputants refrain from further intrusion upon the rights 
of each other, the status of objects is acknowledged, etc. Research find­
ings suggest that compliance with decisions is most probable when imple­
mentation follows immediately on the decision and when the decision en­
tails clear directives (cf. Gulliver 1969; Lowy 1978: 198; Galanter 1974: 
138; Zimmermann 1982: 189). 
A second possibility is that the decision is enforced. The initiative 
to enforcement may lie in the hands of an enforcing institution, e.g. the 
police in what we call criminal cases. It also happens when the deciding 
institution is at the same time an enforcing institution and does not 
dismiss the disputants until damages have been paid, hands have been 
shaken and beer served (cf. Van Velsen 1969: 147; J.F. Holleman 1974). 
The intiative for enforcement may be taken by one of the parties. This 
is especially likely to happen when there is a great imbalance in power 
between the disputants. The powerful and wealthy party usually has 
greater access to official enforcing institutions and thus is able to in­
crease its power advantage even more. The weaker party may anticipate 
this and prefer to comply voluntarily instead (cf. Silliman 1981). The 
difference between voluntary compliance and enforcement will in many 
cases not at all be clear. 
A third possibility is that the parties try to find another institu­
tion to bring their grievance to. This may be a higher institution within 
the same hierarchy or it may be a different type of institution. For in-
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stance, people may first bring their dispute before a village institu-
tion, then to the police and the state court and then appeal to the high 
court and supreme court. The available institutions are not all of the 
same order and may be based on different legal systems -16 
In the fourth place, the parties may do nothing at all, either because 
the decision does not contain any directive for a specific action or be-
cause the adressée of a specific action fails to act as required (see 
Cochrane 1972: 53). It may also be because the winning party is the 
weaker party and has no possibility to recruit powerful support to force 
its opponent to comply (see Silliman 1981: 93 ff). When the power balance 
at a later stage changes in favour of the winning but originally power-
less party, he or she may decide even many years later to enforce compli-
ance.17 With respect to the parts of a decision which do not contain clear 
directives for specific action it is sometimes difficult to distinguish 
conduct which may be interpreted as active or passive acquiescence from 
conduct which indicates rejection of the decision.18 The same behaviour 
can be interpreted either way. There is often much room for ambiguity, 
different interpretations and manipulations. 
Finally, parties may enter into negotiations as to what is to be done. 
Such negotiations may be carried out on the basis of relative equality, 
but they may also be forced upon the weaker party under the threat of re-
sisting enforcement altogether (cf. Gulliver 1963: 251 ff; 1979). Tney 
may result in an agreement that only a part of the decision be carried 
out or that something different from what was decided be done. 
3. The веті-autonomoue social field 
The post-trial stage of a dispute is not situated in the court setting, 
but usually in the social field in which the dispute originated. There 
the disputants are subject to all kinds of influences which may have an 
impact on their course of action, of which the decision itself is not ne­
cessarily the most important one. In order to analyze the factors which 
may influence the behaviour of disputants in the post-trial stage it is 
helpful to draw on discussions about the effects of general legal rules, 
in particular upon Moore's idea that people as adressées of legal rules 
are not simply or directly affected by such rules : they are members of 
one or more 'semi-autonomous social fields' 19, i.e. social fields charac-
terized by their ability to generate their own rules and by the existence 
of mechanisms of social control. As Moore has demonstrated, such fields 
are the most appropriate setting in which the effects of legislation can 
be studied. Her approach should be extended to the study of the effects 
of court decisions. 2 ° Like legislation, decisions flow from a confined 
institutional context into a wider social field which can be called semi-
autonomous in Moore's sense. As in the case of legislation, we must ex-
pect the social significance of decisions to be influenced and shaped by 
the norms, the social relationships and the social processes within such 
a social field (see Lowy 1978; Kidder 1978). 
Moore's approach is important in any society (cf. Griffiths 1983 a and 
c) but particularly so in ex-colonial societies such as Indonesia, with 
a markedly plural system of law and decision-making institutions. The so-
cial fields into which a decision flows, usually a village, share only to 
a limited extent a common legal system with the decision-making institu-
tions of the state. 
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One of the advantages of the observation that decisions flow from the in-
stitutional setting in which they are rendered into the social field in 
which the dispute originated, is that it draws our attention to the pos-
sibility that in that social field people may develop their own interpre-
tations of the decision and thereby change it. It is this interpreted de-
cision which will lead its own life, perhaps in the form of rumour, per-
haps also as the generally accepted meaning of the decision. This is 
nothing unusual in western countries, but in other societies this trans-
formation of the decision may take on an extra dimension since the vil-
lagers consider themselves legitimated by the legal system of their own 
semi-autonomous social field to give their own interpretation. Thus state 
law and state court decisions may be transformed into 'folk law' similar 
to the way in which folk law may be transformed into state law (see K. 
von Benda-Beckmann 1983? Snyder 1981b; Woodman 1969, 1984). 
Moore's approach also draws our attention to the possibility that dis-
putes undergo a post-decision transformation similar to the ones that oc-
cur upon entering a decidion-making institution. Various forums of dis-
pute management maintain their own requirements concerning the formula-
tion of a dispute and tend to emphasize different issues. Depending on 
the forum, the original dispute may be transformed into something quite 
different in order to meet the requirements of a court's jurisdiction and 
its normative idiom. As has been observed repeatedly, parties may have 
to formulate and argue their claims in terms of different purposes and 
rules than those they originally had in mind. Their original grievances 
and interests may disappear into the background. When the constraints of 
the institutional setting fall away and the dispute returns to its origi-
nal social field, the likelihood that it undergoes a new transformation 
is great. 
4. Time 
This new transformation should not be regarded as a re-transformation, 
because the social field from which the dispute emerged and into which it 
returns is not a static entity. It will often have undergone changes dur-
ing the period in which the decision-making institution was dealing with 
the dispute (see Starr 1978b). People go away, others return, offices may 
change personnel, other disputes arise, people marry and enter into con-
tractual relationships, children grow up, etc. Moreover, what goes on in 
court is discussed at length and the testimony of witnesses may either 
cool off or strengthen social relationships among the parties. 
Similar changes may occur in the post-trial stage. We need to know 
what happens within a social field and how it changes, in order to under-
stand why people sometimes choose to sit low for a while and abide a mo-
ment when compliance seems to be within reach or a demand is otherwise 
advantageous. The choices parties make as to what to do with a decision 
are not necessarily permanent, nor need they all be made immediately. 
Changes in the power constellation within the social field may induce 
people to act, who have remained inactive for many years, as the example 
of the Lebanese shopkeeper described by Nader and Todd (1978: 36) shows. 
By treating the post-trial stage as a social process located in a cer-
tain space and changing over time we can avoid many of the shortcomings 
of the approaches to decisions discussed above. One consequence of look-
ing at the post-trial stage over time is that it is very difficult to 
know when a 'case' has come to an end, for one must always leave open the 
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possibility that people will base some new activity upon a decision. 
There is no clearly defined end-point of the disputing process. But the 
advantage of an open-ended unit of analysis seems to me to outweigh the 
disadvantages. For the social scientific study of law, fixation on the 
moment of decision provides us only with a false hope that we have found 
a useful unit of analysis. 
In this paper I shall illustrate the approach proposed above with ma-
terial from my research on dispute-management in Minangkabau, Indone-
sia.22 The examples I shall present concern disputes which were dealt 
with both by village institutions and by the state court of Bukittinggi, 
one of the central towns in the province of West Sumatra. The disputes 
are all civil disputes in the technical sense of the national law, to 
which adat substantive law, which is in theory the folk law of the Mi-
nangkabau, is applied.23 The scope of my paper is limited in several res-
pects. It is concerned only with one category of court disputes, namely 
civil disputes. Furthermore, it looks at the social significance of court 
decisions only for the people somehow involved in the disputes and in the 
social field of one Minangkabau village. It does not deal with the pos-
sible 'general effects' (see Galanter 1981), with the role decisions may 
play as precedents (see Fallers 1969) or as teaching material for law 
students. These more general aspects of the social significance of deci-
sions exceed the scope of the present paper. 
Ethnographic Setting 
West Sumatra is the homeland of the approximately six million Minang-
kabau, half of whom live within West Sumatra, the other half living scat-
tered over Indonesia and beyond. Eigthy-six percent of the Westsumatran 
population lives in villages. With the exception of Padang, a minor in-
ternational port on the coast, most towns share many of the characteris-
tics of the villages. 
West Sumatra is a predominantly agricultural area. Rice is grown as a 
subsistence crop on wet and dry fields. Vegetables, cloves, cinnamon, 
chili, sugar and coffee are grown for private use and as cash crops. Fur-
thermore, many villages specialize in some craft. Bukit Hijau, the vil-
lage in which we carried out the fieldwork on Which this article is 
based, is mainly a rice and vegetable cultivating village. Higher up on 
the slope of the volcano Mount Merapi, at whose foot the village lies, 
there are some cinnamon and sugar-cane gardens. The villagers do some 
basket-weaving and embroidery but there is no true specialization, most 
farmers having a mixed economy. Petty trade is usually done on an indiv-
idual basis. Spouses keep their income largely separated. 
The province of West Sumatra consists of eight districts, each of which 
is subdivided into five or ten subdistricts. Each subdistrict is divided 
into five to twelve nagari, of which there are a total of 508 in the pro-
vince. The lowest effective level of civil administration is the nagari, 
or village, consisting of several groups of settlements or scattered set-
tlements, with a mayor, assisted by a secretary, an advisory Village 
Council (Kerapatan Nagari) and a representative council with limited 
legislative power. Ward heads and ward councils assist the local 
administration. The military and police are stationed at subdistrict 
level, the judiciary at the district level. 
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Prior to Dutch colonial rule, nagari were largely autonomous socio-po­
litical units.26 The socio-political and legal structure were constituted 
mainly by adat, but Islamic influences also were important, especially 
since the late 18th century (see Dobbin 1977, Taufik Abdullah 1966). 
Every villager was a member of a matrilineal descent group, buah gadang, 
named after its lineage head, panghulu. Each lineage was affiliated to 
one of the localized clan-segments, suku. According to adat constitution­
al law, every nagari consisted of at least four suku, each with a suku 
council. The suku structure was the basis of the nagari government, but 
the precise organization varied throughout Minangkabau (cf. F. von Benda-
Beckmann 1979: 58 and literature quoted there). 
Today the traditional adat structure is still widely intact, be it 
that the local administration has taken over many tasks since the Dutch 
penetrated into the highland of Minangkabau in the early 19th century 
(see Dobbin 197 5: 85). 
Bukit Hijau is a nagari with an unusually complex socio-political 
structure.27 It has seven named suku, most of which consist of several 
clusters of lineages, sepesukuan, whose respective ancestors came from 
different areas before they settled in Bukit Hijau. With one exception 
all suku are exogamous units, but common matrilineal descent is not 
traceable for the whole suku nor even within each lineage. Beside the 
suku structure there is a division into associations of lineages, the 
hindu, of which there are twelve in Bukit Hijau and which have their own 
councils. The suku structure is particularly important for matters con­
cerning lineage property, pusako, while the hindu structure was set up as 
a form of nagari administration. It has now lost most of its actual tasks 
to the local village administration, but it is still the basis for the 
Adat Council (Kerapatan Adat Nagari), which consists of one representa­
tive of each hindu. In addition, the nagari is divided into neighbour­
hoods, each with a prayer house and a neighbourhood head and neighbour­
hood council. It is here that Islamic influence in the nagari structure 
is most prominent, because the neighbourhood head is at the same time an 
Islamic leader and an adat functionary. 
Suku, hindu and lineage may be stratified as a result of the incorpo­
ration of ' newcomers ' , people who do not descend from the nagari foun­
ders, or former slaves. These newcomers and their descendants usually 
have less land available than the 'original' settlers and their descend­
ants. They also have an inferior position in decision-making processes. 
However, although this and other forms of stratification, and demographic 
developments, have led to unequal distribution of land within and among 
the lineages, this has not led to a class of landless peasants. 
The three principles of organization just mentioned correspond with three 
traditional realms of decision-making. The suku deals with matters of 
lineage property, the hindu with matters of nagari administration and the 
neighbourhood is responsible for maintaining the prayer house and the 
roads, etc. Depending on the subject-matter of a dispute and on the for­
mulation given to it, the neighbourhood council, the suku council, or the 
hindu council or the Adat Council is considered the appropriate place for 
dealing with it. 
All decisions in disputes must traditionally in theory be reached by 
consensus of all persons involved including the disputants themselves.2 
As long as the conflict is kept 'among ourselves', i.e. treated internal­
ly at the household, sublineage or lineage level, all adults may partici-
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pate in the deliberations. When a dispute receives a more public treat­
ment, the deliberations are confined to lineage heads as representatives 
of their lineages. The disputants are entitled to a proper hearing and a 
decision can only be made if they consent to the solution offered by 
their representatives. This requirement is one of the reasons why deci­
sions are so rarely reached in serious disputes. The traditional way of 
putting pressure on the disputants to give their consent, some form of 
ostracism or eviction from the village community, has lost much of its 
force. The suku- and hindu councils and the Adat Council often make deci­
sions to which disputants do not consent, but such decisions are invari­
ably challenged. 
Institutional and legal plurality on the village level is only one 
part of the very complex legal pluralism characteristic of Indonesia. A 
Western court system was introduced and developed by the Dutch, stream­
lined by the Japanese and maintained as a uniform system by the Indone­
sian Republic (see Tanner 1971: 1Θ4 f f ) . It consists of a State Court 
(Pengadilan Negeri) in every district, a High Court (Pengadilan Tinggi) 
in every provincial capital and the Supreme Court of Indonesia (Mahkamah 
Agung) in Jakarta. The supreme Court can grant review only on questions 
of law. 9 The procedural law of these courts is basically former Dutch 
law, with slight adaptations.30 Judges, prosecutors and clerks should 
have a full law degree, but in particular the smaller court are mainly 
staffed with people who have only a first law degree or an administrative 
training received under the Dutch. The scribes, assistants to the clerk 
who take notes of court sessions and type out the minutes and the final 
decisions drafted by the judges, and assist parties in writing up their 
claims, have no formal law degree. They are trained on the job. A number 
of them have in fact a very thorough knowledge of adat law. 
The state courts have jurisdiction in criminal and civil disputes, 
with the exception of marriage, divorce and inheritance, which fall under 
the jurisdiction of the Religious Court (Pengadilan Agama). (In West 
Sumatra, however, inheritance matters are considered to fall under the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.) There is a religious court in every 
district capital. Appeal is open to the Religious High Court (Pengadilan 
Agama Tinggi), seated in the provincial capital, from which further ap­
peal is possible to the Head of the Directorate of Religious Justice of 
the Ministry of Religion. 
In addition to the courts, there are other state officials and insti­
tutions which deal with disputes: the mayor and the Village Council as 
mediators, the district and subdistrict heads31, and the military and 
police. 
Under Indonesian statutory law the courts are required to administer a 
variety of laws, depending on what the living law (hukum hidup) in the 
cases under dispute is.32 The religious courts apply Islamic law. Sub­
stantive criminal law is statutory, formally similar to Dutch criminal 
law.33 Civil law can be either statutory, (e.g. the Civil Code for the 
Dutch Indies 3"and some statutes of recent date, such as the Basic Agrar­
ian Law (I960)35 and the Basic Marriage Law (1974) 36 or local adat law, 
which varies throughout Indonesia. In central We~t Sumatra adat law is 
applied in 86% of all civil disputes (cf. К. von Benda-Beckmann 1981: 
124). 
Most major disputes and most disputes which reach a state court concern 
land, i.e. inheritance, division and transactions concerning ancestral or 
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privately owned land. A discussion of such disputes must be preceded by 
a brief outline of applicable Minangkabau adat property law. The Minang-
kabau make a sharp distinction between two categories of property: ances-
tral property, harato pusako, and personally-acquired property, harato 
pancaharian. The property holding unit for pusako is the lineage, of 
which it is said that its members are of one pusako. Although the lineage 
is the group which decides on transfers of pusako land, the basic contem-
porary economic units are smaller. These comprise usually no more than a 
household, consisting of one or perhaps two adult couples with children 
and sometimes a grandmother. They farm lineage land if available. If the 
lineage has insufficient land, additional land may be pawned (pagang 
gadai) or taken in share-cropping, usually from remote relatives or in-
laws. 
Access to lineage land is obtained through a complicated system of 
distribution among the lineage members (cf. F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 
154 ff) . Most lineage land is allotted to women and men usually receive 
only small parts. Use rights remain within a lineage segment consisting 
of the woman it was allotted to and her descendants until the segment 
dies out. Use rights do not include the right to alienate pusako without 
the consent of the whole lineage. It is the task of the lineage head to 
organize group consent and to represent the lineage in the negotiations 
concerning the conditions of alienation. In practice, a considerable 
amount of land is pawned or given in share-cropping without consent of 
the whole lineage or even the sublineage. 
Pawned land can always be redeemed after a minimum of two harvests, 
but redemption may in fact occur after several generations. It is the 
right of the lineage as a whole to redeem its land. The exploitation 
rights, however, fall only to those persons who actually participate in 
the redemption payment: the other lineage members acquire a right of ex-
ploitation when they pay their share. Formally, redemption by one or a 
limited number of members of the pusako holding group is considered to be 
a 'transfer of the pawning contract' and not a true redemption. In prac-
tice, however, it is called redemption.38 
Lineage land may in principle not be permanently alienated. In the 
rare cases in which land has been sold, the buyer is always a villager. 
There is also a very strong feeling that only those who live in the vil-
lage may exploit lineage land. However, lineage members living elsewhere 
sometimes get a share of the harvest for their private use. Absentee 
landlordism on any scale does not exist in West Sumatra. 
Personally-acquired property (pancaharian) can be disposed of freely 
by the holder. In former times it was inherited by the members of one's 
lineage segment and added to the existing stock of pusako, but since the 
1960s a man's pancaharian is inherited by his children (see F. von Benda-
Beckmann 1979: 337 ff ) . Within the childrens' lineage, however, it ac-
quires the status of pusako. Land taken in share-cropping or received in 
pawn in exchange for the loan of personally-acquired money has the status 
of pancaharian for the share-cropper/pawnee and his or her heirs. It re-
tains the status of pusako for the original holders. 
This complicated system of land rights gives rise to many disputes (see 
Tanner 1969; 1971: 82, 224). Disputes within segments of a lineage are 
usually disposed of within the lineage and whether settled or not hardly 
ever rise above that level. Disputes between lineage segments and between 
lineages, which also occur frequently, often reach the higher levels of 
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decision-making within the nagari and may well be treated by external in­
stitutions (see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 307 f; Tanner 1971: 21Θ f). 
The most intricate disputes involve situations in which two or more lin­
eages or sublineages contest the inheritance of an extinct lineage or 
segment, or in which pawned land is claimed back as pusako. Also intri­
cate, but in the 1970s not very frequent, are disputes between children 
and their father's matrilineal relatives about the inheritance of their 
father's/uncle's personally-acquired property. Finally, many disputes 
occur when money has been invested in land and there is disagreement 
about its source and thus about inheritance or the right to redeem the 
land (see Tanner 1971: 82; K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981: 125). 
One of the most important reasons for these kinds of disputes is that 
the traditional mechanisms through which such disputes could have been 
avoided have to a large extent broken down. Traditionally, panghulu (lin­
eage heads) played an important role in dispute-prevention, because of 
the requirement of their presence at and consent to all important lineage 
transactions.39 The traditional adat system provided for the cleavage of 
lineages and the creation of new panghuluships. In 1888 the Dutch put a 
stop to the increase of the number of recognized panghulu.1*0 Due to tre­
mendous population increases since then a panghulu has a far larger group 
under him than a century ago. Bukit Hijau has a population of nearly 
10,000 and somewhere between 113 and 139 lineages, but in 1975 only twen­
ty panghulu had been officially installed, due to internal lineage dis­
putes. At the end of the last century, when the Dutch froze the official 
number of panghuluships, there were one hundred panghulu for a population 
of less than 3,000 and most of these were functioning. While at the turn 
of the century the ratio panghulu:population was thus approximately 1:30, 
this ratio in 1975 was 1:500. Moreover, the panghulu in office were not 
evenly distributed over the population, some lineages being larger than 
others and some suku having more panghulu in function than others (cf. F. 
von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 73 ff). As a result of the freezing of the num­
ber of officially recognized panghulu the Dutch administration disturbed 
the mechanisms of splitting, which until then had served as a control on 
the size of lineages. Since then, many lineages have in fact split, but 
in many cases it is not clear whether a formal split pursuant to adat has 
been accomplished or not, so that the status of a kin-group as lineage or 
sublineage is unclear. This uncertainty facilitates manipulations of kin­
ship relations. The status of kin-groups which are not very closely re­
lated has in effect become negotionable. 
The size of the groups currently headed by a panghulu, the many vacan­
cies of panghuluships, the uncertainties concerning the status of various 
kin-groups and the resulting negotiability of kinship relations, as well 
as the complexity of the socio-political system, have important conse­
quences for dispute-management within the village. I have discussed this 
at length elsewhere (see K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981). 
The suku and hindu councils and the Adat Council, as well as the Village 
Council are only rarely able to provide effective solutions in disputes. 
If a lineage or the lineages involved are not able to solve a problem 
amongst themselves, there is little chance for a solution on a higher 
village level. Nevertheless, village institutions are relatively success­
ful in containing disputes within the village; only few disputes reach 
the state court J1 Disputing in state courts is a time and money consum­
ing affair and often lasts 1 1/2 - 2 years (see Tanner, 1971: 187, 226). 
116 Village Justice ana State Courts 
The Minangkabau are acutely aware of the risks involved, as expressed in 
the saying: 
"nan kalah manjadi abu the loser is reduced to ashes, 
nan manang manjadi baro" the winner is reduced to charcoal. 
(Tanner 1971: 187) 
The costs of litigation in the state courts, include the cost of legal 
representation, travel and lodging for litigants, supporters and witnes-
ses (who also require gifts of clothing or something more expensive), and 
court fees. Parties are not required to be assisted in court, but some do 
consult an advocate (4%), of which there are only five in the province of 
West Sumatra, or another professional representative (8%), who is not 
necessarily a lawyer, although most members of the local law faculty also 
practice as legal advisors. Disputants may also choose to be represented 
by a non-lawyer, chosen for his presumed ability to deal with the admin-
istration, such as a school teacher, a civil servant or someone else with 
some formal education. All three kinds of representative are expensive. 2 
If the court considers it necessary to view the site of the dispute, a 
fee of 30,000 rupiah (approximately US $75 in 1975) plus additional ex-
penses is due. For a seizure by the court the same amount must be paid. 
The regular court fee usually amounts only to a few dollars and may oc-
casionally run up to US $30, thus forming the smallest part of all ex-
penses. 
If the plaintiff is not represented, the clerk usually assists him to 
write up the claim. This typically consists of the names of the plain-
tiff (s) and defendant(s), a description of the disputed objects, their 
value and the yearly yield (if land is involved). The claim gives a short 
description of the facts on which the plaintiff bases his case and a 
statement of what the plaintiff wants from the court: recognition as the 
mamak kepala waris (lit.: 'head of the heirs', representative of the 
group) or his lineage or lineage segment; recognition as heir; a declara-
tion that the parties are or are not related; a declaration that the 
disputed objects are pusako or pancaharian; a declaration that a contract 
is valid, etc. Finally the plaintiff asks the court to order the defend-
ant to hand over the disputed objects or to refrain from further in-
fringements on his rights, to pay compensation, or 'to do what the court 
deems appropriate' (the standard expression). 
Sessions are usually held every two or three weeks, although sometimes 
more than a month may pass between two sessions. The first four sessions 
in a case are devoted to reading the written claim, response and counter-
claim, and further pleading, followed by questioning by the judges to 
clarify the issues. Written evidence is also presented during these pre-
liminary sessions. The court then decides tentatively what the issues and 
the disputed facts are and invites the disputants to provide evidence in 
support of their claim. The next sessions are devoted to hearing witnes-
ses and if necessary to viewing the site. This may go on for months, es-
pecially since witnesses often do not turn up the first time they are 
invited to appear. 
When the court considers that it has enough information to make a 
final decision, it usually takes two to four weeks to do so. The deci-
sion, written in Indonesian, is, like Dutch civil court decisions until 
recently, formulated in one long and complicated sentence. It consists of 
four sections. The first part contains the names, sex, age, job, domicile 
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and suku of the parties and their status in the process (mamak kepala 
wans or private person). It also names the parties' representatives, if 
any. Then follows the integral text of the pleadings, a summary of what 
according to the court the disputed and undisputed facts and the issues 
under dispute are, and an enumeration of the written evidence and of the 
witnesses heard. This part is called 'the considerations regarding the 
facts'. It is followed by 'the considerations regarding the law', con­
taining a brief discussion of each piece of evidence and its relevance 
for the disputed issues, and closing by dismissing or upholding of the 
claim. After these considerations the court gives, in the final section, 
a brief statement of what the parties must do or may not do and what the 
relationship between the parties and the status of the objects under dis­
pute is. It concludes determining who has to pay the court fees. 
Formally, the court is required to read the full decision aloud. As 
far as I know this is never done. The president usually suggests to the 
parties that they 'probably do not consider it necessary' to hear every­
thing, to which the parties always assent. He then reads a summary of the 
claim, of the questions which needed to be dealt with and of the con­
siderations concerning the law. Only the final section is always read in 
full. After this the president explains in Indonesian and Minangkabau 
what the decision means, what each party must or may not do and why. He 
then announces that if a party is interested he may get a copy of the of­
ficial decision. Since the decision has at this point not yet been typed 
and signed, a party so interested would have to come back later. He would 
also have to pay a small fee and often another extra sum to the scribe 
who types the decision and obtains the signatures of the judges. If he is 
unwilling to invest much money, it may take weeks before the document is 
ready. In this respect the court operates like every other administrative 
office. A consequence of this situation is that the oral explanation 
given by the president is usually in most respects the real decision. It 
is this version of the decision which usually is interpreted and leads 
its own life in the social field of the disputants. 
If a party is not willing to comply with the decision, his opponent 
may call on the bailiff and the police for execution. This again takes 
time and money. However, it is often quite effective, because refusing to 
cooperate is grounds for a criminal prosecution and this brings with it a 
high probability of being jailed for some time. An informal admonition by 
the police may do the same trick. 
An appeal to the High Court generally entails a stay of execution. Al­
though most claims contain the request that the court declare the deci­
sion to be executable immediately, this is rarely granted (but see The 
oase of the Demolttton of an Adat House)· The winning party must often 
wait several more years before he may recover what has been declared his, 
especially if his opponent decides to appeal again to the Supreme Court. 
The High Court decides virtually exclusively on the basis of documents. 
It does not hear parties and only very rarely witnesses. The parties 
therefore do not have to attend the sessions, which means a considerable 
saving of time and money. During the years 1968-1974, 54% of all civil 
judgments were appealed. The decision was upheld in 45% and reversed in 
41%· in 14% the High Court substituted its own decision. Of all High 
Court decisions, 18% were appealed to the Supreme Court. Over 40% of 
these appeals were reserved.^3 
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The Social Significance of Decisions in Buk.it Hijau 
A demonstration of the importance of the approach outlined in the first 
section requires a detailed description and analysis of cases. I have 
chosen to present only a few extended cases in which a number of deci­
sions were made at various levels within and outside of the village. The 
advantage of this choice is that it provides the reader with some in­
sight in the complexity of the disputing process in which institutions 
internal and external to the village are used. The details are also 
necessary for an understanding of the strategic use villagers make of de­
cisions . 
On the other hand such a choice brings with it its own limitations. 
The material I have is by no means complete. Completeness is impossible 
when one tries to reconstruct the history of a dispute going as far back 
as 50 years; it is beyond reach even for more recent history. Moreover, 
the disputed property usually is scattered over the village and it would 
have required the better part of my research time to map out the history 
of every plot and to find out the names of all persons who at one time 
worked it. I shall therefore often have to indicate that I miss some rel­
evant information. The chosen cases also do not fully cover the whole 
range of variation in types of dispute. My examples concern control over 
and access to land, involving inheritance, transfer of land and the 
status of land as lineage or personally-acquired property. These are the 
issues people fight about over long periods of time and with great inten­
sity. They form the greatest part of the case load of the state courts as 
well as village institutions (see Tanner 1971: 210 ff; K. von Benda-Beck-
mann 1981: 123 f f ). Each of the cases exemplifies at least some of the 
issues mentioned at the beginning this paper.4h 
The Inheritance of Inyik Kaha 
One of the oldest still unsolved disputes in Bukit Hijau started in 1917 
when Inyik Kaba died. Inyik Kaba had, according to several informants, 
been immensely rich, being the last living member of his lineage (or sub-
lineage, as some claimed in 1975). His lineage had possessed the title of 
one of the seven founding panghuluships, but he had never become panghulu 
himself. He had, however, taken on the title of a panghulu: Datuk Mang-
kuto. He had controlled both the land of his own lineage and according to 
several people that of his father's lineage as well, which was also near­
ly extinct. 
After his death, several other lineages within his suku claimed to be 
his heir. This resulted in a court dispute about his lineage land, which 
was either decided in 1919 or in 1924-192 5. No court records or other of­
ficial documents exist anymore. The dispute was between Haji Abdullah and 
Narullah Angku Gunuang (defendant Dia, see diagramme 1), a member of the 
lineage of Datuk Ameh, belonging to two different lineages within the 
same suku and both very wealthy because their lineages were nearly ex­
tinct. 
The court had decided in favour of Narullah, who had from then on con­
trolled the land (which had a value of approximately US $1,000 in 1968). 
The land had been distributed among women of his own sublineage and some 
plots had also been given to the sublineage of Saidi Sutan Andiko (Dlb). 
Saidi had been away for some time in Malaysia and it is not clear whether 
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he was in Minangkabau at the time of the court case. Until the 1940s 
these two men, Narullah and Saidi, controlled the land together. Ihey 
made sure always to be involved in any transaction concerning the land. 
The problem which arose after the court decision was that a third sublin-
eage claimed to belong to the lineage of Datuk Ameh as well. Rasjid Man-
tari Andito (plaintiff, PI, see diagramme 1) claimed that his sublineage 
had not yet received its share in the land won in 1925. It had only been 
allowed to redeem some pawned rice fields belonging to the inheritance 
and it wanted to have its full share. 
this new claim led to a series of disputes, the first of which took 
place in the 1940s between the three sublineages of the lineage of Datuk 
Ameh, whose office was vacant at that time. Rasjid Mantari Andito (PI) 
claimed to be the mamak of the third sublineage and in that capacity en­
titled to one third of the inheritance, but Narullah (Dia) and Saidi 
(Dlb) claimed that they represented the only two sublineages. In 1944 
Rasjid (PI) went to court, but because of the ending of the Japanese oc­
cupation and the ensuing war of independence no decision was ever made. 
In the meantime, Narullah and Saidi got into a conflict with each 
other about the distribution of the land. This dispute was brought before 
the Adat Council in 1946. Saidi, who had not been able to lay hands on 
his full share of the land won in the first case, claimed, this time with 
Rasjid on his side, an equal share in the inheritance of Inyik Kaba. The 
Adat Council decided that Saidi as mamak kepala waris should get his 
share of one third. The written version of the decision only spoke of a 
one-third share for Saidi; it did not mention that Rasjid as the head of 
his sublineage should also get a third. 
Several years passed. In 1952 there was a new attempt to clarify the 
relationships. This time Sainullah Sutan Mantari (P2, MoSiDaDaS of 
Rasjid) and Djamaluddin Diateh (D2, SiS of Saidi) had a dispute about the 
control over wood, which had been taken from the disputed land and 
put at the disposal of H. Datuk Bagindo, the panghulu hindu of their 
hindu, for some nagari purposes. Djamaluddin (D2) had given the wood 
on behalf of the lineage of Datuk Ameh and Sainullah (P2) wanted to have 
Djamaluddin openly acknowledge that the wood was also given on behalf of 
Sainullah's sublineage. When Djamaluddin refused to do this, Sainullah 
threatened to remove the wood. This dispute was settled by the sub-dis­
trict officer, who made H. Datuk Bagindo, Djamaluddin and Sainullah sign 
an agreement in which they recognized that the wood had been given in the 
name of the sublineages of Djamaluddin and Sainullah, and that it would 
remain under H. Datuk Bagindo's control. 
Once more several years went by: the years of the P.R.R.I, revolt, of 
Sukarno's fall and the rise of Suharto. Narullah (Dia) and Saidi (Dlb) 
had died and Djamaluddin (D2) had made place for the die-hard Berahim 
Sutan Tengah (D3a), who managed his sublineage together with Udin Kari 
Batuah (D3b). They were not willing to settle the differences with 
Sainullah's sublineage. When they continued to refuse Sainullah his 
share, the latter went to the Adat Council in 196Θ and again claimed one 
third of the inheritance of Inyik Kaba. The Adat Council took almost a 
year to come to a decision. It was Syech Suleiman - a well known Islamic 
leader and founder of a famous Islamic school in Bukit Hijau - who final­
ly took the initiative and gathered information. He advised the Adat 
Council that each of the three parties was entitled to one third of the 
inheritance. The Adat Council adopted this advice in its decision. One 
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representative of each of the twelve hindu signed the decision. The mayor 
of Bukit Hijau also signed, thereby acknowledging that he had been in­
formed and that the decision was correct. The decision stated which rice 
fields and which gardens with trees were to be given to Sainullah, with­
out however indicating the precise borders. The defendants refused to 
agree to the decision and did not sign. 
Berahim and Шіп not only continued to refuse to give part of the in­
heritance to Sainullah, they flatly refused even to discuss the possi­
bility of letting his sublineage share in the costs of the case of 1919/ 
1925. Sainullah (P2) then went to court in 1968 (Pengadillan Negeri 
Bukittinggi 1968/29) and claimed his third of the lineage land and of 
some other lineage goods, as well as compensation for twenty-eight years 
in which he had not received his share of the harvest. During the court 
proceedings the defendants maintained that Sainullah's sublineage did not 
belong to their lineage. One of their arguments was that the redemption 
of some of the lineage land by Rasjid (PI) had not been a real redemp­
tion, to which only lineage members are entitled, but a 'transfer of the 
pawning contract', to which they had given their consent as mamak of the 
lineage. According to them such a transfer was no proof of Rasjid's lin­
eage membership. The court did not agree with the defendants and consid­
ered the transaction a redemption. 
The decisions of the Adat Council of 1946 and 1969 and of the sub-dis­
trict officer of 1952 were also submitted to the court as evidence for 
Rasjid's and therefore Sainullah's lineage membership. All witnesses 
heard by the court about the decision of the Adat Council confirmed that 
the Adat Council had actually decided that Rasjid should also get a share 
of the inheritance, although this had not explicitly been stated in the 
written decision. When the decision of 1952 concerning the wood was dis­
cussed, the defendants claimed that Sainullah (P2) had had nothing to do 
with the wood, but the decision of the sub-district officer and the tes­
timony of witnesses convinced the court that this assertion was wrong. 
When the court asked the defendants why they had not agreed with the de­
cision of the Adat Council of 1969, they claimed to know nothing about 
it.1*5 They had never been properly informed and therefore there could not 
have been a proper decision. The mayor had decided without proper delib­
eration, they complained. 
Both parties submitted genealogies of their lineage to prove their 
claim (see diagramme 1). Sainullah submitted the genealogy drawn up by 
Rasjid in 1946. Berahim and Шіп had made their own version, which in­
cluded neither the sublineage of Rasjid nor that of Saidi and Djamalud-
din. It did, however, include Inyik Kaba. 
The court concluded that the only valid reason which the defendants 
might have had for denying the plaintiff his share in the inheritance was 
that the latter had not contributed to the costs of the court case in 
1919/1925. Whether this was the case or not should have been proven by 
them, and nothing in their evidence indicated it was. Since it had not 
been made clear that one party had rendered the lineage more service than 
the other, it was only equitable that each should receive one third. The 
court then determined which plots should be given to the plaintiff. It 
also decided that the movable goods in dispute should be estimated at 
market value, of which one third should be paid to the plaintiff. Finally 
it fixed the compensation for the loss of harvests at 575 kg. unhusked 
rice per year, starting five years before the dispute was registered in 
the court and not twenty-eight years, as had been asked. 
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On appeal, the defendants argued that neither the borders of the rice 
fields nor the total number of plots had been properly indicated in the 
plaintiff's claim, which therefore should not have been admitted in the 
first place. Although there had been a court viewing of the site, 
plaintiff and defendants had given different opinions about the borders 
and no further evidence about the exact borders had been given. The ap-
peal was succesful: the High Court accepted the argument and dismissed 
the claim. On appeal to the Supreme Court this decision was upheld on the 
ground that the border question was a factual matter on which the Supreme 
Court had to follow the High Court's decision. 
Sainullah (P2) then started a new case - it was by now 1972 (Pengadil-
an Negeri Bukittinggi 1972/35). He claimed that the defendants had al-
ready admitted that all of them belonged to one lineage, and that the 
dispute of 1919/1925 between Haji Abdullah and Narullah, in which their 
lineage had won the land and goods under dispute, had been equally fi-
nanced by all three sublineages. This had all been established in the 
case of 1968. Only the borders had not been clear. These were clearly 
indicated now, and he claimed the same relief as in 1968. This time the 
court accepted evidence about the borders of the disputed plots and gave 
the same decision as in the case of 1968. Again the defendants appealed. 
When we left West Sumatra in 1975 the High Court had not yet decided the 
appeal and Sainullah had not yet received one single plot from his oppo-
nents . 
We discussed this dispute with a number of adat experts. To them there 
was no doubt that the three sublineages should each get an equal share, 
since they were three branches of the lineage of Da tuk Ameh, which had 
rightly won the dispute with Haji Abdullah in 1919/1925. However, one of 
the most influential lineage heads, Haji Datuk Panghulu Rajo, explained 
to us that 'really' none of the disputing parties was entitled to the 
inheritance, because the lineage of Inyik Kaba was not yet extinct: it 
had simply not had a male member strong enough to stand up against people 
like Haji Abdullah, Narullah and Saidi. That was also the reason why it 
had been so difficult to prove the borders of the disputed land. Many 
villagers did not want to support the disputants by telling the court how 
the borders ran, out of sympathy with the true title-holders. But now the 
rightful sublineage had a promising young man, and Haji Datuk Panghulu 
Rajo predicted that within a few years he would be old enough to start a 
court dispute and claim the whole inheritance of Inyik Kaba for his lin-
eage. And then, he added, everybody would suddenly know exactly how the 
borders ran. Whether this was true or not we could not verify. 
Although I have treated The Case of the Inheritance of Inyik Kaba as one, 
it actually consists of two cases. The first was fought out in 1919/1925 
between two lineages, each of which claimed to be Inyik Kaba's heir. The 
second dispute started in the 1940s between the various branches of the 
lineage which had won in 1919/1925, involved the distribution of the 
inherited goods. The decision of 1925 dominated many of the following 
proceedings, not only in the court cases of 1968 and 1972, but also be-
fore the Adat Council in 1968. Berahim and Udin (D3a and b) based their 
claim as pusako holders on that decision. Sainullah (P2) as head of a 
sublineage within the same lineage in turn based his claim to one third 
of the inheritance on the same decision. The court itself also referred 
to the decision in 1919/1925. It stated that the land under dispute was 
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part of the land which Narullah's lineage had won then. The Adat Council 
referred to it in 1968 when it decided that Sainullah was entitled to a 
share. The decision of 1919/1925 provided for all three disputants a con­
venient way to avoid the necessity of a more fundamental proof for their 
claim. Such proof might have turned out to be impossible, with the un­
pleasant result that none of them would be recognized as the true heirs 
of Inyik Kaba, for example because his lineage was not extinct. It was 
thus in the interest of all three to stay within the normative framework 
implied in that decision, namely that the land had the status of pusako 
of Narullah's lineage. 
The court decided in 1919/1925 that Narullah's lineage was most close­
ly related to the extinct lineage of Inyik Kaba and thus entitled to his 
lineage land. To this establishment of the kin relations it attached the 
consequence that Ha]i Abdullah should refrain from further infringement 
on Narullah's rights. Since there is no report of such interference we 
may assume that that part of the decision was adhered to. 
However, if the information of Datuk Panghulu Rajo should turn out to 
be true and there are surviving members of the lineage of Inyik Kaba, 
then the execution of the decision of 1919/1925 could still be stopped 
after more than 50 years. The state courts follow adat law in this res­
pect. Adat law has nothing like a statute of limitations and accepts that 
no matter how much time has elapsed a claim must be granted if it is 
proven. Considering that pusako is something which stays in a lineage for 
generations, 50 years is only a relatively short period of time. Whether 
such a new dispute would be successful is hard to say. There are indica­
tions that the Adat Council was not happy with its decision of 1969: in 
the court procedure starting in 1968 its president told the court that 
the Adat Council had only decided between the parties before it, because 
it had been asked by the mayor to do so. He implied that the decision did 
not say anything about possible other claims. Another indication to the 
same effect is Datuk Panghulu Rajo's own interpretation of the Adat Coun­
cil's decision, namely that it was made in order to bridle Udin's and 
Berahim's power, without implying anything about the true heir, and his 
assurance that there were still lineage members left. The support of 
these two persons would at least be a good start in a future dispute, but 
the decision of 1919/1925 would be difficult to invalidate. And although 
the court in 1919/1925 had only determined the relationships between 
Inyik Kaba, Ha]i Abdullah and Narullah, in the village this was widely 
interpreted as a decision that Narullah's lineage was the heir, not mere­
ly that his lineage had the better claim. It was used as an argument to 
that effect in the later disputes and it is likely that it will be so 
used in any new dispute. 
The later disputes may be seen as one case. The issue always concerned 
the distribution of lineage land between the various sublineages and the 
question who belonged to Narullah's lineage. The dispute about the wood 
in 1952 was really a dispute about the inclusion or exclusion of Rasjid 
and Sainullah's sublineage. Alliances were more or less constant through­
out the case, with the exception of the dispute of 1946. There, Saidi 
(Dlb) sided with Ras]id (PI) against Narullah (Dia). That did not prevent 
Djamaluddin (D2) from changing alliances again in the dispute of 1952. 
All decisions upheld the claim of Rasjid's sublineage except those of 
the High Court and Supreme Court. However, these courts dismissed Sainul­
lah' s claim only because the borders had not been properly indicated."6 
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But despite the uniform judgment that Rasjid's sublineage was entitled 
to a share equal to those of Narullah's and Saidi's sublineages, they 
never received a single plot of land. The explanation for this can be 
sought at two levels: the formal, or procedural level and the level of 
power relations in the social field of the dispute. 
The decisions of the Mat Council were considered invalid by one of 
the parties. Since adat requires consent of the disputants the decisions 
never reached the execution stage. The decision about the wood in 1952 
needed no other execution than the signature of the two sublineage heads 
and the panghulu. The court decision in the dispute of 196Θ ended with a 
rejection of the claim on appeal and the decision in the dispute of 1972 
was still under appeal when our fieldwork ended and therefore did not 
have to be executed. These are the formal grounds on which Narullah's and 
Saidi's sublineage could persist in their refusal to share anything with 
Rasjid's sublineage. However, the question remains why these two sublin­
eages refused to accept the various decisions, against the contrary opin­
ion of so many influential adat functionaries? 
One reason is that the dispute concerned the distribution of lineage 
land.1*8 A Minangkabau proverb says pusako sakato ninik mamak, meaning 
that pusako is a matter of the panghulu of the suku. In other words, a 
decision concerning pusako should be made within the lineage or clan seg­
ment. However, the office of Datuk Ameh was vacant, since there had been 
no installation of a new panghulu with that title after the late Datuk 
Ameh had died, so that there was no lineage head who could work out a 
solution and be held responsible for a failure to reach consensus. Narul­
lah and Saidi belonged to the senior sublineages and possessed the land. 
Under such circumstances it is very difficult to mobilize enough support 
to force one's opponent into consensus. 
The Саве of the Inheritance of Inyik Kaba shows that the road to recogni­
tion as an heir or co-heir can be long and strenuous. One has to be care­
ful not to let opportunities go by to score small points, such as redeem­
ing small plots of land or having it be openly admitted that wood is of­
fered on one's behalf, which may eventually lead to recognition. In this 
process of winning recognition, decisions may turn out to be significant 
even though they have not been executed. Together they may build up evi­
dence which may eventually lead to a recognition on all levels. Thus, the 
decisions of the Adat Council and the sub-district officer in 1952, to­
gether with the testimony of witnesses, convinced the court in the cases 
of 1968 and 1972 that Sainullah's sublineage was entitled to a third of 
the inheritance. This conclusion would probably not have been reached had 
there not been such a prior decision of a village institution. 
At the same time the case shows what the difficulties may be for the 
court in establishing true lineage relations. The lineage of Inyik Kaba 
was extinct and Datuk Ameh's office was not occupied. There was therefore 
no expert who knew in his capacity as panghulu what the relevant rela­
tions were. This had to be established by other means. A comparison of 
the two genealogies provided as evidence by the parties reveals that kin 
relations can not only be difficult to prove, but also be subject to 
manipulation. The two genealogies coincide only with respect to the de­
scendants of T]into, who is named Inyik Elok in 1969. Within that group, 
which is the sublineage of Narullah, Berahim and Udin, the names are the 
same and only a few age-ranking orders between siblings differ. For the 
rest there is hardly any similarity between the genealogies. The link 
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which should prove the relation between Rasjid's sublineage and those of 
Narullah and Saidi is unclear even in the genealogy made by Rasj id him­
self in 1946. This suggests that a genealogical depth of more than five 
generations is difficult to remember. That may be the reason why the 
generation of Inyik Elok in the genealogy of 1969 (the sixth generation 
counted from below) shows such a striking difference from the same gener­
ation (i.e. of Tjinto) in the genealogy of 1946. ^ 9 Most of these differ­
ences may be the result of ignorance. The inclusion of Inyik Kaba in the 
genealogy of 1969 is clearly an intended manipulation, since the makers 
of the genealogy admitted that Inyik Kaba really belonged to the lineage 
of Datuk Mangkuto and not of Datuk Ameh. When the court asked Why they 
had only included Inyik Kaba and not Datuk Mangkuto, they simply said 
that his lineage was extinct and that there was no need to make a genea­
logy of an extinct lineage. 5 0 Such manipulations are widely used tech­
niques to win court disputes (see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 252). Their 
success diminishes the general esteem in which state court decisions are 
nela, but they do not necessarily invalidate such decisions in the strug­
gle for recognition within the village. 
The complexity of The Саве of the Inheritance of Inyik Kaba lies in 
the number of institutions involved and in the difficulties of eliciting 
a decision which could be executed. Apart from the decision of 1919/1925 
there was no decision which according to all disputants was final or 
valid. The second set of disputes had in all its 50 years not yet reached 
the stage at which the parties had to face the problem of how to execute 
a decision. However, the various intermediate decisions were significant 
because they shaped the decisions which came later. More generally, they 
were important steps on the way to recognition of the heir. 
The following case is quite different. The losing party in court manages 
to continue to till the disputed land, with the consent of the winning 
party. 
The Journey to Mekkah and ite Consequences 5I 
The late Haji Amir had been the last living member of his sublineage. He 
had therefore been able to dispose of much of his lineage land. A small 
part, with an annual harvest of 1,440 kg unhusked rice, was exchanged 
with his son, Hasan Bagindo, for 5 gold rupiah (US Ç375 in 1975). Haji 
Amir had used that money for a journey to Mekkah. He had pawned some 
other rice fields to Taufik's sister and mother and still others to Nurma 
and Murni, distant female lineage-members, who in turn had given the 
fields in share cropping to Sutan Rajo, a member of another lineage with-
in the same suku. After Haji Amir's death in September 1966, two distant-
ly related sublineages within his lineage, those of Rahim Sutan Palimo 
and of Taufik Sutan Palimo, claimed to be Haji Amir's heir and tried to 
gain control over his lineage land. Since much of the land was in the 
hands of pawnees, share-croppers and the deceased's son, one way to be 
recognized as heir was to have these contract partners acknowledge one's 
status as pusako holder and to claim the land under their control. Any 
such successful claim would be a step towards general recognition. 
Taufik set out various lines to get his claim acknowledged. He submitted 
The Social Significance of Decisions 127 
to the lineage heads of his hindu a claim against Hasan to the fields 
which Hasan had received from his father. The elders decided that the 
fields which Hasan had received from his father had originally been pawn­
ed by Haji Amir's lineage and had been redeemed by Haji Amir with his own 
money. The land, or rather the right to use and exploit it, therefore had 
the status of property acquired with gold, harato tambilang ameh (cf. F. 
von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 14Θ). According to contemporary adat law such 
property is inherited by the children of a man but the pusako-owning lin­
eage has the right to redeem it; however, the elders' decision did not 
mention Taufik's right to redeem the rice fields as his pusako. (The de­
cision was made in July 1968, a few months after Taufik had brought an 
action in court. I assume it had taken a few months to reach the deci­
sion, since that is usually the case, and that Taufik must therefore have 
brought the case to the hindu before he went to the state court. However, 
I do not know this for certain.) 
The mayor and the ward head in which the land was situated had also 
been approached to settle the dispute, apparently without success. I have 
no information about this aspect of the case, nor about the persons in­
volved. 
In February 1968 Rahim approached the sub-district officer and asked 
him to declare that another rice field belonging to Haji Amir's lineage 
land was now his pusako because he was Haji Amir's heir. Nurma tilled 
the field and Rahim wanted Malin Palimo, Nurma's mamak, to give it to 
him. Malin Palimo claimed that his mother had pawned the land from Haji 
Amir and that his mother and his sister were therefore entitled to farm 
it. The sub-district officer decided on the basis of a written pawning 
contract between Nurma and Haji Amir, that she had pawned the land and 
that therefore Rahim had to refrain from interference with her cultivat­
ing activities. Disobedience of this decision entailed the risk of five 
years prison or a fine of 10,000 rupiah. ' The sub-district officer, how­
ever, did not consider himself empowered to decide the more fundamental 
question of who the heir of Haji Amir was. 
In April 1968 Taufik hired a well-known court representative and 
started a law suit in the State Court (Pengadilan Negeri Bukittinggi 
1968/9). This time he claimed from Haji Amir's son Hasan the land which 
Hasan had worked since his father's journey to Mekkah. Hasan asserted 
that the land was not pusako but that it had been personally acquired by 
his father, who had redeemed it with his own private money. However, he 
was willing to part with the land in favour of Haji Amir's matrilineal 
heirs in exchange for the sum which he had lent to his father. He also 
claimed that not Taufik but Rahim was Haji Amir's heir. 
In order to prove that he was Haji Amir's heir Taufik produced several 
doctor's bills which he had paid for Haji Amir. He also brought several 
witnesses, who testified that he had cared for Haji Amir when he was 
sick, paid his doctor's bills and had lived with Haji Amir as his heir. 
Taufik and Hasan each produced genealogies. I only have the genealogy of 
Rahim which Hasan presented to the court, so that I cannot compare the 
two versions. They almost certainly differed on the essential points. 
The court decided in January 1969 that the land under dispute was 
pusako and not personally-acquired property of Haji Amir. Furthermore, 
Hasan had not been able to prove the existence of a debt of 5 gold rupiah 
for which he had allegedly received the land as security. Moreover, 
Hasan's claim that Rahim was Haji Amir's heir had not been proven. The 
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court came to the conclusion that Taufik was Haji Amir's heir on the fol­
lowing grounds: In the first place Taufik had signed all written pawning 
contracts as heir, whereas Rahim had never signed any contract in that 
capacity. Secondly, the disputed land was situated in the neighbourhood 
to which both Haji Amir and Taufik belonged and in which Haji Amir had 
been buried, whereas Rahim lived in another neighbourhood. Thirdly, Haji 
Amir had left from Taufik's house on his voyage to Mekkah; nor had he 
visited Rahim's house shortly before he left. Upon his return he also 
visited Taufik's house and not Rahim's. In the fourth place, when Haji 
Amir was ill it had been Taufik who had cared for him and who had paid 
the doctor's bills and to whom he had returned when he had left the 
hospital. Fifth, his body had lain in state in the house of Taufik before 
it had been buried. Sixth, witnesses who had participated in the hindu 
decision had stated in court that the disputants in that dispute had been 
Hasan and Taufik and that Rahim had not been involved. A final argument 
was that Syech Suleiman (the same Islamic leader who played a role in 
The Саве of the Inheritance of Inyik КаЪа) had testified that Taufik was 
Haji Amir's heir. Syech Suleiman, who in his time had been the most re­
spected member of Haji Amir's, Taufik's and Rahim's hindu, had, according 
to the court, been a neighbour and good friend of Haji Amir and their 
lineage land was situated close together. For these reasons the court 
considered it likely that Syech Suleiman was well informed about Haji 
Amir's life and his family relations. The court ordered Hasan to give the 
disputed land to Taufik free and unencumbered. He also had to pay Taufik 
compensation for one half of the yearly yield since 1967, when the dis­
pute had started. 
Hasan appealed (Pengadilan Tinggi Padang 1972/20), claiming that Haji 
Amir had given notice of the lending contract between him and Hasan to 
Djamaluddin as his heir. Djamaluddin was a blood relative of Rahim, of 
one sublineage and one pusako and one graveyard, whereas according to 
Hasan, Taufik was only a lineage member of Djamaluddin. Therefore Taufik 
had no right to the disputed land. In October 1973 the High Court con­
firmed the decision of the State Court and rejected Hasan's claim. 
Hasan and Rahim, who had joined together in the struggle for the in­
heritance, had another string to their bow. Shortly after the court dis­
pute of 196Θ/9 had started, they filed a suit in the State Court against 
Taufik over some other plots of rice land which also were part of Haji 
Amir's inheritance and which were being worked by Taufik's sister and her 
daughter. This time Rahim was plaintiff and Hasan acted as his court rep­
resentative. They claimed that the plots should be given to the rightful 
heir of Haji Amir, i.e. Rahim (Pengadilan tfegeri Bukittinggi 1968/18). 
Taufik defended himself by stating that the land had been pawned to his 
sister and her daughter by Haji Amir and that he was in any case the 
rightful heir. In its decision the court stated that the basic issue was 
the same as that in the earlier case. It was therefore not necessary to 
reexamine the evidence. Rahim's claim was dismissed. 
Notwithstanding the various decisions in favour of Taufik, Hasan con­
tinued to farm the plots. He was still doing so when we left the village 
in September 1975. 
The underlying dispute in the cases described above was a struggle be­
tween two sublineages over the inheritance rights to the pusako of a 
third, extinct sublineage within the same lineage. In the village the 
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conflict was fought out in a fragmented way. Some plots were disputed be-
fore the hindu, others before the mayor. In all village-level proceedings 
and before the sub-district officer the defendants avoided as far as pos-
sible the question of who the rightful pusako holder was and defended 
their rights to use the land on the basis of their contractual relations 
with Haji Amir or on the basis that it was his personally-acquired prop-
erty. These were easily proved assertions which made it possible to 
avoid the fundamental inheritance question. They could have pushed the 
matter and fought out the basic question, but that would have implied the 
possibility of losing. They preferred a less risky step by step strategy. 
This strategy might take more time to reach full recognition, but the 
loss of a single battle would not have such serious consequences. 
The conflict also entered the State Court in a fragmented way. There, 
the dispute between two sublineages, each claiming to be the heir of Haji 
Amir, was transformed into a dispute about the status of land between his 
son who claimed that it was personally-acquired property, and remote 
lineage members who said it was pusako. The ultimate question of who was 
Haji Amir's heir had at first a subordinate position. But Hasan, who did 
not want to rely only on the claim that the property was personally-
acquired and who had taken sides with Rahim because Rahim was willing to 
accept the existence of Hasan's loan to his father, also defended his 
position on the basis that Rahim was the heir instead of Taufik. He thus 
forced Taufik and the court to look into Rahim's relation to Taufik. 
When Rahim himself also sued Taufik in a parallel suit it became rela-
tively easy for the court to see the connection between the two cases and 
to settle the relationship of Taufik and Rahim in the first decision. It 
then only had to refer to that decision in the second case. In the formal 
context of the State Court the latter decision was unusual, because both 
the parties and the disputed land were different from those in the first 
case. 53 It attached a broader meaning to its decision in the case of 
1968/9 than it usually allows for. 
Looking at the consequences ordered by the court, i.e. that Hasan should 
give the land to Taufik, it seems as if the decision of 1968/9 was not 
adhered to, because Hasan continued to work the land. Taufik apparently 
did not make a serious effort to enforce the decision. There was consid-
erable difference of opinion in the village about the reason why Hasan 
stayed on the land. Some, among whom Hasan himself, maintained that they 
worked the land because they had inherited it as personally-acquired pro-
perty. Another explanation given by some villagers was that he was en-
titled to work the land until Taufik paid him 5 gold rupiah, Haji Amir's 
debt to Hasan. The fact that the court had not accepted Hasan's evidence 
as sufficient did not mean in their eyes that the debt did not exist. 
This part of the decision was well understood but carried little author-
ity in the village: too many villagers were convinced that the debt 
existed. 
The other main element of the decision, that Taufik and not Rahim was 
Haji Amir's heir, was again well understood in the village but accorded 
little weight. Not everyone acknowledged Taufik as the only heir of Haji 
Amir. He had won an important battle but would have to fight further for 
full recognition. It may thus have been a tactical move on his part not 
to endanger the effects of the victory in court by pressing for enforce-
ment. He would then have had to stand up against his hindu, which had 
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decided (albeit on other grounds) that Hasan was entitled to the fields. 
Syech Suleiman would probably not support him here and no help was to be 
expected from Datuk Panghulu Rajo, because he was married to a close rel-
ative of Hasan. Under these circumstances another explanation for Hasan's 
continued control over the disputed land becomes plausible. Datuk Pang-
hulu Rajo suggested that there had been negotiations between Hasan and 
Taufik about what was to be done now that the court had not recognized 
the debt to Hasan. The result of the negotiations had been that he was 
allowed to keep the fields, which were worth only a fraction of the debt. 
Datuk Panghulu Rajo formulated this very vaguely: "Hasan has been given 
something too, that has been organized." It seems that the principal 
parties to the dispute in 1968/9 had reached a workable solution for the 
moment without committing themselves to any more definite agreement. 
Taufik's claim to be Haji Amir's heir was upheld but not carried out in 
terms of a change in control over the land. On the other hand Taufik did 
not have to recognize Hasan's claim for the debt, nor his claim that 
Rahim was Haji Amir's heir. Hasan would have to fight further for the 
recognition of his claim but so would Taufik. The solution was thus a 
delicate and short term-one. People expected a dispute to arise again 
some time in the future, perhaps about yet other plots of land, but 
basically about the same issue. 
Thus, because of the village internal power situation the winning par-
ty in the court dispute could not or did not want fully to enforce the 
court decision. Even if he were able to have this decision executed, the 
negative effects would be so great, that he chose not to do so. 
The next case is an example of a situation in which a court decision is 
not executed for a long period of time but in the end is enforced. The 
party who won in court felt she needed to enforce it because otherwise 
she would endanger her own rights to pusako too much. At the same tune 
the power situation had become such that she could afford to invoke such 
execution. 
The Demolition of an Adat House 
Within the lineage of Datuk Bagindo there has been a constant and long-
standing stream of conflicts. Various highlights have already been des-
cribed at length (see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 239-249). The lineage 
has for a long time been in the process of splitting, but a formal cleav-
age, resulting in several new lineages, each with its own pusako and 
panghulu has not yet been achieved. The lineage consists of eleven or 
thirteen sublineages scattered over four neighbourhoods, each with its 
own pusako, but in a sense the lineage segments are still considered to 
be one lineage and their pusako to be the pusako of the whole lineage.51* 
However, the lineage is in the rather unusual situation of having three 
panghulu all with the title Datuk Bagindo (see diagramme 3). Thus, there 
is an A.M. Datuk Bagindo, a B. Datuk Bagindo and a Z. Datuk Bagindo. 
Datuk Bagindo Lapiah is the deputy (panongkek) of A.M. Datuk Bagindo. 
In 1943 two sublineages of the lineage segment of S. Datuk Bagindo (dia-
gramme 4) went to the State Court (Tino Hoin Bukittinggi 1/2603) 55 with a 
dispute about several rice fields and some plots of land on which two 
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houses had been built, one of these a lineage house. The land was situat-
ed in the neighbourhood Batu Balantai. The plaintiff, Angku Koto, claimed 
that the land was pusako of his sublineage and that it had been pawned by 
the defendant, S. Datuk Bagindo, their common lineage head, but redeemed 
by himself. The defendant, S. Datuk Bagindo, claimed that the land was 
his pusako. The court decided in favour of the plaintiff on the basis of 
an oath in which he swore that he had redeemed the land. S. Datuk Bagindo 
had challenged the plaintiff to swear the oath in the expectation that he 
would not dare to do so. But the plaintiff had sworn it, much to the 
chagrin of his panghulu, who lost the case as a result. The court, once 
the 'factual' question of redemption had been solved by means of a deci-
sive oath, simply 'applied' the norm that pledged land must be returned 
to the pusako holder when the redemption sum has been paid, and that such 
redemption may not be refused. 
During the following 30 years the land was worked by members of the 
sublineage of Datuk Bagindo Lapiah, who at that time had been a child. S. 
Datuk Bagindo and his successor A.M. Datuk Bagindo lived in the neigh-
bourhood Puti Ramus, whereas Datuk Bagindo Lapiah lived in the neighbour-
hood in which the disputed land was situated. The two sublineages were at 
that time very close and perhaps were in 1943 still considered to be one 
sublineage. Rumour had it that the sublineage of Datuk Bagindo Lapiah did 
not really belong to the lineage, but was incorporated at the instigation 
of S. and A.M. Datuk Bagindo. 
The installation of Datuk Bagindo Lapiah had caused a lot of trouble, 
but all three panghulu with the title Datuk Bagindo had been present. The 
ceremonies had been held in the newly built adat house, 'in the house of 
A.M. Datuk Bagindo', as Datuk Bagindo Lapiah explained to us. One of the 
reasons for this trouble was that according to the sublineage of Angku 
Koto the adat house had been built on their land and not on pusako of 
Datuk Bagindo lapiah. In their eyes the installation was therefore not 
valid. However, all three Datuk Bagindo had attended the installation 
ceremonies and thus had validated the installation with their presence. 
In 1970 the sublineage of Datuk Bagindo Lapiah built another house on 
the disputed land in an attempt to assert its pusako rights to it. This 
triggered off a new series of actions on the part of Upiek, a younger 
sister of the late Angku Koto. She claimed that the land on which the two 
houses had been built was her pusako and that Datuk Bagindo Lapiah had 
promised to give her fields in exchange for the land before he had start-
ed to build. The fields he had promised her were situated in the neigh-
bourhood in which she lived and had been pawned to a member of her sub-
lineage for about US $100. When she reminded him of his promise Datuk 
Bagindo Lapiah no longer wanted to give the land in exchange. He claimed 
that the land on which he had built the houses were his pusako. 
Upiek then mobilized A.M. Datuk Bagindo, the panghulu most closely 
related to her, who was at that time president of the Adat Council. She 
also won the support of the mayor and several other elderly men of her 
suku. They all confirmed her standpoint in a 'letter of explanation' dat-
ed 22 February 1971. A few days later, on 5 March 1971 the mayor, the two 
heads of the wards in which the plots of land were situated, and the same 
elderly men signed a 'letter of compromise', stating which fields had to 
be given in exchange for the disputed land. On 29 March 1971 A.M. Datuk 
Bagindo wrote a 'decision' , with the same content and had it signed by 
various elderly men of his hindu, leaving out, however, the other pang-
hulu within the same hindu. Datuk Bagindo Lapiah did not sign any of 
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these documents. 
At this point other important members of the lineage stepped in, among 
them Z. and B. Eatuk Bagindo and the very influential hindu official 
(juaro adat) to which their lineage belonged, Bandaro Hitam. They did not 
like the one-man show of A.M. Datuk Bagindo and convinced one of the el-
derly men, who could not read or write, that the letter of compromise 
which he had signed was different from what he had been told and that he 
therefore should withdraw his signature. This he did in a letter. They 
thereupon declared the 'decision' void. There had not yet been a real, 
valid decision, they claimed, because it had been made without their 
knowledge. But their objection was largely to the procedure followed from 
which they had been left out and not to the content of the decision. On 
26 April 1971, they drafted and signed a 'recommendation for a settle-
ment' with basically the same content. Datuk Bagindo Lapiah now protested 
to the Adat Council about this decision in a letter dated 10 June 1971, 
stating that he had not been heard or given an opportunity to produce 
evidence. Only after the 'decision' had been made had he been called and 
confronted with a fait accompli. He therefore considered the matter still 
open and did not intend to comply with the proposed settlement. 
The next step Upiek made was to go to court (Pengadilan Negeri Bukit-
tinggi 1971/30). She acted as representative in court for her son, who 
was sublineage head.56 The sublineage of Datuk Bagindo Lapiah was repre-
sented by his elder brother, Angku Bagindo Mangkuto.57 This time Upiek 
did not rely on the alleged exchange. She claimed that the disputed land 
was pusako of her sublineage and that Datuk Bagindo Lapiah's sublineage 
should return it to her 'free and unencumbered', as the standard expres-
sion is. As it turned out, this standard expression had far-reaching con-
sequences in this particular dispute, because it was taken to mean with-
out the adat house which Datuk Bagindo Lapiah had built on the land. 
Upiek based her claim on the assertion that the land was part of the land 
which her mamak, Angku Itoto, had won in the court dispute of 1943. They 
had permitted the defendants in that dispute to use the land, but only in 
loan (pinjaman). They had permitted the defendants' sublineage to build a 
house on the land only after the latter had promised to give a rice field 
in exchange. Since Datuk Bagindo Lapiah's sublineage refused to give the 
land, the plaintiff wanted her own land back. 
Datuk Bagindo Lapiah and Angku Bagindo Mangkuto denied that the land 
was part of the land involved in the dispute in 1943. Since the court 
decisions of the process of 1943 did not indicate the borders, the court 
came to Bukit Hijau for an official inspection. Both parties were present 
and many other people as well. Such inspection tours always draw a lot of 
people. Three of the four relevant borders could be unequivocally deter-
mined but the fourth and crucial one remained unclear. Upiek then called 
the lawyer of her mamak in the dispute of 1943 who swore that the land 
under dispute then included the disputed land of the present case. That 
settled one issue. 
The other element of Upiek's claim was the exchange contract. She 
tried to convince the court that there had been several decisions by vil-
lage institutions in support of her claim and the court decided to hear 
several witnesses in this regard. One was a village ward head, who de-
clared that he had submitted the dispute to the mayor, who had turned it 
back to the lineage elders, which had led to the exchange contract as a 
settlement. A.M. Datuk Bagindo was also heard. He stated that a settle-
ment had been reached but that the defendants all of a sudden had refused 
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to sign. The reason for this refusal was explained by the mayor. Accord-
ing to him, Datuk Bagindo Lapiah and his brother did not want to sign, 
because the son of Upiek had refused to sign. They were afraid that he 
would later deny the validity of the contract and prevent the users from 
working the land. Their apprehension was not groundless, since this same 
man was the mamak kepala waris of Upiek's sublineage and as such required 
to sign all transactions concerning his pusako. 
Datuk Bagindo lapiah and his brother called the man who had withdrawn 
his signature from the 'decision' of A.M. Datuk Bagindo, who now stated 
that he had withdrawn his signature "because the elders no longer stand 
in the middle", i.e. they are not impartial as they should be. The other 
witnesses were questioned about who was living on and working the land in 
dispute. It was not possible to gain a clear insight into the actual sit-
uation from their testimony, but at the very least the mother of Datuk 
Bagindo Lapiah and a younger sister, (maybe classificatory), lived and 
worked on it. Itowever, living and working on land alone is no proof of 
title. A letter by Haji Batuah (the last living member of the most senior 
sublineage), stating that the land was pusako of Datuk Bagindo lapiah's 
sublineage was not accepted as proof. Nor did the letter in which a sig-
nature had been withdrawn and the letter of the juaro adat of his hindu, 
declaring the decision written by A.M. Datuk Bagindo void, convince the 
court of Datuk Bagindo Lapiah's right. 
The court finally decided that it had established that endeavours to 
make an exchange contract had been made but that they had not resulted in 
a contract. On that basis alone it could not be concluded that Upiek was 
entitled to the land. However, the inspection of the land in the presence 
of the defendant plus the testimony of witnesses concerning the fourth 
border had established that the land presently under dispute had been 
part of the disputed land of 1943. This, together with the endeavours to 
make a contract was proof enough that the disputed land was pusako of the 
plaintiff. The defendant had to deliver it 'free and unencumbered', and 
the decision should be carried out immediately. Fees of US $30 were to be 
paid by the defendant. 
Datuk Bagindo resisted execution but Upiek persisted and called in the 
assistance of the court staff. On 23 May 1973 the defendants and Upiek 
met together with the clerk of the court. They signed a statement that 
the defendants would hand over the land before 14 June. When Datuk Bagin-
do still refused to do so, the court decided on 16 June that the land 
should be seized and handed over to the plaintiff. On 28 June the bail-
iff, together with the mayor and two police officers as witnesses went to 
the neighbourhood where the land was situated. They explained that from 
now on the plaintiffs could use the land and that if the defendants tried 
to prevent them from doing so they could be prosecuted for a criminal 
offence. The costs of the court's inspection trip (US $75) were to be 
paid by the defendants, but it was in fact not the defendants but the 
plaintiff who paid. As a compensations the plaintiff agreed with the de-
fendants that the pawning sum for a plot of sawah, pawned to Dar, a mem-
ber of Upiek's sublineage, would be 'deepened' with 1 gold rupiah (US 
$75). Thus, Datuk Bagindo Lapiah paid doubly. The land on which the pawn-
ing was deepened was precisely the land which Upiek had claimed in ex-
change for the land now under dispute. She could be pretty sure that Dar 
would be able to keep the land for quite some time, for it was unlikely 
that Datuk Bagindo Lapiah would soon be able to pay her such a high 
redemption sum. As for the disputed land, Datuk Bagindo had to watch the 
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adat house being torn down. Upiek had won both halves of the old ex-
change. 
The 1943 decision had stated a) that the land was pusako of Angku Koto's 
sublineage, and b) defendant must return the land to plaintiff. It is 
difficult to speak about 'executing' the first part of such a decision, 
since the defendant does not necessarily have to do anything other than 
'acting as a person entitled to the pusako'. The second part can in prin-
ciple be executed. It would even be possible to speak technically of an 
execution even though the defendants continued to work the land, i.e. if 
it were worked on the basis of an acknowledged pawning or lending con-
tract. In fact, however, the basis on which they continued to do so be-
came unclear. At first the continuation of the defendants' use may have 
been on the understanding that the plaintiff was pusako holder: I have 
not been able to ascertain whether this was the case after so many years. 
In the sixties, in any case, the continued exploitation was used by the 
defendants as an argument to back their claim as pusako holders. Thus, we 
may conclude that ultimately the decision of 1943 was not executed, at 
least not until the dispute was brought to the state court again in 
1971. 
The conflict over the total amount of land involved was fought out in 
the 1943 case with respect to a small part. It is therefore understand-
able that the sublineage of Angku Koto had been willing to leave the ac-
tual use to the losing party. The important thing was that its pusako 
rights had been confirmed by the court. From this position it could start 
a new round of property politics with an act of goodwill towards the 
others, in an attempt to calm down the immediate anger. This apparently 
worked well for quite some time, considering that several women in a row 
from the same sublineage worked the land. This short-term solution, how-
ever, involved the risk that it would become increasingly difficult for 
Angku Koto's sublineage to maintain its position as pusako holder, for a 
person who does not reaffirm his rights regularly will lose them to some-
one who builds up evidence that may be interpreted as indicating that the 
land is his. 
Time worked in favour of Eatuk Bagmdo Lapiah's sublineage. The actual 
farming by several women in a row from the same sublineage could be seen 
as a series of constituting acts, each one increasing the strength of the 
preceeding ones. This was for Upiek reason to act and to reaffirm her 
pusako rights. For the same reason she could not tolerate Ebtuk Bagindo 
lapiah's refusal to give her land in exchange for the plot on which the 
adat house had been built. Being installed in an adat house is a very 
strong indication of one's pusako rights to the land on which the house 
is built and, by extension, to the rest of the pusako of the same sublin-
eage. This indication had to be refuted by an equally strong counter-
move: while providing a lineage member with land to build an adat house 
on may be an act of goodwill between the branches of a lineage, doing so 
without demanding a token that the land concerned remains one's pusako is 
an act of sheer folly. When Datuk Bagindo lapiah refused to cooperate in 
a symbolic exchange, Upiek forced him through the state legal system to 
tear down the adat house. Just as it is necessary to reaffirm one's own 
rights regularly it is also necessary to react against attempts from 
others to establish a right. Whether one succeeds or not depends on the 
power relations within the social field in which these affirmative and 
constitutive acts take place. 
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It is significant that the plot asked in exchange was already under 
control of the plaintiff as pawned land. Ihis indicates that the main is-
sue was not so much that the loss of a piece of land should be compensat-
ed by another, but that rightful control over the plots in question 
should be (re-)established. Catuk Bagindo Lapiah realized the symbolic 
importance of the exchange. If he indeed promised the exchange before his 
installation, as Upiek claimed, he did everything to destroy that impres-
sion afterwards. He made sure to avoid all meetings at which the issues 
were discussed and used procedural arguments to deny that valid decisions 
had been made (cf K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981). 
The tactical moves and thus more generally the social significance of the 
court decision of 1943 can only be fully appreciated when set in the 
larger context of village politics and of the politics within the lineage 
of Eatuk Bagindo. Angku Koto had won in court in 1943, but the very fact 
that he had won against his own lineage head was an important reason why 
he did not actually get access to the disputed land. Not because he could 
not obtain it, for he could have gone to the police, but because the 
negative effects of such an attempt would have exceeded the benefits of 
doing so. Going to court is one thing but forcing one's panghulu actually 
to turn over land goes much further and should be avoided if possible. 
There is a seeming contradiction. On the one hand people do not hesitate 
to challenge their opponents in court, even close relatives or one's 
panghulu. They may even use mean tricks in order to win, as long as the 
dispute is in court or before another state institution. When the dispute 
comes back to the village scruples also come back and all of a sudden 
people remember to pay respect to their lineage head and behave more or 
less within the adat boundaries. F. von Benda-Beckmann (1979: 252) has 
given a striking example of this attitude. The contradiction is not a 
real one. Behavioural propriety depends very much on the context in which 
people find themselves. Within the village setting they feel far more 
bound by adat notions of proper behaviour than in the setting of the 
state institutions, even if the same people and issues are involved. 
This case also indicates, however, that if necessary, villagers may 
force even a deputy panghulu to undergo the humiliation of tearing down 
the adat house in which he was installed. But this was only possible when 
the power relations within the lineage and in the village in general had 
changed to the advantage of the sublineage of Angku Koto and Upiek. The 
decision of the court in 1973 was thus executed because it was necessary 
for Upiek's sublineage to reconstitute her pusako rights, but also be-
cause the power relations within her lineage and in the village enabled 
her to do so. 
In 1969 Datuk Bagindo Lapiah was appointed as deputy of A.M. Catuk 
Bagindo with full support of the latter. It was therefore still difficult 
for the sublineage of Upiek to enforce the exchange contract, for acting 
against A.M. Catuk Bagindo would also have meant acting against their own 
panghulu. However, after the installation of A.M. Eatuk Bagindo and Catuk 
Bagindo Lapiah their relationship had become strained. A.M. Catuk Bagindo 
had watched the activities of his deputy in trying to accumulate pusako 
for his sublineage with increasing suspicion. In 1971 the political scene 
had changed. In 1971, A.M. Catuk Bagindo had been elected as chairman of 
the Adat Council, but was a few months later removed and succeeded by 
Eatuk Batuah Rajo. In the events leading to A.M. Catuk Bagindo's removal 
Catuk Bagindo Lapiah had taken sides against his own panghulu. Eatuk 
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Bagindo Lapiah had considered it wise to look for support elsewhere, 
because he saw that he could not expect much from his own panghulu. He 
aligned himself with Haji Batuah, the head of the oldest but nearly ex-
tinct sublineage in the lineage of Datuk Bagindo. Haji Batuah had also 
lost a dispute against Angku Koto in 1941 and had ever since born a 
grudge against that sublineage. Datuk Bagindo lapiah tried to take advan-
tage of that grudge in the present dispute. At the same time he tried to 
establish himself as Haji Batuah's closest relative and prospective heir 
of his pusako, which led to another series of property and political dis-
putes shortly thereafter (cf. F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 242 ff). Datuk 
Bagindo lapiah was also supported by Haji Datuk Panghulu Rajo (married to 
a woman of his sublineage), with whom he had also sided in the issue of 
the chairmanship of the Adat Council. 
Because of the growing enmity between Eatuk Bagindo lapiah and A.M. 
Datuk Bagindo by 1971 Upiek could enlist the support of A.M. Datuk Ba-
gindo. She also managed to obtain support from the mayor, a permanent op-
ponent of the newly elected chairman of the Adat Council and a good 
friend of the head of the section of religious affairs of the Village 
Council, Upiek's brother in law, and thus also a reliable supporter. Her 
supporters carried more weight in court, where Datuk Bagindo lapiah was 
only supported by Haji Batuah. Once the decision was made, Datuk Bagindo 
Lapiah's supporters were unable to prevent the tearing down of the adat 
house. 
Conclusions 
The Minangkabau example, presented in this paper, illustrates the argu-
ments and propositions set out in the first section. In order to under-
stand the disputing process properly and the role of courts and in par-
ticular of their decisions in this process, it is essential to include 
the post-trial stage in one's analysis. Failing to do so prevents us from 
understanding the social significance of court procedures and of court 
decisions. The disputes described here indicate that, in Minangkabau at 
least, disputes do not end with a court decision; nor can any signifi-
cance of the decision for the following social life be assumed as a mat-
ter of principle. I have tried to offer a perspective for the study of 
the post-trial stage which does not exclude the possible social impor-
tance of court decisions but which does not assume their importance with-
out further examination. 
Understanding of the social significance of decisions requires in the 
first place insight into the way decisions are interpreted and used by 
the persons involved in a dispute and understanding of the mechanisms 
which determine what happens with decisions once they have been render-
ed. I have shown how in Minangkabau decisions, once rendered, leave the 
confined setting of the court and enter into the semi-autonomous social 
field of the village in which the disputes originated. It is in that set-
ting that the effects - and not only the effectiveness - of court deci-
sions must be studied. In that social field courts themselves have little 
control over what happens with their decisions. As the disputes described 
here (especially The Case of the Demolition of an Adat House) show, the 
parties 'monitor' enforcement, but they do not do so in isolation. What 
parties do and can do to a great extent depends on the political situat-
ion within the village. They are constrained by their relationship with 
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each other, but also by their relationships with the members of the vari­
ous socio-political institutions. Such institutions even may take the 
initiative and make a dispute subservient to their own political ends, as 
I have shown elsewhere (see K. von Benda- Beckmann 1981). 
The cases presented also show clearly that the semi-autonomous social 
field out of which a dispute emerges does not remain the same over time. 
It changes constantly, sometimes abruptly and drastically, sometimes 
gradually. Disputes build up their own history, partly in the village, 
partly in the court setting. When they leave the court setting the vil­
lage setting is not the same as it was before and it does not remain the 
same afterwards. All three cases involve changing constellations within 
the relevant semi-autonomous social fields. Alliances fall apart, others 
are built up, power relations change because powerful people die and 
young people come of age. Because of these changes people may react dif­
ferently to decisions over time. Thus, in The Саве of the Inheritance of 
Inyik Kaba there still was hope that the 'true' lineage members of Inyik 
Kaba would obtain their inherited pusako once they would have a strong 
adult man to represent them. In the last case the adat house could be 
torn down when Datuk Bagindo lapiah had lost the support of his lineage 
head. 
I have also tried to illustrate the proposition that the different 
elements of decisions should be examined seperately. On the one hand, 
courts decide which events have taken place, what the relationships 
between parties are, what the status of property is, etc. On the other 
hand they decide what consequences to attach to such ' facts ' . My mate­
rial shows that compliance with one element of the decision does not ne­
cessarily imply compliance with the other elements. Each element can be 
interpreted in a different way from what the court had in mind and each 
must be studied separately, because it may have its own effects. The sec­
ond and third cases show, for example, that leniency regarding the spe­
cific consequences which a court has ordered (i.e., the transfer of land) 
can be accompanied by a great concern for the (implied) decision concern­
ing social relationships and the status of property. It would be too 
easy, however, to conclude that disputants in such cases only want a 
declaratory decision and are not interested in the concrete consequences. 
There is considerable demographic pressure on land, especially on rice 
fields on the lower slopes of the mountains. Exploitation rights become 
increasingly economically important. Access to relatively small pieces of 
land is a matter of concern even for the wealthier people who can afford 
to go to court. And because of the symbolic value of land transfers by 
means of which pusako rights are (re)asserted over a much larger amount 
of land, actual execution of a decision can have far greater importance 
than would appear from the formal subject-matter of a dispute. 
Nevertheless, social and political considerations can make it prefer­
able or perhaps even necessary for a winning disputant to forgo the en­
forcement, to wait for a more opportune moment or to enter into negotia­
tions with its opponent. As I have shown in such negotiations there seems 
to be a strong preference for temporary solutions which fix as little as 
possible about the more fundamental rights and relationships. Thus, as 
long as the basic position as pusako-holder is not openly challenged, 
people may be quite willing to negotiate about the details and to be con­
siderate of their opponent's interests. They may try to secure acknow­
ledgement of their pusako rights without causing a change in the actual 
control over the exploitation rights of the land involved and may think 
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up quite complicated constructions to do so. However, when it is neces-
sary to secure their pusako rights, i.e. when these rights are openly and 
continuously challenged, they take recourse to all possible institutions, 
recruit every possible ally and can be quite unscrupulous in seeking to 
get what they want. The bluff poker around the oath in the dispute of 
1943 and the demolition of the adat house are examples of how hard the 
game can be played if necessary. 
In intra-village negotiations court decisions can have important social 
effects. They are advanced as additional legitimation for one's position. 
In itself, the fact that a state court has decided in one's favour is not 
enough to convince opponents and village functionaries of the strength of 
one's rights. Villagers are acutely aware of the limited knowledge judges 
have of village life. They are also aware that the decision of the court 
does not concern the underlying conflict but is addressed to the dispute 
as this was formulated in court. And they claim that courts lack legiti-
macy in adat to interpret adat. But all this does not prevent them from 
stressing the court's legitimacy - based on the state legal system - when 
the decision happens to support their claim. 
People who go to court rarely stand alone, certainly not in land dis-
putes. They try to enlist the support of politically powerful persons 
within the village. Court disputes and village politics are closely in-
terrelated. This is nothing unusual from the perspective of individual 
actors. Disputants try to strengthen their position in such a way in 
every society. But the particular social and political structure of 
Minangkabau villages entail that the relationship between politics and 
disputes is of a structural nature. In the past, political relations and 
relations with respect to control over pusako were hardly differentiated. 
The lineage heads as political leaders and representatives of the lineage 
were involved in all matters concerning lineage land. In particular they 
played a crucial role in the process and ceremonies in which rights to 
lineage land were transferred or reconstituted. This was one aspect of 
their function of 'preventive law care': with their presence they con-
firmed that the transaction involved was according to adat. It was their 
task to be informed of all transactions concerning their lineage. This 
was possible because of a long training with their predecessor and other 
experts and because they were always present at significant transactions 
and ceremonies. 
Changes during the colonial and post-Independence period have brought 
about significant changes in the position of the lineage head. In partic-
ular, there has been a gradual dissociation of panghulu headed lineages 
from the lineage segments which de facto hold common pusako property. As 
a result, the status and boundaries of descent groups have become in-
creasingly uncertain. Group splittings have become processes which may 
last many years, as the lineage history of Datuk Bagindo indicates. The 
various elements of such a splitting are widely separated in time. People 
may have different opinions about the stage which the process has reached 
at a certain time: some may say that the lineage has been split while 
others claim that it has only been divided into sublineages. Some will 
say that the pusako has been divided, while others say that there has 
been only a redistribution of use rights. The panghulu, who should organ-
ize the deliberations within the lineage to come to a decision about 
these problems often is not available at all or is unable to elicit a 
decision. This means that many relationships within a lineage or between 
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lineages are in affect negotiable. This is not only a matter of twisting 
the truth, but also and predominantly of not knowing any more just what 
the relevant relationships are and precisely how the rights to lineage 
property are distributed. It is very likely, for example, in The Саве 
of the Demolition of an Adat House, that nobody really knew to whom the 
land under dispute properly belonged. As a result, it has become increas­
ingly important for people actively to reaffirm their kin relationships 
and their rights as pusako holders. They can do so by caring for sick and 
elderly relatives, as Taufik had done for Haji Amir in The Case of the 
Journey to Mekka and its Consequences. Catuk Bagindo Lapiah had doneso by 
acting at one occasion as the representative of Haji Batuah and by being 
installed in the adat house of A.M. Eatuk Bagindo. However, such personal 
acts of reaffirmance are not enough. One must be able to mobilize influ­
ential persons who will affirm and recognize one's rights and status and 
acknowledge the behavior symbolizing them. 
The Minangkabau example shows the importance of time in an amplified 
way. However, I would maintain that a dynamic perspective should never be 
left out of an analysis of processes of dispute management. 
On a more general level, my material illustrates that there is no valid 
reason why a 'case', for purposes of analysing law or the disputing pro­
cess, should end with the decision. This is certainly unwarranted for de­
cisions of institutions at a great social and spatial distance from the 
disputants, because the probability for transformations seems to be 
greatest there. But neither should it be taken for granted that a dispute 
has come to an end with the final decision of an institution highly in­
ternal to the semi-autonomous social field, even if execution of one of 
the parts of the final decision takes place within 1»he setting of the de­
ciding institution. I have pleaded for an open-ended concept of a case, 
since one never can be quite sure whether a dispute has come to an end. 
Usually a field researcher has to base his or her analysis on a greater 
or smaller part of a dispute without hoping to encapture the whole dis­
pute. 
Finally, the Minangkabau example also illustrates the importance of 
looking at the relationship between disputes, dispute prevention and 
trouble-free social life. It is necessary to understand the general, nor­
mal social role of relationships, property, rights and duties in order to 
understand what a dispute is about and why people choose to act or to 
remain passive. A concept of law which concentrates on disputes, 
sanctions and social control tends to neglect both the fact that parties 
are active and not merely passive recipients of sanctions or 'law', and 
the role of law in trouble-free social life. 
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VI 
Transformation and Change in Minangkabau 
Introduction 
40 years ago, Korn (1941) complained about the strange course the study 
of Minangkabau adat law had taken and the sad state of affairs which 
these studies had produced: fundamental misunderstandings of Minangkabau 
society and its law, and misconceived and patently unjust applications of 
adat law in the colonial courts. This concerned not only the (mis)under-
standing of the present state of adat law, Korn pointed out, but also af-
fected the understanding and interpretation of social and legal change in 
Minangkabau. More recently, Kahn (1976, 1980a, 1980b) has again argued 
from a slightly different point of view, that the interpretations of so-
cial change in Minangkabau are misconceived, as they proceed from a false 
historical baseline: that is the idea of the 'traditional matrilineal 
system' of Minangkabau, which in his view was basically the product of 
early Dutch colonial domination. He warned of the dangers inherent in the 
uncritical use of earlier Dutch writings on Minangkabau adat law and con-
tended that its reconsideration start with its deconstruction as it is 
portrayed in the discourse of earlier Indonesianists (1980a: 82). 
With this paper we wish to contribute our share to this deconstruction 
of adat and adat law of Minangkabau. Like Korn and Kahn we are convinced 
that many of the earlier interpretations of Minangkabau adat and Minang-
kabau social organization are misconceived, and that these misconceptions 
lie at the root of equally misconceived analyses of change in Minang-
kabau. Like Korn and Kahn we shall in particular focus upon changes in 
the complex of rules and institutions relating to property holding, in-
heritance, and succession to positions of socio-political authority known 
as adat pusako, the adat of matrilineal heritage. In our analysis we 
shall consider two sources of potential distortion. One of them has al-
ready been emphasized by Kahn: disregard of the effects of the colonial 
government's administrative and economic policies. Kahn argues that the 
adat and social organization described in 19th century writings and re-
produced since then was not the system as it existed prior to Dutch 
colonial rule, or the turmoil of the Padri-war which Minangkabau had 
experienced the previous 20 years. The image of the traditional matri-
lineal system was to a large extent, if not completely, the product of 
traceable Dutch interventions in political and economic life. Whether or 
not one shares Kahn's conclusions as to the effects of Dutch measures, 
his general point is an important one which must lead to a critical re-
examination of Dutch writings. We should like to discuss another element 
of potential distortion to be considered in the deconstruction. Minang-
kabau adat has been described and interpreted largely in terms of western 
- usually Dutch - legal thinking. We shall try to show how interpreta-
tions of Minangkabau social forms, both by lawyers and social scientists, 
have been western in character and how these have influenced conceptions 
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of social and legal change in Minangkabau. 
In our attempt to add to the understanding of socio-legal and economic 
developnents in 19th and 20th century Minangkabau we shall proceed in the 
following manner. We shall first indicate our historical baseline by out-
lining the rules and institutions of the adat pusako as we think it 
existed in the early 19th century, at the close of the Padri war but be-
fore the actual systematic colonization of the Padang Highlands by the 
Dutch. The main parts of our paper will then focus on the impact which 
Dutch administrative and economic policy had on the adat pusako and on 
the socio-economic activities related to it, as well as on the nature of 
the legal and social change occuring during the first half of the 20th 
century. Ihe discussion of both questions, particularly the first, leads 
us into a complex dialogue with Kahn's ideas about the actual state of 
19th century Minangkabau. Briefly, the divergence between Kahn's and our 
interpretations is the following: We do not think that the 'traditional 
matrilineal Minangkabau society', with corporate kin groups in which 
there was equal access to lineage property based on common ownership, 
ever existed. We rather think that it only existed in some stereotyped 
summary reproductions of Minangkabau adat and society, and that we must 
work with a much more differentiated picture of Minangkabau law and so-
cial organization. Kahn, on the other hand, thinks that such a tradition-
al system did exist, but that the system written about was not it but 
was instead basically the product of 19th century economic and adminis-
trative policy of the Dutch. He therefore takes other interpretations of 
change to task for not proceeding from a correct historical baseline. Our 
impression is that Kahn himself fell victim to the transformed descrip-
tions of Minangkabau adat which he takes as descriptions of actual con-
ditions. Furthermore, the factors which in Kann's view essentially pro-
duced the traditional system, in our view rather contributed to a dis-
integration of the actual system as we conceive it. 
It is understandable, then, that our different interpretations result 
in different analyses as to the character of changes flowing from the new 
economic and administrative policy in the early 20th century. To be sure, 
Kahn's interpretation of Minangkabau socio-economic changes differs from 
the previous interpretations of Schrieke and Maretin. For example, where-
as Schrieke and Maretin see rural capitalism emerge as the locally domi-
nant mode of production, Kahn sees petty commodity production emerge in-
stead. The three basically agree nevertheless in portraying 19th century 
changes as dramatic and far-reaching, as fundamental departures. We on 
the other hand begin with a different interpretation than they of Minang-
kabau social forms prior to the 19th century, we see the 19th century 
changes as somewhat less dramatic than they, and we see some continuities 
where they see departures. We recognize that our views also carry ele-
ments of speculation which are attendant upon any historical reconstruc-
tion. Nevertheless we think that a careful reading of available sources 
brings us closer than Kahn to an accurate account. Fortunately 19th cen-
tury Minangkabau is relatively well documented, especially the second 
half of the century, so we can form a rather detailed picture of central 
elements of its social and economic organization.x 
It will be one of our major criticisms of the writings of Kahn, Schrieke 
and Maretin that some of their more important interpretations of Minang-
kabau history perpetuate biases inherent in the earlier writings on the 
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subject. Especially important are the biases inherent in Western legal 
thinking, by which we mean much more than jurisprudence alone. One must 
be wary of ethnocentrisms in legal thought whether they take the form of 
diffuse and vague or of highly precise and professionalized notions of 
what law, rights, and kindred concepts mean and how they relate to social 
practices and organizations. Early writers, including anthropologists and 
colonial judges were often unaware of conceptual mistakes engendered by 
the mis-translations based in their ethnocentrisms, a point recently re-
peated in legal anthropolgy but which was previously well recognized by 
some among the Dutch adat law scholars .2 Whereas an uncritical use of 
specific or professional western legal concepts can easily lead to "jam-
ming into categories" (Nader 1965) or unwarranted "backward translation" 
(Bohannan 1969) and thereby to distortions of the social life purportedly 
described,an unspecific general use of terms can be equally misleading by 
virtue of vague or diffuse descriptions leaving a reader to guess an 
author's intentions (cf. Hooker 1975: 23). 
Although there is a wide range of what western legal thinking means 
for the individual scholars concerned, they usually agree upon several 
basic, mainly structural, characteristics of western law. These are that 
western law is the product of a society which is politically organized in 
the form of a state and characterized by a high degree of social differ-
entiation and functional specialization or division of labour. It is to a 
high degree externally and internally differentiated. External differen-
tiation makes law as a whole a relatively autonomous category of cogni-
tive and normative conceptions distinct from other categories, such as 
ethics, morals and good manners. It also demarcates a sphere of legal be-
haviour which is differentiated from other spheres such as the social, 
economic and political. Western law is internally differentiated in the 
sense that there are a number of distinctions among spheres or fields of 
law such as public and private, criminal and civil, substantive and pro-
cedural, property and inheritance law, that of things, of obligations, of 
persons, and so forth. Furthermore, western law has a specific notion of 
subjective rights, legally defined as protected interests which give the 
entitled person a claim, ultimately to be effectuated in court. 
These structural characteristics of western law and the pre-occupation 
with subjective rights, especially the various types of ownership, 
should be kept in mind when considering writings on Minangkabau adat and 
adat law. In Minangkabau adat, as in most Indonesian adat systems, there 
is no conception of 'adat law'. Adat is internally differentiated3, but 
the folk system of classification has no category for 'law', nor does any 
of the folk categories correspond to an analytic conception of law in 
general. However, there are many rules, concepts and principles which 
would fit in almost any analytical concept of law designed for compara-
tive analysis. Besides, some of the adat classification are almost com-
pletely legal in character.'* The term adat law (adatrecht, hukum adat) is 
a Dutch invention.5 In Van Vollenhoven's writings it was designed to re-
fer to the law in adat. Van Vollenhoven was well aware of the fact adat 
law was not only 'oosters' (oriental) in content, but that is also dif-
fered considerably from western law in its formal and structural proper-
ties . He chose to use the term adatrecht precisely to express that adat 
law could only in part be differentiated within adat (1918: 9). But in 
spite of this insight and his, certainly for his time, unparalleled 
understanding of the nature and working of law in the Indonesian adat 
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systems, the law in adat was gradually transformed into a separate cat-
egory, adat law. It came to be interpreted and applied in a context of 
western legal thinking. As we shall show, interpretations of adat biased 
by western legal thinking also pervaded the specific literature on Mi-
nangkabau adat, thereby creating a partly transformed adat or adat law 
different from the adat produced and reproduced in the village sphere. 
Some sources show a remarkable precision in describing indigenous terms 
and institutions. The use of some key-terms with a technical legal mean-
ing in western law may have blinded later writers to the actual ethno-
graphy. 7 
But apart from that were the transformations resulting from the political 
struggles for the recognition of indigenous law and rights by the domi-
nant colonial legal system.8 The term adatrecht itself became important 
in this struggle. But central to the discussions concerning the introduc-
tion of agrarian legislation in the 1870's were the terms 'beschikkings-
recht' (the communal right of avail of Indonesian communities) and 'in-
lands bezitrecht' (native right of possession). Throughout the colonial 
era these terms were the focus around which the question of recognition 
was centered.9 
In order to have adat rights to land recognized, it was essential to 
stress their similarities with Dutch rights to land. Thus, these neolo-
gisms, although designed to avoid direct translation of adat phenomena 
into Dutch terms, more often than not were in their structural character-
istics as western as the Dutch legal terms - as we shall see in the ana-
lysis of the literature on Minangkabau. The effects were multiplied when 
these terms not only were used as political tools, but also as a standard 
terminology to describe the various adat laws in Indonesia. The transfor-
mation of adat into adat law finally took a new dimension when it was 
used and re-interpreted in the colonial courts and when, primarily under 
the influence of Ter Haar, adat jurisprudence and adat law literature 
were progressively tuned to the needs of the colonial courts.10 The 
courts were themselves a western legal institution working with a western 
law of procedure. In this context adat rules and principles were divested 
of their procedural elements. The adat processes of decision making and 
realization of rights in interaction processes simply could not be repro-
duced in the western-style courts. Furthermore, detailed and unbiased 
descriptions of the law in adat were in the court context transformed 
into 'adat law' . 1J 
It is therefore important to distinguish between the law in adat as 
conceived and operated in the village sphere, and adat law as conceived 
in the courts and the literature. A description and analysis of legal 
change in Minangkabau must pay attention to both. As has also been point-
ed out by Kahn, it vrould be misleading to assume that these two levels of 
adat were and are isomorphic but it would also be a mistake to assume 
that they are unrelated to each other (1980a: 82). The courts' adat law 
has been shaped by the law in adat and has in turn influenced it and its 
development.12 And both have been influenced, often differentially, by 
non-legal factors. 
Western legal thinking is not confined to certain assumptions about the 
nature of legal rules and their application in adjudicative processes. It 
also extends to the relation between law and behaviour, and in a dia-
chronic perspective, to the relation between law/legal change and social 
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and economic change. Some comments must therefore be added on the rela-
tion between law and behaviour, both in its synchronic and diachronic di-
mension. A clear understanding of this relation is fundamental for our 
later discussion of change, and for our argument against other interpre-
tations . 
Statements of the relationship between law and behaviour are often 
dominated by clichés. Characteristic of these clichés and the assumptions 
on which they rest is a preoccupation with prescriptive rules. In this 
thinking, behaviour is related to law simply in terms of conformity or 
deviance. Another cliché is that if social behaviour patterns change, law 
will in principle also change. If law does not change, it is conceived of 
as lagging behind social or economic development. This limited view 
disregards the fact that law does not only prescribe or validate certain 
activities but also always leaves room for relatively autonomous conduct. 
Within this range of autonomy, new patterns of social and economic behav-
iour can emerge without necessarily changing the law or creating a lag.11* 
These simplistic models, which are not confined to legal thinking but 
are as frequently encountered in general anthropological theories,15 pre-
pare the ground for a new set of transformations. They encourage unwar-
ranted inferences as to actual behaviour patterns based on legal rules, 
or the reverse inferences regarding legal rules based on actual behav-
iour. In our attempts to reconstruct the state of law and social and 
economic organization in Minangkabau, we must therefore take particular 
care that the domain of adat law and ideology and that of actual social 
and economic activities remain separate, and avoid reductionist inferen-
ces both from the state of adat/adat law to economic life, and in the re-
verse direction. This is all the more important anri difficult, since the 
term 'adat' can refer to social phenomena in both domains (cf. Kahn 
1980a : 82). 
Minangkabau Property Lau in the Early 19th Century 
Minangkabau property and inheritance law in the 19th century - leaving 
open for now the question of just what were the conditions in the vil-
lages temporarily governed by the Padri - was essentially defined as 
adat. It was part of the adat pusako complex of rules and principles 
which was dominated by the social, political and economic relations 
within the nagari. 
Before trying reconstruct the content and structure of this legal complex 
let us first , in order to avoid misunderstanding, comment on the problem 
of the dominant system of law. We do not wish to argue that the adat of 
the 19th century was something like a pure adat of a timeless golden age. 
Por many years prior to the Padri war and the subsequent IXitch colonial 
domination, adat as a legal system existed in a dual relationship with a 
concurrent system, Islamic law. This relationship was dual in two senses, 
first in that elements of Islamic law and legal language have been incor-
porated into adat, a process which probably began well before the Padri 
war and which continues until the present time. Secondly, even when Is-
lamic elements were not translated into adat, or accepted beside it in 
everyday village life, Islamic law as a separate system was also accepted 
and reproduced in Minangkabau. The relationship between adat and Islamic 
law has, so far as we know, varied considerably in the history of Minang-
kabau, before the Padri war as well as under Etotch colonial rule and 
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after Independence. This relationship has varied with the relative power 
of the proponents of the system and with the economic and political bases 
for this power (cf. Taufik Abdullah 1971, 1972). Following Dobbin (1977: 
27 f), we can assume that during the latter decades of the 18th century a 
definite attempt to give more force to Islamic law in property and econ­
omic legal affairs culminated in the Padri war. But there is no evidence 
from which we may infer that Islamic law as a whole ever succeeded in 
superseding adat as a system of property and inheritance law. We may as­
sume on the other hand, that probably well before the Padri war, adat as 
system was influenced by Islamic law and that this particularly may have 
been the case in those nagari which for a longer period came under actual 
Padri government. However, as far as we know, the elements of Islamic law 
were in general translated into adat, incorporated into adat, or accepted 
beside adat as village law. 
For example, the establishment of Islam as the dominant religion re­
sulted in the creation of religious offices. But these offices, malim or 
chatib adat, subsequently became suku offices, to be inherited matriline-
ally. large parts of Islamic marriage law and burial customs were accept­
ed into the village law, not replacing adat but added to adat rules and 
customs. Many legal concepts of Islamic law, like hak (right), milik 
(property, ownership), hibah (gift), warith (heir) were used in adat. 
Moreover, comparison of the adat expressed in Islamic terms, and the 
meaning these terms have in Islamic law itself reveals,that the original 
adat conceptions were not suppressed by Islamic legal institutions : 
Warith in Islamic law are the Koranic heirs and a person's agnates - in 
Minangkabau warih denotes matrilineal kin and matrilineal heirs. Hibah in 
Islamic law is a contract which must become effective during the donor's 
lifetime, and the donor is not restricted as to the amount of his or her 
gift. In Minangkabau adat hibah is revocable and becomes effective only 
at the donor's death; the donor is severely restricted with respect to 
the amount of the gift. Hak and milik were similarly adapted in the con­
text of adat (cf. F.von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 162, 322). 
Before, and also to a large extent after the Padri war, the power bases 
of Islamic legal influence lay outside the system of nagari government; 
the economic relations on which Islamic legal influence could build were 
mainly inter-nagari or inter-regional trade relations. From this posi­
tion, it was difficult to attempt to redefine the legal system of proper­
ty relations, particularly a legal system which was so interwoven with 
intra-nagari social and political relations. It is likely that when the 
Padri moved to occupy political power within the nagari, more force was 
given to Islamic law than previously but there is little evidence from 
which to speculate. Apparently not even the Padri tried to abolish the 
pusako system as a system of property law. l 6 The restoration of adat law 
and order following the military defeat of the Padri was certainly not a 
complete return to the situation which existed before the outbreak of the 
civil war. We know that in some cases the Padri domination left its clear 
marks on the political organization of the nagari.17 But we can gather 
from early post-war descriptions such as that of Francis (1Θ39) that the 
restoration of the 'soekoe bestuur' (suku government) and the adat pusako 
system and the adatization of Islamic/Padri influences seem to have been 
successful. The military defeat of the Padri and the presence of Dutch 
troops and administrative officials were essential conditions for this 
restoration, and we shall discuss the impact of the Dutch administration 
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on the adat pusako system in a later section of this paper. But in the 
third decade of the 19th century, the legal system pertaining to nagari 
government and property was essentially adat, with the first influences 
of the new rulers and additional influences from Islam. Before we 
consider what the effects were of the developing economic and political 
conditions in the coming years, and during the Cultuurstelsel in partic­
ular, let us first try to outline the basic principles of the adat pusako 
complex. 
1. The system of adat pusako 
Each villager is, on the basis of matrifillation, incorporated into a 
number of groups which are generally structured by or modelled on the 
principle of matrilineal descent. There are groups of different sizes, 
the smaller groups usually being segments of the more inclusive ones. 
True matrilineal descent groups of any size and genealogical depth are 
called jurai. In the most frequent use of the term, however, jurai 
denotes sub-branches within the groups which are headed by a panghulu 
(panghulu andiko) who is an acknowledged member of the adat council. 
These groups we shall call 'lineages' (see for an overview of the differ­
ent terms. De Josselin de Jong 1951: 49 f f ). As lineage membership was 
relevant for nagari citizenship, residence, access to agrarian productive 
resources, economic cooperation and ceremonies, it seems justified to 
view them as the basic socio-political units. Their members are charac­
terized in adat as 'being of' or 'having in common' a.o. one panghulu 
(sapanghulu), one panghulu title (sasako), one heritage (sapusako), one 
property (saharato), one graveyard (sapandam sapakuburan) and one forest 
(sahutan kareh). 
A lineage could be a true matrilineal descent group, but could also be 
internally stratified. Internal lineage stratification came into exist­
ence when persons of different social and political rank - strangers and 
descendants of former slaves - were incorporated as lineage members. 
Since strangers and the descendants of former slaves could only acquire 
citizenship in a nagari through lineage membership, many lineages have 
been stratified during some period of their history. In the course of 
time, however, such ex-stranger or ex-slave jurai were usually given in­
dependent lineage status with their own panghulu, as a result of which 
the membership of the original lineage was again reduced to matrilineally 
linked blood relatives and the former internal stratification was raised 
to the level of inter-lineage stratification (see also F.von Benda-Beck-
mann 1979: 61 ff). 
Supra lineage organization and institutions of nagari government vary 
considerably throughout Minangkabau. It is common to the socio-political 
organization of all nagari that each lineage and each lineage member is 
on the basis of real or putative common matrilineal descent affiliated to 
one of the named groups called suku or suku pusako in most parts of 
Minangkabau (but kampueng in 50 Koto, see De Rooij 1Э90). Suku are sup­
posed originally to have been Minangkabau - wide matnclans. These groups 
were exogamous and constituted units within which inter-lineage inherit­
ances of property (harato pusako) occurred and which handled disputes 
about property matters or succession. These suku structures were also 
used for the politico-administrative organization of the nagari. Lineages 
and groups of closely related lineages were, however, in many nagari also 
grouped together in politico-administrative units which cross-cut suku 
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lines and combined component groups of different suku pusako. Such units 
were called hindu (adat) or also suku (adat).18 The actual political or-
ganization of most nagari consisted of varying combinations of these two 
group-forming principles. Qnphasis on the hindu/suku adat principle seems 
to have been characteristic for the traditional Koto-Piliang system of 
government in which all suku (clan) segments were united in 4 suku (ad-
ministrative) units. In these nagari, representatives of the '4 suku' 
also formed the highest governmental institution. In the Bodi-Caniago 
tradition, the highest governmental institution, the Karapatan Mat 
Nagari, was formed by all lineage heads (panghulu andiko). But in the 
19th century, the political organization of most nagari seems to have in-
cluded elements of the two classical systems. 15 
These variations in political organization accounted for similar vari-
ations in the socio-political control over the nagari-territory. Roughly 
speaking the territory of the nagari was divided into two categories of 
land: 1) the land which was inherited property (harato pusako) of lin-
eages, mainly land under cultivation and used for house-sites, 2) ulayat 
land, land not permanently exploited agriculturally, particularly un-
cleared forest. The control over these lands was vested in the panghulu 
as representatives of the nagari, their suku or their lineages, depending 
upon the political organization of the respective nagari. 
The lineage was a unit in its external relations - which concerned common 
representation in nagari governmental and administrative affairs by its 
panghulu andiko, common liability for compensation in serious criminal 
matters, common rules of exogamy, and common representation in transac-
tions about the pusako property of its members with members of other lin-
eages. In its external relation all inherited property held by the lin-
eage members was attributed to the lineage or to is panghulu (ship), the 
symbol of group unity and leadership. 
It would be wrong to infer from this external unity that all members - or 
even all blood relatives - would be equally entitled to all pusako prop-
erty. Internally the lineage and in particular its members' property re-
lations usually were differentiated. In a true matrilineal descent 
group this was a result of the mechanisms of internal distribution and 
allocation of pusako property and of inheritance. Only those lineage mem-
bers for whom the property was actually harato pusako turun temurun, i.e. 
the direct matrilineal descendants of the person(s) who originally ac-
quired a particular property, had a right to be considered in the dis-
tribution. This could be all lineage members. But usually there were sev-
eral complexes of such property held by smaller jurai within one lineage. 
Such complexes came into existence when a member inherited self- acquired 
property (harato pancaharian) which then became pusako for him/ her and 
his/her descendente. Or it could originate from a temporary gift (hibah) 
of pusako property from a member's bako, the father's matrilineage, to 
his child, its anak pisang (see below). Whereas such property was exter-
nally included into the lineage's pusako, and represented by the pang-
hulu, internally only the descendants of the ex-pancaharian property 
holder or the recipients of a gift - as long it did not return - were en-
titled to its economic exploitation. 
However, the main portion of the lineage property usually was harato 
pusako turun temurun for all lineage members. The relation of the group 
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members to their pusako was an unspecified 'having' or 'holding in com-
mon' , which was expressed through possessive pronomina or references to 
the group. This 'having in common' was the legal basis for acquiring con-
crete rights to use and exploit pusako property; it was not identical 
with these concrete rights. Concrete rights could only be acquired as a 
result of a decision making process, ideally, organized by the group head 
and resulting in a consensual decision of all adult group members 
(sakato). 
The most important concrete rights were the ganggam bauntuek, the pam-
baoan, and the dapatan.They were all temporary in character, for defini-
tive division of pusako property within the lineage was not allowed. When 
it did occur, it meant a division of the group holding common harato 
pusako as well, i.e. a cleavage of the lineage into two lineages, each of 
which then was saharato sapusako. 
The ganggam bauntuek was ideally distributed to ]urai of equal genea-
logical depth. It remained in the jurai unless a redistribution occurred. 
The ganggam bauntuek gave its recipients, in principle both men and 
women, the exclusive right to use the property. The actual use was deter-
mined by the jurai. It was generally women who exploited ganggam bauntuek 
property, but men could be given pambaoan property out of the ganggam 
bauntuek stock. The actual distribution of ganggam bauntuek depended upon 
the concrete needs of a woman or jurai - e.g. number of children, of fe-
male children in particular, economic situation of the women and of their 
husbands, additional opportunities to exploit other land by way of pam-
baoan or a gift (hibah). Changes in the circumstances making a distribu-
tion uneven would necessitate a redistribution. This constituted the tem-
porary nature of the ganggam bauntuek. Redistribution also required a 
consensual decision by all adult lineage members. In practice such at-
tempts often seem to have led to quarrels and ultimately to cleavages 
after which the former ganggam bauntuek holding units became lineages, 
each holding their own harato pusako turun temurun. The allocation of 
pambaoan and dapatan had a more temporary character. 
Pambaoan could be given to a married man for exclusive use in his nu-
clear family. After his death, pambaoan in principle reverted to the 
group which had given it (pambaoan kumbali). If the relations between the 
man's lineage and his children - between the bako and their anak pisang -
were good, the bako could decide to leave the property with the children 
for a longer time, or the transfer could be formalized as a privileged 
loan or temporary gift. Decisions about pambaoan were made unanimously by 
the lineage. Whether pambaoan should be given, in what amounts and for 
how long, depended on the concrete circumstances of the situation - the 
economic situation of the man's wife, the relation between her group and 
that of her husband and the possibility of eventual further marriages to 
strengthen the inter-group relationship. 
Dapatan was pusako property usually given to women at the time of mar-
riage or shortly thereafter. Prior to marriage, women had no separate 
household within the rumah gadang, but worked and consumed together with 
their mothers. After divorce or the woman's death, the dapatan remained 
with the group which had allocated it. 
In a stratified lineage, there was an additional differentiation, for 
lower ranking lineage members were entitled only to a gift (pambarian) 
but not to share in the processes of distribution (pambahagian). The lin-
eage's core members, the blood relatives, would decide how much of the 
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lineage's property would be given to the lower ranking members. This 
property remained subject to the ultimate control of the core members and 
the panghulu, and the recipients often were not allowed to pawn it. If 
the blood relatives of the lineage were extinct, their pusako property 
could be transmitted to the lower ranking lineage members. This was, how­
ever, no automatic process but rather required the consent of the extinct 
core group's matrilineally related relatives in other lineages. The lower 
ranking lineage members were in principle excluded from succeeding to the 
lineage's sako, the panghulu title. Within their group, however, the 
property they had been given was treated as 'their' pusako and this prop­
erty complex was subject to the same rules about distribution, 
allocation and inheritance as pusako in general. 
Alienations of pusako property were severely restricted. Pusako was her­
itage, acquired by the ancestors, to be used by the present generation 
and to be passed on to future generations of group members. "Aienyo 
bulieh diminum - buahnyo bulieh dimakan - batangnyo tatap tingga" - "Its 
water may be drunk, its fruit be eaten, but its stem remains forever". In 
principle, only temporary alienations were allowed and these had either 
to be based upon existing special social relationships or to create such 
ties. One category has already been mentioned: transfers of pusako prop­
erty to the group's anak pisang. Various types of such transfers were 
known under various terms (cf. F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 176 ff). Some 
resembled a pawning or privileged loan, others were closer in nature to a 
temporary gift. The property was something given for as long as the 
children live, salamo hiduik anak. In this case the land reverted to the 
bako after the death of the (last) anak pisang. Alternatively, allocation 
was to the anak pisang's jurai in continuity. In this case the property 
would revert to the bako only if the children's jurai became extinct. 
The other important category of temporary alienations were pagang 
gadai transactions, usually translated as grondverpanding by the Dutch or 
pawning, pledging in English (see Guyt 1936, cf. F. von Benda-Beckmann 
1979: 169 ff). Through these transactions, the pawner (panggadai) trans­
ferred the right to use the land in exchange for a sum of money or gold, 
to the pawnee (pamagang). In classical adat pawnings were allowed only in 
four cases: when a lineage required money for the marriage feast of a fe­
male member, for the installation of a panghulu, for a burial and for the 
reparation of the rumah gadang. Pagang gadai transactions ideally had to 
be based upon social relations of matrilineal kinship, but it seems that 
in practice other grounds were also accepted.22 The propspective pawner, 
the head of the group lineage needing money, had to try first to pawn the 
pusako to members of related lineages in his suku. Only if none of them 
was willing to give money and take the land, could it be pawned to un­
related groups. Pawning of pusako required the consent of all members of 
the group who held the pusako in question as common pusako turun temurun. 
The transaction involved also a ceremony, in which the panghulu and the 
holders of the neighbouring plots of land participated, and by their par­
ticipation indicated that the transaction was in accordance with adat - a 
process called 'preventive law care' by the Dutch scholars of adat law.23 
The location of the ceremony was relevant to the additional consequences 
of the pawning. The ceremony had to be held in the house of the pawnee. 
But male pawnees had two houses, the 'house of the children' and 'the 
house of the kamanakan'; i.e. the house of their wife's (lineage) and 
that of their own lineage. The choice of location indicated who would 
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benefit from the transaction and would receive the pawned property if the 
pawnee should die before the moment that it was redeemed. 
Redemption (tabuih) terminated the pawning relationship. The right to 
redeem could not be abrogated in adat and was not subject to limita-
tion.2" 
The pawned property kept its pusako status for the pawner's lineage. 
For the pawnee, the right to use the land was determined by the status of 
the money invested. If the money/gold was pusako or bungo pusako, the use 
right for the pawnee also was considered pusako. If the money was panca-
harian - personally-acquired property - the right to use the land had the 
same status. 
The pangang gadai relationship could also be ended by the 'transfer of 
the pawning', mangisah gadai, to a new pawnee. This was frequently done 
if the relationship had endured for a long period. In this case, the 
pawner might think that the relationship should be terminated as other­
wise the pawnee might claim the land as his own pusako property. If the 
pawner did not have the means to redeem the property, he could decide to 
transfer the gadai to a third person, a transaction often also used to 
'deepen the pawning', i.e. to increase the pawning sum. The initiative to 
terminate the relationship could also come from the pawnee. If he wanted 
his money back, he would offer the land for redemption to the pawner. If 
this offer were not accepted, the pawnee himself could with the pawner's 
consent initiate the transfer to a new pawnee. However, if the pawner had 
refused an offer to redeem his property, he could not then withhold his 
consent (F. von Benda-Весkmann 1979: 174). 
2. Personally-acquired property 
Property which was not inherited but acquired by a person's own efforts, 
such as newly cultivated land, trade earnings and products of one's own 
creative labour were called harato pancaharian. The property complex ac­
quired by a married couple during their marriage was termed harato sua-
rang (individual property) . In the system of the adat pusako, self-ac­
quired goods were considered to be 'pusako in chrysalis state' (Willinck 
1909: 584). The adat status of these property objects was temporary. Once 
the individual property holder had died, the property was inherited by 
the members of his jurai.25 
In exchange transactions Minangkabau individuals could dispose freely of 
their pancaharian property. Disposition in the form of gifts, in practice 
gifts from a father to his children, which presented a threat of with­
drawal of future pusako from his jurai, were subject to adat restric­
tions. Such gifts, generally termed hibah, were allowed and valid only 
satahu saizin ahli warih, with the 'knowledge and consent' of the lineage 
members who were the future heirs to this property, and with the 'cooper­
ation' of the panghulu. Satahu saizin might be better translated as 'ack­
nowledgement' ; it did not refer so much the result of a process of per­
ception as to a social process of giving and receiving knowledge.26 
3. Concepts, rules and decisions 
The dominant rules and values of the pusako system were clearly expressed 
in the adat conceptual system of property categories and relationships. 
Property objects and relations were dominated by the idea of the conti-
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nuity of lineages and their heritage, pusako. Heritage (pusako), rather 
than material property obiects (harato) stood at the apex of the universe 
of valuable goods, material and immaterial. Property obiects were defined 
by their use value in relation to that continuity, and were distinguished 
by the means (actual labour) by which they had originally been acquired 
and by reference to the relative distance in time from the moment of 
their acquisition. Pusako property was distinguished into the following 
categories : 
- harato pusako tambilang ruyuang - the pusako property dug up from the 
trunk of the palm tree; the land originally cultivated by the ances­
tors, i.e. the real pusako turun temurun of the lineages. 
- harato pusako tambilang ameh - the pusako property acquired by gold/-
money; former pancaharian goods, bought or pawned property. 
- harato pusako tambilang basi - land dug up with the iron hoe; recently 
cultivated land. 
- harato pusako tambilang budi (tambilang kai'tan, harato hibah) - pusako 
or property acquired on the basis of good social relationships; land 
given to strangers and descendants of former slaves Who were incorpo­
rated into the lineage, or land acquired by temporary gifts. 
Using these categories of pusako, the legally relevant differential prop­
erty relations within the saharato sapusako-group may appropriately ex­
pressed . 
In the conceptual world of Minangkabau adat temporary social units and 
relationships (marriage, patrifillation, individual lives) and the prop­
erty relations based upon them (pambaoan, suarang, pancaharian; temporary 
gifts to anak pisang) were overshadowed and absorbed in the diachronic 
notion of pusako continuity. All property was pusako in the diachronic 
dimension. This diachronic conceptualization of property was so dominant 
that harato pancaharian was, and to a certain extent still is (for empir­
ical data see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 194 ff) identified and referred 
to as one category of pusako property (tambilang basi/ameh). In the dia­
chronic dimension pancaharian "is" pusako because it will be pusako. 
The adat rules and principles about property relations, distribution, al­
location, pawnings, gifts, and so forth share some important traits. To 
varying degrees, they permit such actions or transactions to take place, 
state conditions concerning their validity and prescribe the process in 
which they are to be carried out. But there are scarcely any strict rules 
stating whether these transactions should take place and to what concrete 
result they should lead. Both depend on a social process of decision mak­
ing in which the concrete circumstances of the situation must be consid­
ered - it is 'tergantung situasi dan kondisi', as Minangkabau say now­
adays. The relevance of certain types of circumstances are indicated by 
principles most of which have already been mentioned: The concrete needs 
of individuals or groups, the location of a pawning transaction, and the 
actual social relationships between individuals or groups. Which circum­
stances are the most relevant in a specific case, whether they lead to a 
constructive decision, and to what decision they lead, must be determined 
in a concrete interaction process leading to a consensus (sakato) of the 
decision makers. This action/interaction element is implicitly or expli­
citly integrated in the rules;27 which rules cannot be conceived as 
standing apart from this action/interaction element. Under different cir-
transformation anâ Change 161 
cumstances - and these are different in nearly every case - the same rule 
thus can lead to different results. 
What holds true for rules also holds true for the conceptions of 
'rights'. Rights in Minangkabau adat were not subjective, as are rights 
in western law, which one either has or does not have and which can be 
actualized independently of 'circumstances'. The actualization of rights 
also depends upon decisions: the action/interaction element is also inte-
grated into them. It is therefore understandable that the relations be-
tween persons and property objects are not conceptualized in terms of ab-
stract rights in adat. 
The Impact of the Colonial Administration 
The presence of the Dutch troops and the gradual defeat of the Padri 
forces set the scene for the restoration of adat law and order in the 
Minangkabau nagari. Although the build-up of the Dutch colonial adminis-
tration introduced new elements into the socio-political organization of 
the nagari and created unprecedented forms of supra-nagari governmental 
stru tures, the nagari retained, or returned to a socio-political organi-
zation essentially based upon the principles of the adat pusako. In some 
nagari, traces of Padri governmental institutions were retained, but 
these also were 'adatized' in the course of time. Whereas the Dutch had 
consciously supported the 'adat party' against the Padri and in their 
subsequent policy aimed at keeping the influence of Islamic functionaries 
to a minimum, they had little sympathy for the actual nature and content 
of the adat system with its suku government and matnlineal succession 
and inheritance rules. In their eyes, the nagari were ungovernable with 
such a political structure, and they immediately tried to change the sys-
tem by creating new political offices on the village and supra-village 
levels, in order to devise a new form of local government and create a 
workable link between their own administration and the local population. 
That no more far-reaching attempts to change the Minangkabau socio-poli-
tical organization were made was due mainly to a lack of economic, per-
sonal and political resources. It certainly did not stem from a positive 
evaluation of the adat pusako system. As early as 1837 Francis comment-
ed: 
"Many times we have tried to convince the Malays how difficult it 
was to deal with the suku administration and how imperative it was 
to replace it with a hierarchical multi-level form of government. 
But their stubbornness and ambition did not make this possible, and 
thus the suku administration has remained intact despite several 
organizations. Neither the tyrannical government of the Padri nor 
the system introduced by us has been able to extinguish their gen-
eral preference for the suku government (1Θ39: 128)". 
It therefore seems to be justified to assume that although the Dutch pre­
sence was a necessary condition for the restoration of the adat system, 
this restoration during the 1820's and 1830's actually occurred against 
or despite the Dutch preference for a more 'rational' hierarchical and 
unicentric local government organization.26 
During the following decades, however, the Dutch administrative and econ­
omic policy brought forth important changes in the socio-political and 
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economie structures and activities. The systematic establishment of a 
pseudo-traditional administrative system based upon the offices of 
Tuangku Laras, panghulu kepala and panghulu suku (rodi), the introduction 
of the system of forced cultivation and delivery of coffee (1847), the 
introduction of a new judicial system officially doing away with nagari 
justice (187 5) and the declaration of unused land to state domain (1874) 
significantly changed the political and economic context in which the 
Minangkabau property and inheritance law operated. According to Kahn, 
"... the culture system, based upon state control of land and forced cul-
tivation of export crops, served to reinforce the process of feudalisa-
tion and stagnation in the indigenous commercial economy and to solidify 
certain aspects of local social organization." The result, in his eyes, 
was a static system of corporate lineage organization, based upon common 
ownership of and access to land and to what he calls the development of a 
traditional Minangkabau society (1976: 87 f, 1980b: 163 f). 
In our view, this hypothesized impact on lineage structure and land hold-
ing and distribution is not plausible. While the gradual encroachment of 
the Dutch colonial administration undoubtedly led to significant changes 
in the politico-administrative and economic context in which the system 
of land holding and distribution operated, it is difficult to see how it 
could have produced 'the traditional matrilineal Minangkabau society' en-
visaged by Kahn. 
The new administration failed.It never created the effective link to 
the villages for which the Dutch had hoped (cf. Francis 1839, Verkerk 
Pistorius 1868, Kroesen 1874, de Rooij 1890). Although the offices in-
troduced by the Dutch were quickly 'domesticated' (Graves 1981) by the 
Minangkabau, they could never actually replace the system of authority 
based upon adat. The result was a dualistic form of nagari government. 
Which still is characteristic for contemporary Minangkabau (see Syofyan 
Thalib 1974, K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981). The government consisted of new 
or quasi-adat offices established by the Dutch on the one hand and genu-
ine adat offices on the other. The adat panghulu in principle retained 
much of their authority and power. But in fact their functions were in 
part transformed and reduced and their actual power undermined, since 
some aspects of political decision-making processes were assumed by 
supra-nagari institutions. Other aspects, such as command over some econ-
omic activities of lineage members, were transferred to the panghulu 
kepala and the panghulu suku rodi.29 The latter did not, however, suc-
cessfully usurp supervision of pusako and proper adat activities (see 
Kroesen 1874; Verkerk Pistorius 1868; de Rooij 1890). None of the new or 
remodelled political units - the artificially created laras-district, the 
administrative nagari under the panghulu kepala and the 'culture system 
suku' under the panghulu suku rodi - ever became a unit characterized by 
coimvon ownership of land or a group within which there was equal access 
to land. 19th century administrators generally noticed that the new func-
tionaries did not exercise land control rights, except for the cases in 
which they had been in office as panghulu adat before their appointment 
(Kroesen 1874: 8, see also Verkerk Pistorius 1868, de Rooij 1890). In 
those cases in which they used their position of power to engage in land 
politics, it certainly was not to promote equal access to land. From the 
very beginning of Dutch colonial rule the Dutch officials reported the 
manner in which the new local officials manipulated their external 
sources of power in order to enrich themselves or their lineages. 
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lb support his hypothesis on the actual creation or, at least, intensifi-
cation of communal property relations, Kahn further draws inferences from 
the situation in Java. There, De Kat Angelino (1931: 436) had suggested 
with regard to the effects of the culture system "that the redistribution 
of land, often thought to be a product of an earlier, communal system of 
land tenure, was in fact a consequence of the Culture System itself, 
which made access to subsistence land more important than ever." Noting 
that "in Java, the combination of sugar-growing and the cultivation of 
rice was intended to preserve a separate subsistence sphere", and that 
"village lands, in effect owned by the colonial government, were divided 
up regardless of the local structure of land ownership", Kahn maintains 
that, "though coffee cultivation in Sumatra was cultivated not in estate 
fashion but by individual coffee-planters, the situation in Sumatra was 
very similar to that on Java, as overall ownership of land throughout the 
East Indies lay with the government" (1980b: 166). 
It seems to us that this hypothesis, and the facts it presupposes, are 
untenable. To begin with, there was never overall state ownership of vil-
lage land in West Sumatra. Until 1874, when the so-called Sumatra Domain 
Declaration was issued, state ownership of land existed in no way whatso-
ever. The domain declaration, when introduced formally, certainly did not 
cover all village land. Par. 1 stated: 
"All waste land (woeste gronden) in the Sumatran districts under 
direct Government rule are part of the State's domain, unless mem-
bers of the indigenous population exercise rights over it which are 
derived from the right of reclamation (ontginningsrecht). Except 
for the cultivation rights of the population, the right of disposal 
is exclusively vested in the Government". 31 
It was generally assumed that the ulayat lands in the nagari had become 
state domain through this declaration. However, this assumption of owner-
ship of land seems to a large extent to have existed on paper only. The 
declaration had been kept 'secret', it was not brought to the notice of 
the adat leaders (Korn and Van Dijk 1946: 26; AB 11: 80). In 1904, the 
assistent-resident of the XIII and IX Kota's summarized the state of af-
fairs as follows: 
"The Director of Justice (in Batavia) relies on the domain declara-
tion and seems to think that it has made the right of avail (be-
schikkingsrecht) of the native heads over the ulayat lands obso-
lete, or in any case subject to the Governent's rights of disposal. 
According to him, the old adat, being inconsistent with the regula-
tions, must not be adhered to any more. I do not wish to give a 
judgment on this difficult question, but would like to state, that 
the Local Government has never given notice of the domain declara-
tion to the native heads, precisely because the declaration was in-
consistent with adat. In practice, the heads have not felt much or 
anything of the declaration, and the Colonial Government itself has 
not implemented the declaration in the strict sense, probably for 
the same reasons which led the Local Government of the Residentie 
to keep the declaration secret from the native heads".32 
Whereas land used for coffee cultivation to some extent may have been 
ulayat land, rice land which was the pusako of the lineages certainly did 
not fall under any form of state ownership. Whilst the combination of 
state control of land and the culture system economy on Java may have had 
the effect of creating new forms of communal ownership, it never did so 
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in West Sumatra. 
It is equally misleading to conclude that if "the colonial government 
also sought to encourage communal access to rice land" (Kahn 1980b: 166) 
and if "local officials were therefore encouraged to administer carefully 
the allocation of land on the basis of adat" (1980b: 167), the colonial 
administration actually did take appropriate measures to ensure this or 
that local officials actually did so. From what we know, the contrary is 
more likely: that Minangkabau officials rather promoted unequal access to 
land by using the Dutch connection in nagari property politics. Besides, 
the Dutch colonial administrators and courts in the 19th century did not 
usually interfere in internal lineage property affairs. The Dutch courts 
systematically refused to hear lineage internal disputes about pusako 
property (Guyt 1936: 145 f ). And if the Dutch interfered at all, they 
tended to uphold the, also in Kahn's view, pre-colonial status-based dif­
ferentiation in lineage internal property (AB 11: 74 ff). 
Equally mistaken is Kahn's idea that by registering and then limiting the 
number of panghulu, "the Dutch further regulated the forms of local kin­
ship organization in order to fulfil the needs of the colonial govern­
ment" (1980b: 168). Again, this would have been the Dutch intention. But 
like most administrative measures of the Dutch, it resulted rather in the 
opposite of the intended goal - The Dutch prohibition on creating new 
panghuluships, rather than creating or intensifying corporate groups with 
communal ownership, seriously affected the adat mechanisms of group 
splitting and group formation (see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 65 ff, 365 
f, Graves 1981: 41). Instead of splitting the panghulu headed lineage 
which held 'one sako and one harato pusako' in accordance with the adat 
principle 'what has become too large must be shortened, what has become 
unclear must be clarified'ээ, the 'one-property-holding'-groups became 
much too large for the adat mechanisms of allocation and distribution of 
land to be carried out successfully. Within the Dutch-recognized panghulu 
lineage, subdivisions developed with a great degree of autonomy in prop­
erty matters. Whereas in Dutch adat, these groups could not become pang­
hulu headed lineages, such groups generally claimed and often established 
a new title according to village adat. Thus a new ambiguity concerning 
the status of groups and their property complexes was introduced which 
became a dominant theme in village politics. The more such groups de­
veloped and the more they in time split themselves, the more difficult it 
became to settle the succession to the panghuluships and to maintain lin­
eage control over the separate pusako complexes and the idea that all 
members of a panghulu lineage were really 'of one property'. Instead of 
creating or intensifying the development of corporate lineages with com­
mon ownership and equal access to land, the Dutch measures led to an in­
creasing dissociation of panghulu headed groups and groups which were ac­
tually saharato sapusako. This development was also fed by the impact 
which the culture system economy had on Minangkabau property relation­
ships, in particular by the increasing monetization of property relation­
ships to land. 
This monetization must not be equated with (increasing) trade or other 
economic activities based upon exchange rather than (re-)distribution of 
goods, nor with the monetization of the Minangkabau economy as a whole. 
There is evidence that trade played an important role in the overall 
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Minangkabau economy well before colonial rule, and that the years 1780-
1830 were characterized by a new trade boom in many areas of Minang-
kabau (Dobbin 1977). At the end of the 18th century considerable quanti-
ties of coinage were introduced into the Minangkabau economy for the 
first time, offering an alternative to the traditional methods of barter 
and of exchange calculation based on a system of gold weights (Dobbin 
1977: 24). But trade, and the money flow which accompanied it, was mainly 
an inter-nagari or inter-regional affair. The money earned in trade was 
usually invested in new exchange relations or in the acquisition of con-
sumer goods. Under colonial rule, the monetization of the economy con-
tinued, but important changes occurred which changed the direction of the 
money flows and its impact on property relations. Inter-nagari commercial 
activities decreased. With this the possibilities of earning money by 
inter-nagari trade also decreased as did the opportunities of investing 
money in consumer goods or new inter-nagari exchange relations. Through 
concentration of coffee cultivation, new money was introduced, money that 
in general was also held individually (see Kahn 1976: 82). Since the im-
port of new commodities, and trade in general, was restricted by the 
Dutch, the money flow was more or less forced into the nagari, where it 
affected the nagari economy and social life internally. Also affected was 
the system of adat property law which was based upon these relations. 
The basic way in which money could affect internal nagari property rela-
tions was the system of pawning, transfers of pawning, and redemptions. 
There is clear evidence that pawnings were frequent during the period of 
the Culture System. In 1874, Kroesen reported: 
"Innumerable are the disputes about land ownership, which are the 
consequence of temporary alienation by means of pawning. Both par-
ties, often the heirs in the second or third generation of the 
original pawner/pawnee try to prove the original right of their 
ancestors. The witnesses are usually dead, and what the heirs de-
clare to have heard by tradition is usually insufficient to clarify 
the issue (1874: 19)". 
The 19th century observers were suprised by the extent to which pawnings 
occurred, and they could not conceive of the economic rationality behind 
the pawnings - a point faintly echoed by Kahn's question of why villagers 
should have had any interest in rice land transactions over and above 
subsistence needs (1980a: 87). One should not overlook the fact that paw-
nings were generally initiated by the pawners who were in need of money 
for consumption purposes among which were the four classical adat rea-
sons, the costs of a burial, the wedding of a female lineage member, the 
construction of an adat house and the installation of a panghulu. It is 
quite plausible that the stagnating economy and reduction of the overall 
money flow actually contributed to an increase in pawnings as families 
living off rice production and trade were increasingly cut off from the 
sources of earning money or gold. 
The mechanisms for monetization were pawning, redemption and pawning 
transfers. The transfers of pawnings, in particular, made it possible to 
transfer exploitation rights on pusako property without adherence to the 
restrictions which adat imposed on pawnings. In the degree to which pan-
caharian money was invested in these transactions they led to the 'pan-
caharianization' of pusako. This did not concern pancaharian rights to 
other lineages' pusako property only, but also the holding of pancaharian 
exploitation rights in one's own group's harato pusako. For if the whole 
166 Village Justice and State Courts 
group did not want or was unable to redeem the pusako, then individual 
group members could not be prevented from doing so in order to acquire 
the right, though temporarily, to use and exploit the pusako property 
exclusively. In adat, such transfers are not termed 'redemption' but 
rather 'transfer of the gadai' (mangisah gadai). This terminology indi­
cates that the pusako-relationship of the whole group (for whom the prop­
erty in question was turun temurun) and their right to redeem and redis­
tribute the property were not affected by the pancaharianization of one's 
pusako. 
Thus the basis was laid for a new type of differentiation of pusako 
property relations, based upon money investment. The importance of the 
processes of distribution within the whole group was reduced, and actual 
exploitation rights were brought to smaller social units. In both res­
pects, the authority which the panghulu could exercise over their lin­
eage 's pusako property was undermined. 
In sum, we can state that a) in early 19th century Minangkabau, there did 
not exist a system of static, panghulu focussed lineages, the property of 
which was held in common ownership giving each lineage member equal ac­
cess to land, and that b) the Dutch administrative and economic policy 
did not create such a system or intensify its development; on the con­
trary, Dutch policy created the conditions for the gradual dissolution of 
political and socio-economic groups and for the emergence of a new type 
of internal lineage differentiation in access to land. 
20th century developments 
In the early decades of the 20th century, economic and legal developments 
changed the impact of the monetization and pancaharianization of rela­
tions to pusako property significantly. The system of forced cultivation 
was abandoned and replaced by money taxation. Minangkabau was opened up 
to the influx of foreign commodities and the administrative and commer­
cial sectors expanded. New needs for money and new means of earning money 
were thereby created. As far as we can tell from the available sources, 
the new economic conditions led to a considerable increase in the rate of 
land transactions, pawnings in particular (Schrieke 1928/1955, cf. Oki 
1977: 117 f f ). These in turn led to an increasing monetization of the 
relationship to pusako property, which considerably affected the oper­
ation of the adat mechanisms of land distribution and allocation. For 
'pusako held with money' was not subject to ganggam bauntuek (re)distri­
bution in the group for which the property originally was, and in prin­
ciple remained, common pusako property. The adat mechanisms, however, 
were not replaced. They continued to operate, but in the smaller lineage 
segments, expanding through time, which held the use rights to the pusako 
land on the basis of invested money. 
The impact of the monetization of relationships to pusako land became 
even greater when the adat and adat law restrictions on dispositions over 
pancaharian property were relaxed. In the second and third decade of the 
twentieth century the adat principle requiring the consent or acknowl­
edgement of the panghulu and all adult lineage members for a gift of pan­
caharian was dropped and the freedom of disposition was generally accept­
ed both in village and the courts' adat law. эч Pancaharianized use rights 
to pusako now could freely be transferred to a man's own children. In 
theory at least, most pusako property could be held individually and 
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be transferred within the conjugal family, though in theory and practice 
such transfers were only temporary and their effect could be undone if 
the members of the group holding pusako rights exercised them. A new di­
mension was added to this development when in the 1960's village adat and 
court adat law definitively accepted intestate inheritance rights of 
children in their father's pancaharian property, even though this new 
rule still operates only within the nuclear family. Outside this circle 
the matrilineal system of inheritance rules is still intact. Also, once 
pancaharian property has been inherited by children, it becomes pusako in 
their lineage segment and is forthwith inherited matrilineally (cf. Kato 
1977: 26Θ). 
Ironically enough, corporate lineages with common ownership and equal ac­
cess to land were being created precisely during that time in which, in 
the eyes of contemporary and later observers, the matrilineal system was 
breaking down. When the tax system was introduced in 1908, the units made 
responsible for the payment of taxes were the groups which were consider­
ed by the Dutch to own pusako property in common. For these groups, the 
Dutch created a standard term, kaum. The kaum was represented by its 
head, whom the Dutch styled mamak kepala wans, 'the mamak who is the 
head of the heirs, i.e. lineage members'. The kaum with its common harato 
pusako and its mamak kepala wans also became the standard legal body 
which dominated, and still dominates35 , court proceedings over pusako 
property. This terminology has been a constant source of confusion36 : The 
word kaum refers to groups of different size (panghulu lineages, sub-
lineages) in different nagari, yet all kaum are treated according to the 
same rules in the court system (cf. К. von Benda-Beckmann 1982: 29). 
Thus for the first time, lower level units of adat socio-political organ­
ization which in adat held pusako in common in the sense that they con­
stituted one property complex in their external relations were directly 
linked to external administrative and judicial institutions of the colon­
ial system. From that time onwards, Dutch administrative attention 
switched from the panghulu suku (rodi) to 'the mamak' - mamak the man­
ager, mamak the creditor, mamak the manipulator of pusako property. 
Schrieke's report and several judgements from the first decades of the 
20th century give a vivid impression of the manipulation of pusako prop­
erty by mamak kepala wans (see Schrieke 1955, Guyt 1936: 145-155, Oki 
1977: 128). 
The role of the mamak in the property affairs of their lineage members 
was strengthened by a new wave of adat interpretation which reflect the 
Dutch desire to have individual persons responsible for the pusako com­
plex also in non-tax matters. This was the 'recognition' that in the four 
classical adat situations a mamak kepala vans could pawn the pusako 
property of his kaum without the consent or acknowledgement of even the 
closest kaum members. The formulation of this new adat rule seems to have 
been more or less a one man show. It was asserted by Guyt in his disser­
tation Gvondvevpandinq in Minanqkahau (1936: 70-74), based upon some am­
biguous statements in the literature and some recent court judgements 
(Landraad Pariaman 1926, Landraad Fort de Koek 1933, Landraad Payakumbuh 
1933). However, the chairman of the courts handing down the explicit 
statements of the new rule in the last two cases had been Guyt himself -
a fact not mentioned in his dissertation.37 This interpretation has not 
been upheld in post-Independence Minangkabau. 
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The Transformation of Adat 
The creation of the 'kaum as owner of its pusako' in the early 20th cen­
tury was a marking point in a development in which adat property rela­
tionships had been transformed by western legal thinking. This develop­
ment and the mechanisms of transformation must be well understood, be­
cause the transformed adat notions gradually became an independent adat 
law system of increasing relevance in practical property affairs, but 
also because they heavily influenced later interpretations of social 
change in Minangkabau. 
The influence of Dutch legal thinking in the description and interpreta­
tion of Minangkabau adat is most evident in the attempt to conceive of 
property categories and relationships in western notions of rights, in 
particular of ownership (eigendom). A good impression of the degree to 
which this was done can be won by reading through the 19th century 
sources collected in the Pandecten van het Adatrecht.3* This review shows 
that even where the adat system is largely described in its own and not 
in technical legal terms , the descriptions are ultimately summarized in 
terms of eigendom. Basically, harato pancaharian was considered to be in­
dividual ownership, pusako property common or family ownership. 
Once this thinking became manifest, it had consequences at several 
levels of interpretations. In Dutch law, ownership is an institution of 
the private as distinct from the public law sphere. Dutch law, of course, 
recognizes also public legal relations to property, land in particular, 
of sovereignty over territory, public control and administration of land 
vested in the state and its administrative agencies. The state, or less 
inclusive public corporations, can also be owners in the sense of private 
law but this is something very different from its exercise of public le­
gal rights. 
In this conceptual frame, the much less differentiated public and pri­
vate aspects of adat property relations could not be adequately expres­
sed, the communities' relations to ulayat land posed a particular prob­
lem, since the state had assumed sovereignty and, in 1870/1874 also pri­
vate law ownership of land not held in ownership by Indonesians. The dis­
cussions occuring in the 1870's, after the introduction of the Domain De­
clarations, show the dilemma with which the colonial lawyers were con­
fronted: either the relations to ulayat were sovereign rights, and had 
then been replaced by the state's rights, or else they were private 
ownership rights, in which case they would be exempt from the domain de­
claration. The relations to ulayat land fitted neither category well, and 
so there ensued long and politically and economically motivated contro­
versies about what consequences should be held to follow. , 0 The West Su-
matran practice is largely known: the Colonial Government considered 
ulayat land to fall under the state's domain, though the population was 
allowed to exercise rights of cultivation (ontginningsrecht); the local 
government was strongly opposed to this interpretation and was extremely 
hesitant to interfere with ulayat land. 
In the dichotomous framework of public - private law, the relationships 
to ulayat land thus were assimilated into Dutch public rights. Pusako re­
lations were reduced to the dimension of private law. Lineages which in 
their external property relations formed a unit in adat, i.e. mainly in 
public and political matters, were thus conceived of as property holding 
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units in terms of private law also. All the pusako properties held by the 
lineage's members formed one property complex. Translated into western 
notions of rights, it was only logical that the familie (lineage, kaum) 
was considered to be a legal body holding property in common ownership. 
It was a 'rechtsgemeenschap' with common property and common administra-
tion. 
Although there existed fairly detailed and differentiated accounts of 
the group-internal kinds of property relations, these were also trans-
formed by the same logic: The right of ownership in Dutch law is the most 
absolute right which includes the right to use and to exploit the proper-
ty objects being owned. Lesser rights must be derived from ownership. The 
concrete adat rights flowing from ganggam bauntuek distribution and pam-
baoan/dapatan allocation were translated into such rights, e.g. gebruiks-
recht (right of use), but this presupposed the existence of a legal body, 
the familie, which was different from the sum of its members. Within the 
unit of common ownership of pusako, there could not, in Dutch legal log-
ic, be a smaller unit having equal rights to a part of the common prop-
erty complex. Consequently, only the lineage was considered to be a 
rechtsgemeenschap, and not the lineage segment, the jurai (see Van Vol-
lenhoven 1918: 250).^ 
The introduction of the neologism 'inlandsen bezitrecht' did not les-
sen or otherwise change the effects of this transformation. It was a well 
meant effort to conceive of Oriental' rights in oriental terms and to 
explicate the difference between adat concepts and the western term ei-
gendom. But this 'orientalization' of eigendom only concerned the exter-
nal aspects of the rights of property holding units, be they individuals 
or groups; i.e. differences in the rights to dispose of property by way 
of sale, gift etc. (see Van Vollenhoven 1918: 264). It did not affect the 
idea that the group was holding one property in common on the basis of a 
common right. 
Thus the important and legally relevant distinctions within the pusako 
property complex in adat could not be adequately expressed. The distri-
bution and allocation of ganggam bauntuek, pambaoan and dapatan was push-
ed into the background. By the same logic the inheritance of ganggam 
bauntuek and pancaharian property also was transformed. 
This was done in two ways: Through inheritance the pancaharian right 
was transferred. The receiver had to be a legal person, capable of hold-
ing rights. We have seen that only the family,the lineage, was such a 
unit, not a lineage segment. Thus, the individual ownership (harato 
pancaharian) had to become common ownership (harato pusako) of the whole 
lineage. Ganggam bauntuek on the other hand, could not be inherited at 
all, because it was not held by a legal person, but by a segment only.1*2 
This led some authors to deny the possibility of inheritance-like trans-
fers at all and to construe the changes in property relations on the mod-
el of accrual and decrease derived from western (germanic) notions of 
common ownership. 
"The Malayan law does not have the right of inheritance, nor does 
it know heirs. Each time a family member dies, the remaining mem-
bers' shares increase, and each time a new member is born into the 
family, the other members' shares in the pusako decrease. Harta 
pentjarian becomes part of the pusako as soon as the person who had 
acquired it dies. But also here we cannot speak of 'inheritance'. 
The pentjarian is ipso jure joined with the pusako as a consequence 
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of the death, but does not fall as inheritance to the persons en­
titled in the pusako. " **э 
In these interpretations, the existence of the internal lineage differen­
tiations of the pusako complex described earlier could not be maintain­
ed. 
It must be noted that the interpretations given above are the result of a 
systematic interpretation of adat in terms of Dutch jurisprudence. They 
were not fully developed until the early 20th century, which saw the 
emergence of the adat jurisprudence, in particular in and as a consequen­
ce of the work of Van Vollenhoven. Most 19th century descriptions and 
interpretations did not go so far. Though freely operating in terras of 
such notions as individual and common ownership, their emphasis remained 
in detailed ethnographic description rather than pressing the data into a 
logical system built upon the notions of ownership. Also, in the early 
20th century Willinck had given a very detailed description and interpre­
tation of the adat legal system, in which he had freely used Dutch and 
Roman legal notions. However, he used them as a comparative framework for 
a better understanding of adat instead of transforming adat notions into 
them. 
Under the influence of the adat jurisprudence, however, these earlier 
descriptions were further transformed, and Willinck's work was not held 
in high esteem by the Leiden adat law scholars.'*'' A systematic 'correc­
tion' and adaptation of earlier 'wrong' or 'unsystematic' descriptions 
took place when the sources were collected and published in the Pandecten 
van het Adatvecht. To give one examples In 1871, Verkerk Pistorius had 
written about pancaharian inheritance: 
"All goods left by a deceased, whether he was married or not, fall 
to the relatives* to whom he, according to Malayan thinking, is 
most closely related. The inheritance of the Malay [...] falls to 
his brothers and sisters* and later to the sisters' children but 
not to his wife and his own children" (1871: 45). 
In the Pandecten, the words marked with the asterisk were corrected with 
the annotation: "better: familie (legal persons)". 
The relations to pusako were further adjusted to Dutch conceptions of 
property rights by moving away from the diachronic towards the more fam­
iliar synchronic dimension as the basis for distinctions. Thus the elab­
orate distinctions by source of acquisition of pusako property were triv­
ialized. They were reduced to a simple distinction between 'high' and 
'low' pusako property, between harato pusako tinggi and harato pusako 
rendan, the former being the pusako which since old times had been in the 
family, and the latter being property recently made into pusako. The bas­
ic distinction in the adat law literature became the one between harato 
pusako and harato pancaharian (cf. F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 351 ff). 
This interpretation of adat rules and property relations increasingly 
divested adat rules and rights of their element of orientation to action. 
The notions of equal shares in the pusako complex, of decrease and ac­
crual in accordance with the number of living lineage members, or of 
equal rights in pusako of all lineage members in accordance with the 
Dutch notion about 'entitled persons', did not leave room for the intel­
lectual and social processes in which the concrete needs and social rela­
tionships of the persons concerned could become relevant. 
Since we lack sufficiently detailed sources, it is difficult to assess 
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the actual significance of these interpretations and their use by the 
colonial courts for the property and inheritance affairs of Minangkabau 
villagers. But the changes certainly increased during the first half of 
the 20th century. Judging from the available sources "*6 and drawing cauti­
ous inferences from our own research in 1974/7 5, we discern the following 
developments : 
In the late 1920's the colonial courts started to accept intern kaum 
disputes about pusako property as a matter of principle (Guyt 1936: 146). 
Although most disputes continued to be dealt with by the nagari adat 
councils before they reached the courts (Guyt 1934), we can assume that 
the actual number of court cases increased, and with this the opportunity 
for the courts to impose their interpretations in intra-kaum as well as 
other pusako disputes. Judging from contemporary experience, we can, how­
ever, assume that even then the percentage of disputes internal to kaum 
remained relatively small and that such cases mainly concerned inter-seg­
ment disputes in which the actual distribution of the pusako was not sub­
mitted to or decided by the court.'*7 The court insisted upon the 'adat 
rule' that in all disputes about pusako property, the kaum (the owner) 
must appear in court represented by its mamak kepala waris. Thereby ac­
cess to adat-court law was limited in cases where individual kaum mem­
bers, mostly women, had grievances but could not bring them to court due 
to an unwilling mamak (see K. von Benda- Beckmann 1981: 144). The courts' 
adat law application based upon the interpretations outlined in this sec­
tion, disregarding the internal differentation of property relationships 
and paying no attention to circumstances which in adat would have been 
relevant, resulted in decisions which were quite different from those 
made in local adat procedures. Treating adat principles as strict rules 
instead of as principles subject to differential actualisation, depending 
upon different kinds of circumstances, led to the misunderstanding and 
unjust application of adat law about which Korn complained so bitterly in 
1941 (1941: 302, 315). Besides, the village institutions of dispute set­
tlement increasingly imitated the decision making style of the courts 
(Ter Haar 1929, К. von Benda-Beckmann 1981) through which the Dutch in­
fluences were gradually introduced into village life. 
The Interpretation of Change 
Several social scientists have regarded the end of the system of forced 
cultivation and the introduction of the tax system as a dramatic turning 
point in the social and economic history of Minangkabau.^6 In their view 
this change was marked by the dissolution of the matrilineal socio-legal 
system and the rise of the nuclear family (Schrieke 1928, Maretin 1961) 
or even the development from matriliny to patriliny (Maretin 1961), in­
volving the hypothesized development of inheritance rights in the 
father's line (Van Vollenhoven 1918: 271, Joustra 1923, Schrieke 1928, 
Maretin 1961, Scholz 1977). Kahn posits a development characterized by 
increasing individualization of property rights leading to the breakdown 
of common ownership and equal access to land and to an increasing differ­
entiation of land holding as a consequence of individualization and dra­
matically increasing land mobility (1980b). Schrieke and Maretin point to 
the emergence of a new dominant mode of production, rural capitalism 
(Schrieke 1928, Maretin 1961) and Kahn posits petty commodity production 
(Kahn 197 5, 1980b). However, other recent research has shown that despite 
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considerable change in social and economic behaviour and some significant 
changes in adat law, one can speak neither of a breakdown of the adat 
ideological-legal system nor of its loss of practical significance.1*9 
Instead there emerges a picture of a much more gradual process of indi-
vidualization and monetization of property relationships, and of shifts 
within rather than away from the matrilineal system. 
The weakness of the first kind of interpretation is in exaggerations both 
of a 'traditional matrilineal system' and in inferences of changes in the 
first three decades of the 20th century. 19th century conditions are seen 
as too 'communal', 20th century conditions as too individualized. As we 
have tried to demonstrate in this paper, this diachronic comparison pro-
ceeds from a false historical baseline: it is based upon conditions of 
19th century Minangkabau seen through the eyes of western legal thinking, 
either as a result of the writer's own bias or as a result of a retrojec-
tion of the early 20th century adat law image of the common ownership of 
pusako by the kaum into the past. Such retrojection was probably facili-
tated by the apparent paradox that this image was only fully developed at 
a time when social and economic activity pointed towards greater individ-
ualization and differentiation in the access to pusako land. Besides, the 
comparison was largely a 'false comparison' (Van Velsen 1969). It related 
social and economic behaviour to the (assumed) adat ideology of the past; 
even worse, for this past it assumed that social and economic behaviour 
was consonant with the ideological system. 
Moreover the interpretations of the consequences of the observed 
behaviour in the early 20th century, mainly increasing land mobility, 
were coloured by western legal thinking, based especially on the equation 
of harato pancaharian with individual ownership. For example, one of 
Schrieke's important arguments for his break-down prognosis was that in 
1927 nearly all land in the Solok region had been pawned and converted 
into self-acquired property (1955: 110). His assumption was that this 
state of affairs would remain. But, as Prins had pointed out already in 
1948, research subsequent to 1927 had shown that most property in the 
area was pusako property (AB 41: 392; Oki 1977: 126). Prins correctly 
pointed out that the userights could well be regarded as pancaharian 
property but that this did not affect the pusako status of the land to 
which the userights pertained (1954: 52, see also F. von Benda-Beckmann 
1979: 422). It must also be kept in mind that the pancaharian-like use-
rights themselves became pusako for the holder's jurai after his death. 
In Schrieke's interpretation there is an implicit equation of harato 
pancaharian with individual ownership. This led him to believe that the 
userights, or the land to which they pertained, would in the future re-
tain their individualized status. This would be so with individual owner-
ship but was not the case with pancaharian property. 
The distortion of past and present by western legal thinking also led to 
an exaggerated importance attached to the change in the inheritance rules 
concerning pancaharian, which was incorrectly taken to be the other im-
portant nail in the coffin of matriliny (see Schrieke 1955: 118, Maretin 
1961: 193). Here again, the diachronic comparison is false in several 
respects. It proceeds from a state of Minangkabau society characterized 
by a strict and 'pure' matrilineal system in relation to which any non-
matrilineal element is dramatized as 'deviance' or 'development' (cf. F. 
von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 373 ff) . But in terms of descent and lineality, 
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the change in pancaharian inheritance is certainly not as drastic as it 
has been made out to be. Many of what appear to be elements of change 
were in fact integral parts of the traditional social organization. For 
example, the traditional system recognized bilateral kinship relations (a 
point made by Djojodigoeno 1968: 262 ff, Fischer 1964), ones not very 
heavily loaded with social functions. The patrifiliative link between 
children and father, and through the father to his lineage, was always an 
integral part of the Minangkabau social system. More important, this 
link could always be used as a basis for property transfers. Property 
transfers between a father and his children, or between the bako and its 
reciprocal anak pisang, were not a new element nor were they forbidden by 
adat - they were only restricted by the way in which the father's lineage 
exercised its autonomy in decision-making about such transfers. 
The misconstruction of change is most evident in Schrieke's descrip­
tion (1955: 118), which served as a point of departure for later authors, 
such as Maretin (1961) and Kahn (1976). In discussing the changes, 
Schrieke notes that 
"the adat laws of inheritance as applied to acquired property dis­
play a growing recognition of a new set of laws governing intestate 
inheritance in place of the original rule by which property passed 
to the branch of the family in question or the most nearly related 
branches as the case may be" (1955: 118). 
Schrieke, however, adduced no evidence at all for childrens' intestate 
inheritance; references are made only to property transfers based upon 
gifts (hibah) and last wills (umanat). These are implicity contrasted to 
a strictly matrilineal inheritance rule, and so gift practices, arrange­
ments of property transfers after mutual consultation, depending upon the 
mutual relations of the families, appear to be something new. That they 
are not new is evident from Schrieke's own 19th century sources (1955: 
118 Note 37; 271) which give a similar impression, but which also do not 
speak of intestate inheritance. 
But even when in the I960's intestate inheritance rights of children 
were recognized, both on village level and in the Indonesian state 
courts, the impact of the overall change in inheritance rules on the adat 
pusako system remained limited. It must be recalled that pancaharian 
property is not continuously individual ownership. Once transferred by 
way of gift or inheritance to the children, it becomes pusako property in 
the children's lineage segment, and as such follows the continuity out­
lined by matrilineal inheritance after its short patrifiliative inter­
lude. Besides, the new inheritance rules only function within the nuclear 
family; outside this circle, the matrilineal system is still intact (cf. 
Oki 1977: 138). To speak of a change of the inheritance system, from a 
matrilineal to a bilateral or even patrilineal inheritance eyetem, is 
completely unfounded. Apart from the viricentric bias of such inter­
pretation - pancaharian property held by women was always inherited by 
their children - the changes did not greatly affect the adat as an ideol­
ogical legal system.5Ц 
This conclusion, of course, is not to deny the changes which have occur­
red in the social and economic behaviour of Minangkabau villagers and in 
the social and economic significance of the adat property categories. But 
even these changes should not be dramatized. The residential and socio­
economic arrangements which dominate contemporary village life, on the 
one hand seem to demonstrate the break-up of the matrilineal system, but 
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simultaneously they reinforce the principles upon which it is based. It 
has become very rare for whole sublineage to co-reside in adat long-
houses. Most villagers nowadays live in small house and the conjugal fa-
mily, together perhaps with the wife's mother or aunt, forms the dominant 
residential unit.5b But the houses in which married men live are always 
on their wives' pusako land and money or labour they invest into them 
invariably passes to their wives(' lineage). Since the system of resi-
dence is effectively governed by adat and pusako, men have no chance to 
establish neolocal residence. Men do little work on the pusako lands of 
their lineage, but spend most of their labour on their wives' pusako or 
on land which they have temporarily acquired through pawnings, transfers 
of pawnings, or redemptions. All this comes close to the ideal of a mod-
ern nuclear family with the husband and father being free from the bonds 
of his lineage membership. 
But most pancaharian money is invested for the benefit of their wives 
and daughters and invariably becomes pusako in their (sub-) lineage. Thus 
men contribute to the maintenance of the pusako system through their 
wives and daughters, and the more they do so, the less they are a danger 
to their sisters, through whom the pusako system is maintained (see also 
Tanner 1971: 34, Kato 1977: 265). Pawnings and transfers of pawnings are 
frequent and have gradually created a market for temporary use rights to 
land. But as land mobility increases and land increasingly assumes a 
monetary value, redemptions and redemption-type transfers of pawnings 
also increase, because they are important means of getting access to 
land. And through redemptions and redemption disputes 56 the notion of 
pusako and the rights based upon matrilineal inheritance are constantly 
restated. 
¡feu Transformatione of Property Relationships and Categories 
Independence and the subsequent replacement of Dutch judges and adminis-
trative officials by Indonesians, Minangkabau people for the most part, 
did not immediately bring any significant changes in the interpretations 
of Minangkabau adat in court practice and legal literature (see F. and K. 
von Benda-Beckmann 1981). Most judges were alienated from village life 
and had been socialised in western legal thinking during their pro-
fessional training. The growing Indonesian literature on adat law to a 
large extent simply reproduced the older Dutch classics like Van Vollen-
hoven and Ter Haar, and little research on local adat law or its develop-
ment was carried out. The last decades, however, have seen the emergence 
of new tendencies in the transformation of adat property relations and 
categories. The most important in our view is the redefinition of adat 
property categories in terms of hak milik (ownership, eigendom) and the 
weakening or abolition of the rule that pancaharian property becomes 
pusako property after its holder's death. 
These tendencies are fed by two channels. One is the introduction of the 
Basic Agrarian law of 1960 and its innumerable implementing regulations. 
Although professed to be based upon adat, the property categories and 
relationships defined in it are basically of the Dutch law type.57 Hak 
milik, the most (although by no means completely) absolute right in the 
agrarian law, shows most characteristics of the Dutch eigendom. Although 
detailed knowledge of the law by Minangkabau villagers is extremely rare 
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and the actual implementation of its regulations in Minangkabau, the re-
gistration and conversion of adat rights defined by the code in particu-
lar, is minimal so far (F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 281), the law pro-
vides a new conceptual frame in which to talk and think about property 
relationships. 
Secondly, until the first decades of the 20th century, the transfor-
mation of adat property categories was practically mainly concerned with 
the external aspects of property relationships. Ihe transformation of the 
internal relations to pusako property was basically confined to descrip-
tions and interpretations in the literature. During the last fifty years, 
however, internal group-relationships and adat property categories in 
general have been increasingly transformed, both in economic and legal 
practice. It has already been mentioned that in the beginning of this 
century, disputes about internal group-relationships to pusako were open-
ed up to direct judicial intervention. Beside this, the increase of tem-
porary land transfers based on money investments led to an increase in 
pancaharian rights to exploit pusako land. Land disputes have more and 
more involved both pusako and pancaharian rights. As a result, new inter-
pretations and redefinitions of pancaharian, as a consequence of the new 
rules about disposition and future inheritance, also affected the rights 
of pusako. This effaced the sharp distinction between pancaharian and 
pusako property. 
At the same time there are attempts from several quarters to reduce 
the adat property distinctions to one basic distinction, harato pusako 
and harato pancaharian, and to redefine the legal status of self-acquired 
property. At the conference on Minangkabau adat held in 1969, a Minang-
kabau lawyer proposed that in the future only the concepts of harato 
pusako and harato pancaharian should be recognized; he also proposed 
abolition of the concept pusako rendah. The consequence was stated quite 
explicitly: 
"The harato pusako (which generally have been called harato pusako 
tinggi) which already exist, will be left in peace. There will be 
no further possibility for the existence of pusako rendah, as this 
would lead to an increase in pusako tinggi."58 
Attempts at redefinition were also made during the 1952 conference of the 
Badan Permusyawaratan Alim Ulama, Ninik Mamak dan Cerdik Pandai: Here 
pancaharian property was amongst others defined as the property objects 
which one has received by Islamic testamentary dispositions and by way of 
hibah. 59 
Following the emphasis in Dutch law on the synchronic sphere of prop-
erty law, interpreters are also inclined to focus on the legal status of 
property during the holder's lifetime: the full rights of disposition 
typical for the western notion of individual ownership. Harato pancaha-
rian is therefore sometimes called hak milik (pribadi), the Indonesian 
expression for individual ownership. Hak milik also implies its reified 
character: it does not only define the relationships to property but also 
the legal status of the property object. Once the equation harato panca-
harian = hak milik has been made it is only a small step to invoke the 
hak milik characteristics when an item so characterized is inherited. In 
westernized legal thinking, hak milik keeps its status after inheritance, 
it does not become pusako any more. Thus the adat rule according to which 
self- acquired property becomes pusako is in danger of becoming obsolete. 
As rights to use pusako often have pancaharian character, these transfor-
mations tend to affect and change the rights to pusako themselves and 
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give rise to categories such as 'private pusako property' or 'property 
which originates from harato pancaharian and which has according to its 
development become hak milik' (see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 348 f f ) . 
These notions cannot be accomodated by the internal logic of the adat 
pusako any more. 
It seems premature to speak as yet of developments implying a new system 
of adat law. We rather have to do with a gradually emerging tendency 
which co-exists with and is still dominated by older adat interpretations 
and practices. Sometimes the tendency is articulated in single court 
decisions the fate of which is uncertain (see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 
352 ff). Such court cases involve the status of men's pancaharian objects 
as a critical problem; the status of women's pancaharian after death is 
only very rarely a problem for villagers. So the articulation of the new 
tendency is limited to a non-representative type of cases. Besides, the 
courts and villagers are usually concerned with ad-hoc solutions of prob-
lems and not with the creation of a new conceptual system. 
However, these tendencies must be followed attentively. The pusakoiza-
tion of pancaharian property is of basic importance for the maintenance 
of the pusako system, for it guarantees that, through time and inherit-
ance, all property will be pusako. If pusako is abolished, the basis is 
provided for a real breakdown of both the adat ideological system and the 
behaviour relating to it. 
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Notée 
1. Even though most of the 19th century sources were written in the last third 
of the century, we can assume that a great part of the descriptions reflect 
Minangkabau prior to much influenc by the colonial administration. 
2. Compare Nader 1965, Gluckman 1969, Bohannan 169, Vansina 1965. For the older 
Dutch literature, see Van Vollenhoven 1909. It should be noted, however, 
that the use of western concepts can also contribute to a refinement of the 
analysis of the non-western concepts and institutions. A good example is 
Willinck 1909, who scrupulously compared some Minangkabau notions of harato 
pusako with the Dutch notion of common ownership and hibah with Dutch and 
Roman notions of donations. He was severely criticized for his comparisons. 
However, his critics did not recognize the differentiated descriptions and 
understanding of Minangkabau institutions, wrapped up as they were in long 
exposées on Itoman and German law and in strongly expressed dislike for the 
Minangkabau culture. For similar analyses of Barotse material, see Gluckman 
1972, 1973. 
3. See Dt. Sidi Bandaro 1965, R.M. Dt. Rajo Panghulu 1971: 100 ff, Nasroen 
1957; F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 115 f f. As Kahn has emphasized again 
recently (1980a: 81), this law in adat by no means exhausts the empirical 
and analytically distinguishable referents of the concept adat. One must 
therefore take care to make such distinctions as that between the law-in-
adat and adat in the sense of behaviour patterns. 
4. For example the two cupak, the four kato, the four laws (cupak nan duo, 
kato nan ampek, undang nan ampek), see Dt. Sidi Bandaro 1965. 
5. See Van Vollenhoven 1918: 1 ff and 1928. 
6. See for example Verkerk Pistorius 1871, Stibbe 1869, Résumé 1872. Earlier 
literature does not give very detailed information. 
7. See e.g. Van der Toorn 18В1. For similar reasons Willinck (1909) was mis­
understood. 
8. The emphasis on the legal aspect of adat was also directed against the wide­
ly held opinion that the indigenous law of the Indonesians was, in princi­
ple. Islamic lew. For references to and a critical discussion of this view, 
see Van Vollenhoven 1918: 19 ff, 1928: 110 ff. 
9. Cf. Van Vollenhoven 1919, Logemann and Ter Haar 1927, Korn and Van Dijk 
1946, Nolst Trenité 1920, 's Jacobs 1945, cf. Burns 197В. 
10. For a recent analysis of Ter Haar's influence, see Strijbosch 1980. 
11. This problem is extensively discussed in K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981, 1982. 
See also Woodman 1969: 129 ff, 1981. 
12. For an early analysis see Ter Haar 1929. 
13. Compare Abel's (1973b) discussion of the "gap" problem. 
14. The classic study of the relation between legal and economic change is Ren­
ner' s study of the institutions of private law and their social function 
(1929). In his analysis of the change from petty commodity production to 
capitalism in Western Europe he demonstrated that important socio-economic 
change can occur in a field where conduct is not legally prescribed ('change 
of function' ) without this change being yet reflected in or leading to a 
change of legal rules ('change of norms'). 
15. They have also largely dominated the assumptions of structural functionalism 
and are characteristic for many Marxist interpretations; see Cerroni 1972, 
Poulantzas 1972. 
16. See HAMKA 1968: 33. About later Islamic efforts to replace the adat property 
and inheritance law, see Prins 1953, 1954, HAMKA 1968, Anas 1968, F. von 
Benda-Beckmann 1979: 323 ff. For further material concerning the pre-Padri 
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era, see Kielstra 1887a, Dobbin 1975, 1977. 
17. In Bukit Hijau, a system of territorial divisions linked to the mosques 
(sidang) has survived as a combined form of government with Islamic and adat 
functionaries. Whether it was used as a purely theocratic form of government 
during the period Bukit Hi]au, was occupied by the Padri unfortunately is 
not known, see K. and F. von Benda-Beckmann 1978, F. von Benda-Beckmann 
1979: 80. See for similar survivals AB 39: 212 ff. 
18. This multiple meaning of suku led to controversies among the CXitch scholars 
and administrators of Minangkabau, the parties variously asserting that suku 
were clans or administrative unions of clan segments. For the view that the 
suku were originally clans, see Stibbe and Kroesen in Résumé 1872; for the 
contrary view, that suku were administrative associations of clans at the 
very beginning of Minangkabau nagari organization, see De Rooi] 1890 and 
Leyds 1926. 
In our opinion, both kinds of groups must have existed in the early 
stages of Minangkabau political organization. For the recognition of the two 
different kinds of groups in early Bukit Hijau, see the account of the 
nagari foundation, F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 72 ff. The same distinction 
is reported in the account of the foundation of nagari Tandjung Sungayang, 
which is considered one of the oldest nagari in Minangkabau. Dt. Sanggoeno 
Dirajo describes how the leaders of the genealogical groups 'make' suku adat 
(1920: 82 ff). 
The distinction between suku (pusako) and suku adat/hindu adat apparently 
obtains in all Minangkabau nagari, though the groups are often labelled with 
the same term (suku) or still other terms. For an overview, see Kemal 1964. 
For a more systematic description of the political organization of nagari 
Bukit Hij au see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 61 ff and К. and F. von Benda-
Beckmann 1978. 
19. Cf. Westenenk 1918a, De Waal 1889, Kemal 1964. 
20. For accounts of ulayat land and the relationships to it in Minangkabau see 
Résumé 1872: 11 ff, Kroesen 1874: 15, Willinck 1909: 637 ff. Westenenk 
1918a: 15. The community's right over ulayat was termed beschikkingsrecht 
('communal right of avail') by the Dutch adat law scholars; see Van Vollen-
hoven 1918: 263, 1919; Logemann and Ter Haar 1927. 
21. For a more comprehensive description of the adat system of property and in-
heritance, see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979. 
22. Cf. Résumé 1872: 19; F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 170; see also Joustra 1923: 
118, Guyt 1936: 59. 
23. See logemann 1924, Holleman 1920, Van Vollenhoven 1931, Ter Haar 1934, 
1937. 
24. See Wilken 1926: 417, F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 172 ff. 
25. For more detailed descriptions see Willinck 1909: 776 ff. Sarolea 1920, F. 
von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 151, 155 f. 
26. See logemann 1924: 123, F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 193, К. von Benda-Beck­
mann 1982. 
27. See also K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981, 1982. 
28. See also Verkerk Pistorius 1868: 353 ff. In his lament over the adat suku 
government, the adat pusako system and the disappointing functioning of the 
Dutch created functionaries, Verkerk Pistorius even doubted that the Dutch 
had made the right choice when siding with the adat party against the 
Padri : 
"But also the Padri did not have sufficient time to take far-reaching and 
persisting measures. If we had cooperated with them, if we had used their 
influence in place of protecting the insignificant influence of the op-
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ponents and thereby these old and obsolete institutions [i.e. of the adat 
pusako] - how much better would the prospects now be for the wellbeing and 
the future of the native. We had no reason to be afraid of the Islamic 
functionaries' power; we could have subjected it to our ideas and later, 
if necessary, could have subjugated it completely" (1868: 345). 
It should be noted though that Verkerk Pistorius, like other Dutch officials 
who thought the adat pusako system as an obstacle to good government and de-
velopment, pleaded for bringing the present governmental system more into 
line with adat principles. Cf. Graves 1981: 29 ff. For more material about 
the Dutch policy in the first half of the 19th century see Kielstra 1887b, 
1888, 1889. 
29. Kahn does not share the assumption that the imposed system of government had 
a deleterious effect upon the position of the panghulu (1976: 85). The facts 
and reasons given by him, however, do not demonstrate anything to the con-
trary. If pre-colonial forms of village organization, much of Minangkabau 
property and inheritance law, among them the panghulu's function in land 
distribution, were retained (1976: 86), if the panghulu could retain a 
degree of judicial power, and if they were not made entirely powerless by 
the new system of administration (1976: 87) - all this does certainly not 
suggest that the panghulu were as powerful as in pre-colonial times or even 
more powerful. 
30. See Francis 1839: 128; Verkerk Pistorius 1868. Alone during the years 
1870-1874, for example, 17 Tuangku Laras and 54 panghulu kepala were deposed 
by the Dutch (Mailrapport no. 575, 22.6.1875). 
31. Regeling der wijze van uitgifte van onbebouwde gronden in de gouvernements-
landen van Sumatra, Staatsblad 1874: 94 f. On the different legal interpre-
tations of these provisions, see Van Vollenhoven 1919: 53 ff. See also 
Logemann en Ter Haar 1927: 106. 
32. AB 11: 80. For a good illustration of the practice see the case history de-
scribed in AB 11: 74 ff., partly reproduced in F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 
259 ff. See also Oki 1977: 109 ff. 
33. "Panjang dikarek-buntak dikapiang". For a discussion of the mechanisms of 
group splitting see Kooreman 1902: 917; Willinck 1909: 353; F. von Benda-
Beckmann 1979: 66 ff. 
34. See F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 328 with case references; in particular see 
the decisions in the case of the inheritance of dr. Muchtar, Indisch Tijd-
Bchrift voor het Recht 131: 82 ff. 
35. In + 50% of all civil disputes at least one party acted as mamak kepala 
wans. See K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981: 125. In pusako disputes this per-
centage was much higher. 
36. See K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981: 143, 144. 
37. See Guyt 1936: 72; Indisch Tijdschrift voor het Recht 126: 75, 140: 218; 
140: 226; compare also Ter Haar's postcript in 140: 225. 
38. Vol.1 (1914) on the beschikkingsrecht ('communal right of avail' and Vol.Ill 
(1916) on the inlandsen bezitsrecht ('native right of ownership (possession) 
of land'), in which excerpts from the writings of 20 and 23 authors have 
been collected. 
39. See for instance Verkerk Pistorius 1871, Résumé 1872, Kroesen 1874, Wilken 
1883. 
40. For different interpretations by officials in Minangkabau see Verkerk 
Pistorius 1871 and Willinck 1909; see also Oki 1977: 109 f. For the 
discussion on the national colonial level, often with reference to the 
Minangkabau case, see Van Vollenhoven 1919, Logemann en Ter Haar 1927, Korn 
and Van Dijk 1946, 's Jacob 1945, Nolst Trénité 1912, 1920. Cf. Burns 1978. 
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41. Different, and much more differentiated, was the description and interpre-
tation given by Willinck (1909), who very systematically related the adat 
notions to the Dutch eigendom notions and who particularly also analysed the 
differences in the internal rights and mechanisms of distribution. 
42. This view was basically shared by Van Vollenhoven who recognized inheritance 
only between families (lineages), suku and nagari, i.e. between rechtsge-
meenschappen (1918: 250, 261). He also held that pancaharian fell to the 
familie as a whole; only in the first generation was there a 'precedence-
in-use' (onderhoudsvoorrang) for the closest matnlineal relatives. In the 
notes added to the second volume of his Adatveaht Van Nederlandech-Indie 
(1931: 883 f ), however, he freely admitted his incorrect interpretation 
after reading the account of Sarolea (1920) which confirmed Willinck's des-
cription. This seems to have gone unnoticed, however, and his influential 
statement was forthwith reproduced in the literature. Cf. F. von Benda-
Beckmann 1979: 190. 
43. AB 6: 179, see also Smits and Bosse as quoted in Willinck 1909: 769 ff. 
44. Willinck's writing was heavily biased against Islam, matriliny and 'the 
Minangkabau'. Besides, he had severely critizised Wilken who was regarded as 
one of the founding fathers of the Leiden adat law school. See the polemics 
between Willinck (1911) and Van Ossenbruggen (1911). 
45. Vol. Ill, 1916: 365. For more examples see the annotations on pp. 224, 
362-368. 
46. See e.g. Ter Haar 1929; Guyt 1934, 1936; Korn 1941; the case law published 
in Indisch Tijdschrift van het Hecht no. 140. 
47. During 1968-1974, only 11% of all pusako disputes in the courts of Bukit-
tinggi, Batusangkar and Payakumbuh concerned lineage internal disputes, F. 
von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 307, K. von Benda-Beckmann 1982. For similar stat-
istical information from the 1960's, see Tanner 1969, 1971. 
48. Mainly Schrieke 1928/1955, Maretin 1961, Kahn 1975, 1976, 1980b; cf. Scholz 
1977. 
49. Tanner 1971, Thomas 1977, Kato 1977, Oki 1977, F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979, 
K. von Benda-Beckmann 1981, Prindiville 1980. 
50. For a similar interpretation, see Scholz 1977: 136 f. 
51. Korn (1941) and Fischer (1964) in particular have stressed the importance of 
the father-children/bako-anak pisang relationship as part of the social or-
ganization and cautioned against the superficial interpretation in terms of 
pure matriliny. De Josselin de Jong's interpretation (1951) of the Minang-
kabau social system as being based upon a system of double unilineal descent 
is exceptional insofar as it does not subscribe to the naive notion of a 
formerly exclusively matrilineal Manangkabau and in that it does not treat 
the 'deviations' from matriliny as 'changes'. But instead of concentrating 
upon the bilateral kinship elements and the patrifillative link, it postu-
lates the existence of a patriline for which the evidence adduced remain 
unconvincing; cf. Thomas 1977. 
52. On the development see F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 335 ff. 
53. F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 343. See for Padang Evers 1975. 
54. See also Tanner 1971: 34, Kato 1977: 267 ff, F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 373 
ff., 1980. 
55. Cf. Thomas 1977: 59 f f ; Scholz 1977: 145; Kato 1977: 201. 
56. Many land-disputes brought to court concern the question of which party is 
entitled to redeem the property in dispute. 
57. See Gautama and Har sono 1972: 39 ff., Gautama and Hornick 1972: 97 f., Tan 
1977. 
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58. See F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 358. See also the judgement of the Indone-
sian Supreme Court in which the new inheritance rule for pancaharian was 
stated, Yurisprudensi Indonesia 1969 III: 17-33. 
59. Cf. Prins 1953; Tanner 1969; F. von Benda-Beckmann 1979: 324 f. 
A view in Bukit Hijau. 
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Samenvatting 
De vijf artikelen, die in deze bundel bijeen zijn gebracht behandelen 
enige kernpunten van de processen van konfliktbehandeling in de hooglan-
den van West Sumatra, Indonesië, het centrale gebied van de Minangka-
bauers. Het daar geldende recht is een buitengewoon komplex rechtsplura-
lisme en bestaat uit elementen van drie verschillende rechtsstelsels: de 
Minangkabause adat, een verzamelterm die in de ruimste betekenis de ma-
nier waarop men behoort te leven inhoudt; voorts Islamitisch recht en 
tenslotte overheidsrecht, bestaande uit voormalig koloniaal recht en uit 
wetgeving afkomstig van de centrale, de provinciale en distrikts over-
heid, in de vorm van wetten, algemene maatregelen van bestuur, verorde-
ningen, beschikkingen, richtlijnen etc. Ook institutioneel is de rechts-
pleging ingewikkeld. Hij bestaat uit gewone overheidsrechtbanken, die 
adat recht en overheidsrecht toepassen, religieuze rechtsbanken, waar 
voornamelijk Islamitisch recht wordt toegepast, en een komplex van dorps-
instanties die gezamenlijk worden aangeduid met het begrip dorpsjustitie 
en die volgens adat of adatrecht beslissen. Verder vervullen de politie, 
de militaire commandant, het openbaar ministerie en het onderdistrikts-
en distriktshoofd, inofficieel of officieel ook taken op het gebied van 
de rechtspleging. 
De organisatie en de procedures van de gewone overheidsrechter zijn 
nog voor het grootste deel dezelfde als in de koloniale tijd en vertonen 
sterke gelijkenis met de Nederlandse civiele rechtspraak. Het belangrijk-
ste verschil met de koloniale tijd is dat er nu een uniform stelsel is 
voor de gehele bevolking van Indonesië, terwijl er vroeger verscheidene 
rechtsgangen bestonden. Voor de religieuze rechtbanken, die onder het Mi-
nisterie van Religieuze Zaken vallen, heeft dat Ministerie eigen procedu-
res opgesteld. De dorpsinstanties, gedeeltelijk georganiseerd o.g.v. een 
provinciale verordening, gedeeltelijk volgens de adat, werken allemaal in 
grote lijnen volgens adat procedures. 
Deze studie behandelt verschillende aspekten van rechtspluralisme, in 
een situatie die over het algemeen weinig aandacht heeft gekregen. Hij 
geeft een beschrijving van een aantal instellingen die konflikten behan-
delen, te weten de dorpsjustitie en de gewone rechter (pangadilan negeri) 
in civiele zaken in eerste aanleg. Deze instellingen passen allemaal adat 
recht toe, maar gaan daarbij op geheel verschillende wijze te werk. Een 
vergelijking van deze verschillende soorten rechtspleging verschaft een 
inzicht in de betekenis van de procedures, - d.w.z. de manier waarop in 
besluitvormingsprocessen normen worden geïnterpreteerd, feiten worden 
gekonstrueerd en geëvalueerd en waarop hieraan konsekwenties worden ver-
bonden - voor de uitkomst van de processen van konfliktbehandeling. Daar-
naast verschaft een dergelijke vergelijking inzicht in de relatie tussen 
procedures in de ruime betekenis als hierboven gegeven enerzijds en mate-
rieel recht anderzijds. Daarbij blijkt dat het adatrecht zoals het op 
dorpsniveau wordt toegepast nauwelijks een onderscheid maakt tussen in-
houielijke en procedurele regels. Veel regels bestaan zowel uit inhoude-
lijke als procedurele elanenten, die volgens de adat onlosmakelijk met 
elkaar zijn verbonden, maar door de overheidsrechtbanken wel van elkaar 
worden gescheiden. Hst overheidsadatrecht blijkt dan ook iets anders te 
zijn dan het dorpsadatrecht. 
Het materiaal waarop de analyse is gebaseerd is deels afkomstig van 
een dorpsstudie van de nagari Bukit Hijau (pseudoniem), gemeente en tege-
lijkertijd traditionele dorpsstaat, in het distrikt Agam, aan de voet van 
de vulkaan de Merapi. Ce overheidsrechtspraak is voornamelijk bestudeerd 
aan de rechtbank van Bukittinggi en in mindere mate in Batusangkar en 
föyakunbuh, alle drie gelegen in centraal West Sinatra. Ce Inleiding be-
vat een korte uiteenzetting van de vragen waarmee het onderzoek is begon-
nen en hoe het onderzoek is uitgevoerd. In dit hoofdstuk is eveneens een 
sunmiere historische ontwikkeling van de overheidsrechtspraak en de 
dorpsjustitie opgenomen sinds het koloniale bewind zich in het begin van 
de 19e eeuw in het binnenland van West Sumatra vestigde. Eten beschrijving 
van de dorpsjustitie in Bukit Hijau staat in hoofdstuk III, maar in de 
Inleiding worden wel de belangrijkste principes van de dorpsjustitie be-
sproken: Het gezag van de maniak, de panghulu, het vereiste een konflikt 
op zo laag mogelijk niveau te behandelen en het principe van consensuele 
beslissingen. 
Hoofdstuk II, 'The Uee of Folk Law in Weet Sumatra State Courte'ι laat 
zien dat regels, principes en rechtsbegrippen in verschillende stadia van 
een proces een verschillende rol spelen. Ik heb vier stadia onderschei­
den, beginnend met het ogenblik waarop een instelling ingeschakeld wordt. 
In het eerste stadiun wordt de eis ingediend en worden de konfliktpunten 
gedefinieerd en nader gespecificeerd. In het tweede stadiun wordt bewijs 
geleverd en gewaardeerd, zowel in termen van geloofwaardigheid als van 
relevantie. Stadium drie omvat de eindbeslissing die een eindversie van 
het konflikt geeft, de rechten, positie en relaties van partijen, alsmede 
de konsékwenties die dat heeft voor de partijen. De rechter moet boven-
dien een rationalisatie van zijn beslissing geven. Stadiun vier valt niet 
meer binnen de institutionele kontekst van de instelling die de zaak be-
handelt, maar gaat over de tenuitvoerlegging van de beslissing. 
Hoofdstuk III, 'Forum Shopping and Shopping Forums, Dispute Ргоаеввіпд 
in a Minangkabau Village in Weet Sumatra', gaat voornamelijk over het 
eerste stadiun, over de definitie van het konflikt bij het zoeken naar 
een instelling die het konflikt wil behandelen. Afhankelijk van het forun 
waaraan een konflikt wordt aangeboden verschuift het zwaartepunt van het 
geschil. Konflikt behandeling is een belangrijke, politieke aktiviteit en 
speelt een grote rol in politieke manipulaties. On zo lang mogelijk een 
slag om de arm te hou3en m.b.t. de inhoudelijke beslissing wordt in de 
openbare zittingen door alle deelnemers voornamelijk in procedurele ter­
men geargumenteerd. Inhoudelijke argunenten worden aanvankelijk alleen in 
kleine, besloten voorbesprekingen geventileerd. ïas als overeenstenming 
binnen bereik lijkt te liggen wordt er ook openlijk over inhoudelijke ar-
gunenten gesproken. Aan het slot van hoofdstuk III wordt in het kort in-
gegaan op de beperkende en versterkende invloed van de overheidsrechtbank 
op de politieke manipulaties van dorpsinstellingen. 
Hoofdstuk IV, 'Evidence and Legal Reasoning in Minangkabau', gaat over 
bewijsvoering en bewijswaardering en behandelt dus het tweede stadiun. 
Adat opvattingen en de opvattingen van de rechtbanken dienaangaande wor-
den tegenover elkaar gezet. Daarbij blijkt dat de grootste verschillen 
niet voortkomen uit voorschriften waaraan de rechter gebonden is, maar 
dat zij liggen op gebieden waarin de rechter relatief vrij is: bij de be-
handeling van getuigen, de waardering van getuigenverklaringen en bij de 
waardering van de relevantie van het bewijs. Rechters interpreteren adat 
regels, die de basis voor de relevantie waardering vormen, heel anders 
dan dorpsinstanties. Ik heb de rechtbank benadering gekarakteriseerd als 
analytisch en het gebruik van normen en begrippen als centrifugaal, van-
wege de grote nadruk op het bepalen van de grenzen van het toepassingsbe-
reik van een norm of begrip. De benadering van dorpsbewoners is integre-
rend en centripetaal, aangezien zij voortdurend terugkoppelen naar de 
kern betekenis van normen en begrippen en de verschillende elementen van 
de zaak voortdurend met elkaar in verband brengen. In dit hoofdstuk wor-
den ook enige praktische gevolgen van deze verschillen in interpretatie 
behandeld. 
Hoofdstuk V, 'The Social Significance of Minangkabau State Court Deci-
sione', handelt over het vierde stadium en geeft een analyse van de bete-
kenis van beslissingen in de periode nadat het konflikt de institutionele 
kontekst heeft verlaten en weer terugkeert naar het semi-autonome sociale 
veld waar het is ontstaan. Mijn analyse omvat meer dan wat gewoonlijk in 
effektiviteitsstudies wordt gedaan. Elke beslissing bestaat uit verschil-
lende elementen: vaststelling van verhoudingen tussen personen en zaken, 
de status van personen en van goederen, rechten, verplichtingen en van 
konsekwenties die daaraan worden verbonden. Effektiviteitsstudies konsen-
treren zich vrijwel uitsluitend op de konsekwenties en zijn daardoor veel 
te beperkt. Elk afzonderlijk element van de beslissing kan een eigen rol 
gaan spelen in het verdere verloop van het konflikt en kan op een ver-
schillend ogenblik meer of minder belangrijk worden. Zij moeten daarom 
allemaal over kortere of langere periode worden bestudeerd. 
Het ethnografisch materiaal uit Minangkabau laat zien dat het post-be-
slissingsstadium heel lang kan duren en dat de beslissing een telkens 
wisselende rol kan spelen bij de telkens terugkerende onderhandelingen 
over verwantschapsrelaties. De invloed van de verschillende elementen van 
de beslissing is afhankelijk van de veranderingen in de politieke kon-
stellatie binnen het dorp en binnen de afstammingsgroepen die bij het 
konflikt betrokken zijn. De analyse van het post-beslissingsstadium heeft 
twee implicaties. De eerste is dat een geval '(case)', dat een centrale 
rol speelt in de rechtsantropologie, niet langer als een vast afgebakende 
eenheid kan worden gehanteerd. Het heeft niet allen een open begin maar 
ook een open eind. Dat betekent dat de periode tussen twee beslissingen 
van instellingen die zich met een konflikt bezighouden niet alleen als de 
voorfase voor de laatste instellingsbehandeling maar ook als post-beslis-
sings fase voor de voorlaatste behandeling geanalyseerd moet worden. 
De tweede implicatie is dat het begrip sanktie, nog steeds bij uitstek 
het onderscheidend kenmerk voor een geldige dan wel effektieve rechtsre-
gel in de opvatting van de meeste rechtsfilosofen, -theoretici en -socio-
logen/antropologen, een wel zeer beperkte visie op het recht met zich 
meebrengt. Heel in het algemeen leidt de fixatie op sankties de aandacht 
te sterk af van de rol die het recht kan spelen buiten geschillen, name-
lijk in norm-konform gedrag en in de z.g. preventieve rechtszorg. In mijn 
artikelen heb ik zelf de relatie tot de preventieve rechtszorg telkens 
gelegd. Ik laat bovendien zien dat de heersende rechtsopvatting zelfs 
voor de behandeling van geschillen leidt tot verwaarlozing van belangrij-
ke delen van deze processen, n.l. het post-beslissings stadium. 
Het laatste hoofdstuk, 'Transformation and Change in Minangkabau 
Adat', is mede door F.von Benda-Beckmann geschreven. Daarin worden in-
zichten gewonnen uit een analyse van de relatie tussen procedures en ma-
terieel recht toegepast op een diskussie over de sociaalekonomische ver-
anderingen die Minangkabau in de afgelopen 150 jaar heeft ondergaan. In 
dergelijke diskussies wordt uitvoerig gebruik gemaakt van juridische 
bronnen. Daarbij wordt echter voorbij gegaan aan het gekonstateerde ver-
schil tussen het rechtbanken adat recht en het dorps adat recht. Verder 
houden weinig historische beschouwingen voldoende rekening met de moge-
lijkheid dat de normatieve beschrijving van adat niet geheel of zelfs 
helemaal niet overeenkomt met het gedrag en dat er sterke soci-
aal-ekonomische verschuivingen kunnen optreden zonder dat het normatieve 
systeem verandert. Tenslotte wordt de vertaal-problematiek van Minangka-
bause termen in westers-juridische begrippen te vaak over het hoofd ge-
zien. De westerse betekenis wordt te gemakkelijk overgenomen terwijl uit 
de beschrijvingen zelf al vaak blijkt dat er iets heel anders mee bedoeld 
is en dat de begrippen alleen bij benadering de Minangkabause inhoud 
weergeven. Met dit laatste hoofdstuk heb ik, naar ik hoop, duidelijk ge-
maakt dat mijn analyse van de processen waarin konflikten behandeld wor-
den niet alleen van fundamenteel belang is voor een begrip van de rol van 
het recht in konflikten en in norm konform gedrag. De betekenis daarvan 
gaat veel verder en kan zich uitstrekken tot analyses van sociaal-ekono-
mische veranderingen. 
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Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift van CE. von Benda-Beckmann-
Droogleever Fortuijn: The Broken Stairways to Consensus; Village Justice 
and State Courts in Minangkabau. 
1. De indeling van het Indonesische recht bij de "Islamitische rechtsfa-
milie" in de rechtvergelijkende literatuur is noch uit didactisch noch 
uit wetenschappelijk oogpunt te verdedigen, zelfs al wordt daaraan 
toegevoegd dat het Indonesische recht een mengvorm is. 
2. De procedure van de rechtbanken in civiele zaken in West Sumatra ver­
toont meer overeenkomsten met de Nederlandse administratieve recht­
spraak dan met de Nederlandse civiele rechtspraak. 
3. Het is onjuist te beweren dat de westerse rechtspraak gekenmerkt wordt 
door een grotere mate aan rechtszekerheid dan niet westerse, zgn. 
"traditionele" rechtspraak. Het verschil zit in de wijze waarop dit 
principe is uitgewerkt. 
4. Het zal de politieke duidelijkheid in Nederland ten goede komen als 
degene die niet (meer) betaalde arbeid verrichten een eigen belangen­
organisatie zouden opzetten en zich niet door de vakbonden zouden la­
ten vertegenwoordigen. 
5. De toenemende mate waarin de rechter wordt opgedragen recht te spreken 
"naar redelijkheid en billijkheid" impliceert op zichzelf een ondemo-
kratische tendens. Het is uit het oogpunt van de "balance of powers" 
de vraag of dit ongewenst is. 
6. Het bestaan van het zwarte en grijze arbeidscircuit is een argument 
tegen de stelling dat het huidige stelsel van sociale zekerheid de 
mensen hun verantwoordelijkheid voor hun eigen welzijn doet afschuiven 
op de overheid. 
7. De informele circuits van onderlinge hulpverlening tussen moeders vor­
men een ondergewaardeerd element van sociale zekerheid. 
Θ. Het sociaal ekonomisch belang van wet(jes)geving schijnt omgekeerd 
evenredig te zijn met de omvang en status van de wetgeving. 
9. Het getuigt van gebrek aan fantasie van de rijksoverheid dat invoering 
van shirt- resp. togareklame niet wordt overwogen ter verbetering van 
de financiële positie van de universiteiten. 



